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Summary 
Egypt experienced considerable economic growth during President Mubarak’s last term, 
with annual per-capita growth averaging 6 per cent from 2004 to 2008 and only dropping 
below 2 per cent after the January 25th revolution of 2011. However, this growth was nei-
ther pro-poor nor sustainable. Because it was not labour-intensive, it did not reduce either 
poverty or unemployment. It was based on windfall profits (high oil prices and high receipts 
from tourism and the Suez Canal) rather than improvements in international competitive-
ness. Although foreign direct investments (FDIs) and exports rose, almost all FDIs were in 
the extractive industries or service sectors rather than manufacturing or agriculture. Imports 
increased even faster than exports, creating a negative balance of trade – dropping from a 
surplus of United States Dollar (USD) 3 billion in 2004 to a deficit of USD 5 billion in 2008 
that worsened in 2011 and 2012. Since Egypt has to import crude oil and its natural gas 
reserves are shrinking, it is unlikely that the country’s external position will improve. 
Moreover, current exports are undiversified and have low technological content, and only 
one-third of all exports are finished goods. 
The challenge for the Egyptian economy is to become more productive and diversified 
through the development of more knowledge-intensive industries and exploitation of inter-
firm specialisation. But the question for Egypt and for other low- and middle-income coun-
tries is how structural change can be achieved and what the state can do to facilitate it. In-
creasingly there is a consensus that industrial policies can be decisive in solving market 
failures – especially regarding the provision of public goods (research and development, 
(R&D), workers’ training, market information, etc.) and the coordination of complementary 
investments. But uncertainty persists about how and how much a government should inter-
vene, given the risk of government failure (misallocation of funds, political capture and the 
creation of perverse incentives for investors and bureaucrats). This is especially true for 
countries with weak political checks and balances – like the Egypt of Mubarak. 
Egypt has a long history of strong interventionist, top-down industrial policies. After the 
‘Free Officers’ staged a coup d’état in 1952, the new regime embarked on a statist path of 
development to promote structural change and growth. It attempted to channel labour and 
capital into sectors that would help develop the country. But industrial policies were also 
used to channel privileges and resources to the regime’s clientele. 
A substantial reorientation took place in 2004 when President Mubarak appointed a new 
government, which included several former businessmen. It endorsed a new strategy for 
industrial policy that was considerably more market- and demand-oriented and less inter-
ventionist. It was intended to address the market failures that were preventing structural 
change in Egypt and avoid vertical discrimination as much as possible.  
The question is whether the businessmen in Egypt’s government were more successful at 
facilitating structural change without political capture: How did they diversify the econo-
my? What instruments did they use? Were they more effective and efficient than their statist 
predecessors? Were their policies fair and transparent – or did they serve their own busi-
nessmen-minister interests and those of their clientele? What can Egypt’s new government, 
which came to power after the revolution and parliamentary and presidential elections, learn 
from the industrial policies of the businessmen-ministers?  
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This study demonstrates that Egypt’s post-2004 industrial policies have been comparatively 
effective in promoting investment and exports but much less so in facilitating structural 
change. While they have improved entrepreneurs’ access to finance, simplified tax rates and 
procedures and cut away red tape, they have not substantially improved the technology con-
tent of exports, firms’ business sophistication and technology absorption, or raised the level 
of applied research and innovation in Egypt. These partial failures can be explained by defi-
cits in the effectiveness, efficiency, fairness and relevance of the instruments of the indus-
trial policy strategy applied between 2004 and 2011: 
Effectiveness. The instruments created public goods (R&D, workers’ training) and encour-
aged risk-averse entrepreneurs to modernise. But they did not help overcome the coordination 
failures that typically prevent structural change. Some instruments even adversely affected 
structural change. Their generous transfers made it possible for Egyptian exporters to compete 
on world markets, but also reduced firms’ incentive to innovate and become more competitive. 
Efficiency. Egypt’s industrial policies between 2004 and 2011 consisted of three isolated 
strategies, each implemented by a different ministry. This led to a duplication of administra-
tive structures, lack of coordination and gaps in responsibility. In addition, there was no 
independent mechanisms to evaluate the impact of any given instrument. 
Fairness. The main instruments focused on medium-size to large, rather than micro- or 
small, enterprises. Although the latter firms were eligible for support, most funds went to 
companies that were already exporting or didn’t need any government assistance to start 
exporting. Beyond this, different agencies were individually tasked to promote small, medi-
um-size and large companies so that when a company graduated from one size class to the 
next it had to work with a new agency.  
Relevance. Most instruments did not benefit Egyptian enterprises because they did not tack-
le the main constraints for business – especially (i) deficits in entrepreneurs’ and workers’ 
education and training, (ii) the rule of law, (iii) transparency and competitive fairness, 
(iv) private sector representation and (v) the availability of affordable land. 
Therefore, Egypt’s new government should implement reforms in the following five areas: 
(i) raise the quality and relevance of education and training in the public school system, 
(ii) establish the rule of law, (iii) make political, administrative and judicial procedures and 
decisions more transparent, (iv) promote competition on markets, and (v) help small and 
medium-size enterprises access land. 
But the government should also adopt a more coherent approach to private sector develop-
ment, avoiding duplication of structures and make sure that all enterprises have the same 
opportunity of support. It should establish a public–private dialogue with private enterprise 
representatives from all segments to begin a real multi-stakeholder process of drafting, im-
plementing and monitoring a new industrial policy strategy for Egypt. 
Although the new government could continue some older programmes, it should also con-
sider becoming more interventionist – at least in promising sectors where investments are 
not being made because of coordination failure. Since most Egyptian entrepreneurs are re-
luctant to cooperate because they mistrust each other, the state could help by facilitating – 
and when necessary, arbitrating – cooperation agreements. 
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1 Introduction1 
Productivity growth is necessary to raise living standards and maintain competitiveness in 
the globalised economy. In developing countries low total-factor productivity is one of the 
root causes of persistent poverty. The productivity gap separating poor and rich countries 
has never been as wide as it is today. Low- and middle-income countries must boost their 
productivity. They are challenged not to only develop more productive ways of doing 
business in established industries but also to develop new, more knowledge-intensive in-
dustries and exploit the advantages of inter-firm specialisation. 
While the private sector is clearly the main driver of structural change, it is up to govern-
ments to create frameworks that allow for competition, encourage innovation and techno-
logical change – and correct market failures. They may have to encourage new activities 
that do not emerge spontaneously, for example, because several interrelated investments 
need to be made simultaneously, which exceeds the possibilities of individual entrepre-
neurs. In addition, governments may also have to support activities that are unlikely to pay 
off right away for an individual investor but that will probably produce manifold linkages 
and spillovers in the future and long-term gains for the whole economy. This is what in-
dustrial policy is all about.  
While the theoretical case for industrial policy is not in doubt, no consensus exists about 
the right degree of intervention. The controversy is mostly about selective interventions 
that favour some sectors over others and thus interfere with the price mechanism, which is 
the main signalling device of market economies. Critics argue that governments are usual-
ly not very good at identifying coordination failures or anticipating the future potential of 
different industries, and their decisions may well end up reducing allocative efficiency and 
creating perverse incentives for investors and bureaucrats alike. 
It is now widely accepted that industrial policy can work well in countries with strong, 
merit-based public services and political checks and balances. But opinions clash over the 
role of industrial policies in low- and lower-middle-income countries where financial re-
sources are often limited and core institutions still need to develop administrative capaci-
ties and better incentive systems. According to available governance indicators, most low- 
and lower-middle-income countries lack effective governments that are transparent and 
accountable and can be counted on. Hence, even if it is clear that they face particularly 
severe market failures, there is a big question mark as to the ability of governments to in-
tervene in markets to increase public welfare. 
In any case, it is unlikely that the appropriate policy mix for low- and lower-middle-
income countries would be the same as for rich countries, where the requirements and 
capacities for public intervention are substantially different. Most empirical case studies of 
industrial policy focus on the early industrialised countries or the famous success stories 
of technological catching up (such as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Brazil and 
                                                 
1  I am very grateful for my interview partners for the time they took for talking with me and for the in-
formation they shared with me. In particular, I thank, the following persons for their comments and in-
valuable support: Natalija El-Hage (then at GTZ Cairo); Nihal El-Megharbel (then with the Ministry for 
Local Development in Cairo); Amirah El-Haddad (Cairo University); Mona El-Tobgui (Fraunhofer So-
ciety, Cairo); Diane Zovighian (then at the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 
Beirut); and the teams of the GTZ and the German–Arab Chamber of Commerce in Cairo. 
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Chile). Much less is known about the quality and outcomes of industrial policies in low- 
and lower-middle-income countries. 
This report on Egypt aims to help fill the knowledge gap regarding industrial policy. It is 
part of a comparative research project run from 2008 to 2012 by the German Development 
Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) on ‘Industrial Policy in Low- 
and Lower-Middle-Income Countries’. The project was funded by the German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development / Bundesministerium für wirtschaft-
liche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) and supported by the Deutsche Gesell-
schaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), now known as the ‘Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)’. In addition to Egypt, the research project stud-
ied Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, Syria, Tunisia and Vietnam. A synthesis report2 was 
recently published. 
Egypt is a particularly interesting country for studying industrial policy. It has a long his-
tory of intense government intervention that started in 1952 with the so-called revolution. 
Manufacturing and service industries were nationalised and the state invested heavily in 
infrastructure and production in order to create new activities. Later, incentives to invest in 
Egypt were offered – first to foreign, and then also to domestic, private entrepreneurs. But 
until the 1990s, central planning, trade protection and administered prices prevailed. The 
private sector was not very involved in industry – although a relatively small group of 
entrepreneurs with good connections to the regime benefited handsomely from a combina-
tion of tax holidays, subsidised utilities, domestic market protection and privy access to 
information from political decision-makers. 
2004 saw the formation of a new cabinet, one-third of whose members were businesspeo-
ple, under a prime minister who was also a businessman. It embarked on a more market-
friendly course and intensified efforts to attract foreign investors while also supporting 
domestic entrepreneurs. An ambitious new industrial policy strategy was designed that 
relied entirely on market forces and avoided vertical discrimination between sectors.  
The January 25th revolution flushed away that cabinet together with President Mubarak. A 
new parliament and a new president have since been elected, and the new government has 
the opportunity to redesign Egypt’s economic and social policy. 
This discussion paper investigates the Egyptian government’s industrial policy strategy 
from 2004 to 2011. It aims to contribute to the debate within Egypt about the country’s 
future industrial policies: what can be learnt from the old policies, what elements should 
be kept in place and what must be done differently. Certainly, not everything that  
Mubarak’s government did was bad. But much can be improved. 
At the same time, this discussion paper addresses a political economy question of more 
general interest: How do businesspeople act when they control virtually all the ministries 
responsible for economic policies? How do they facilitate structural change and diversify 
the economy? What instruments do they use? Are their strategies more effective and effi-
                                                 
2  Altenburg (2011). In addition, the following country case reports have also been published: Altenburg 
(2010) on Ethiopia; Chahoud (2011) on Syria; Erdle (2011) on Tunisia; Krause / Kaufmann (2011) on 
Mozambique; and Rosendahl (2010) on Namibia. 
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cient than those of their bureaucratic, statist predecessors? Are their policies fair and 
transparent – or do they promote their own interests and those of their friends and business 
partners at the expense of less influential entrepreneurs? Would it thus be possible, as Ab-
del-Latif and Schmitz (2009) argue, to create trustful “growth coalitions” between the 
state and individual (as opposed to all) entrepreneurs – thereby serving not just the inter-
ests of a few Egyptians but society as a whole? Or does such collusion ultimately disad-
vantage everyone who is not at the table? 
Chapter 2 of this paper summarises the most important arguments raised in the conceptual 
literature on industrial policies in developing countries. Chapter 3 examines the frame-
work and historical background of industrial policy-making in Egypt between 2004 and 
2011. Chapter 4 describes the elements of recent industrial policies and Chapter 5 analyses 
their strengths and weaknesses in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, fairness 
and significance. Chapter 6 concludes with policy recommendations. Hurried readers can 
easily jump to the chapters they find of greatest interest. 
It should be noted that, as in other developing countries, reliable data is hard to come by in 
Egypt and policies are rarely monitored or evaluated. The present analysis and assessment 
of policy processes and impacts is therefore largely based on qualitative information pro-
vided by descriptive literature and interviews conducted with experts on Egyptian eco-
nomic policies during four research trips to Cairo in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
2 Industrial policies in developing countries – a conceptual framework 
Globalisation forces nation states to become more competitive by improving the efficiency 
of their production processes or reconfiguring their product portfolios. Since there are lim-
its to how much production processes can be improved, the main task of economic poli-
cies is to facilitate structural change – shifting capital and labour to different economic 
sectors (or to different processes within economic sectors) that allow for greater gains. 
Today there is broad consensus that the process of structural change mainly depends on 
private entrepreneurs identifying new business opportunities and embarking on new eco-
nomic activities, as well as on incentives set by government industrial policies and the 
complementary activities of non-state public actors, such as business associations (Alten-
burg 2011, 7). 
Debate about state involvement in industrial policy goes back at least to the days of Alex-
ander Hamilton and Friedrich List who both made a case for active government policies to 
protect domestic infant producers in their emerging economies (the United States and 
Germany, respectively) from their more advanced British competitors. 
Curzon Price defined industrial policies as “any government measure, or set of measures, 
to promote or prevent structural change” (Curzon Price 1981). Such a broad definition 
elicits broad consent in contemporary literature about the usefulness of industrial policies.  
But there is still dissent about the degree to which a state should pull or push capital 
and/or labour to specific sectors in light of longer-term economic, social or environmental 
considerations. Such an approach has been labelled a ‘selective’ or ‘vertical’ policy – as 
Markus Loewe 
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distinguished from a more ‘functional’ or ‘horizontal’ policy, in which the state takes a 
fairly passive role, leaving decisions about economic industries entirely to market forces – 
that is, to choices made by the private sector. 
Protagonists of selective (vertical) industrial policies argue that the frequency of market 
failure – which may be due to one or more of the following factors – justifies state inter-
vention:  
— Public goods. The development of new business activities may require investing in 
goods that are ‘public’ because they are non-rival and non-excludable. After some-
one has paid for them, everyone else can use them. Sometimes the research and in-
vention of new business ideas are referred to as ‘non-rival’: The competition can 
profit from a pioneering entrepreneur’s innovations that are the fruit of the latter’s 
investment in R&D. As a result, there is no incentive for a private actor to invest in 
non-rival public goods and the state may have to finance R&D. Entrepreneurs may 
also be reluctant to invest in the skills of employees who might be lured away by a 
competitor right after they have been trained. 
— Coordination failure. Some economic activities depend on complementary activi-
ties, meaning that an investment in one activity will not pay off if an investment is 
not simultaneously made in another. In such cases, entrepreneurs will not invest 
without having the guarantee of a complementary investment. Some sectors require 
action to be concerted and monitored by the state. 
— Dynamic economies of scale. Many economic activities involve learning curves that 
help reduce the high initial costs of production significantly. Investors may not 
know the degree of this effect or be reluctant to pay high initial costs that only pay 
for themselves after some years. In cases like these, the state may consider creating 
positive incentives for investors. 
— Lack of quality reputation. Consumers may want assurances about a specific product 
but lack reliable information about the whole range of selections and so prefer to re-
ly on established brands with good reputations. Since new producers do not have 
reputations, they have difficulty getting established on the market without state help 
to create public trust in their products. 
— Access to capital. Investors tend to know more than anybody else about the risks and 
opportunities associated with their business activities. So when they start a new ac-
tivity that requires external finance, banks and other money lenders charge risk pre-
miums on top of market interest rates, which correspond to investment risks that are 
significantly higher than the effective risk of the new business activity. In such cases 
the state could consider subsidising bank credit for investments – or offer credit itself.  
— Social and environmental development. Finally, it may be wise for the state to de-
velop specific sectors in order to create stable employment for the poor (or more de-
cent work than in other sectors), reduce environmental risks or ecologically harmful 
emissions or produce meritorious goods (goods with positive externalities on other 
economic sectors, social development or nature conservation) (Altenburg 2011, 13–
15; Gill / Kharas 2007, 4–10; Klein 2004, 28–33; Kosacoff / Ramos 1999, 39–45; Na-
bli et al. 2006, 5–8; Noland / Pack 2005, 2–6). 
While opponents of industrial policy do not deny that market failures occur, they argue 
that government interventions to address them are much riskier. But not all opponents pro-
test policies that generally promote economic development. Most of them accept horizon-
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tal policies such as the provision of education and training, communication facilities, pub-
lic transportation and market information, or general support for research and technologi-
cal development but they warn of more selective (vertical) industrial policies that the state 
might not be able or willing to design or implement in a way that improves social welfare 
(e.g. Pack / Saggi 2006). 
In fact, the ability to design a good industrial policy strategy requires fundamentals that 
governments in developing countries often lack: 
— Information. They need access to the data used to identify economic opportunities 
and threats, as well as promising economic sectors. 
— Analytical capacities. Governments need to be capable of analysing the causes of 
market failure. 
— Policy formulation. Governments should be capable of designing adequate measures 
to address market failure and raise social welfare, determine adequate levels of in-
tervention (e.g. taxes or subsidies) and define criteria for ending or fading out a poli-
cy (an exit strategy). 
— Building acceptance. Governments should be capable of creating a social contract 
around the industrial policy strategy that aligns all actors (including foreign donors). 
Many countries also face deficits in their ability to implement industrial policies: 
— Organisational skills: setting up competent service agencies; devising incentive 
schemes that ensure effective and customer-oriented service provisions; establishing 
checks and balances to hold the implementing agencies accountable; and preventing 
political capture through transparent and rules-based implementation directives.  
— Monitoring skills: regularly reviewing the performance of implementing agencies; 
establishing feedback loops between service providers and those affected by their 
decisions; and sanctioning the misuse of funds and other violations of the rules.  
At the same time, governments and bureaucracies sometimes lack the will to design and 
implement industrial policies to optimise social welfare. Industrial policies involve the distri-
bution of economic rents, which risk being generated and distributed according to other criteria 
besides economic and social welfare. This may also apply to horizontal strategies. For example, 
when a country subsidises energy, it provides more support to industries that are energy-
intensive than to others. There is thus a risk that rents are generated and distributed on the 
grounds of other than economic and social welfare criteria. 
— Legitimisation of political leaders: Politicians seek to demonstrate that they are tak-
ing action in order to satisfy their constituencies, regardless of the outcomes. 
— Lobbying by pressure groups. Politicians also may be unable to resist rent-seeking by 
vested interests that undermines a well-conceived policy. 
— Self-perpetuating dynamics. Once a strategy has been initiated, implementing agen-
cies have an interest in setting up new programmes, expanding them and extending 
their terms in order to increase the agencies’ budgets and prerogatives (Altenburg 
2011, 17–18 and 46–50; Noland / Pack 2005; Schmitz 2007). 
A whole strand of literature has developed about the criteria for successful industrial poli-
cies (Altenburg 2011, 28–33; Rodrik 2004): 
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– Clear and concrete vision. The strategy should be based on a clear vision that de-
fines a limited number of realistic, measurable and time-bound goals. The priorities 
of these goals should be clearly formulated. 
– Customer-orientation. Implementing agencies must understand how markets and 
private enterprises operate. They should “speak the language” of businesspeople and 
behave appropriately.  
– Participatory policy formulation. Entrepreneurs, experts and the government should 
co-operate closely in designing an industrial policy strategy, which should be defined 
as a national project for socioeconomic transformation and growth – so as to ensure 
the commitment of all relevant stakeholders. 
– Regular impact assessments. Independent monitoring and evaluation is essential to 
inform about needed improvements and safeguard against political capture. 
– Clear responsibilities. If the strategy is implemented by different agencies, the divi-
sion of labour should be clear from the start. Fragmentation must not lead to leaks or 
duplication of responsibilities. 
– Effective, non-discriminatory instruments. Targeted interventions must be carefully 
designed to challenge entrepreneurs and encourage their learning and innovation – 
instead of creating a protected environment that suffocates entrepreneurial dyna-
mism and technological learning. In particular, interventions should contribute to 
overcoming information and coordination problems and similarly benefit all the en-
trepreneurs in one sector. 
– Well-tailored incentives. Financial incentives should be employed with great care be-
cause they bear the risk of misuse and arbitrage. Some co-financing from customers 
should be required in any case so that they only use the services they really need. Sup-
port should also be temporary and offered just as long as needed for market actors to 
adjust to a changing environment. Credible exit strategies must be formulated early to 
signal that support is help for adapting to new challenges – and not a form of unlim-
ited underwriting for inefficient rent-seeking industries. Clear provisions are also 
needed to terminate failed policy experiments. 
– Rational prioritisation. The choice to prioritise specific sectors should build on ex-
isting comparative advantages – not defy them. 
– Good investment climate. Industrial policies must be complemented by efforts to 
reduce the general costs and risks of investment. The effectiveness of industrial pol-
icies depends on: (i) a reliable legal framework that protects property rights and en-
sures contract enforcement; (ii) a well-educated, well-trained and motivated labour 
force; (iii) a good communications, information and transportation infrastructure; 
(iv) an efficient financial system that provides entrepreneurs cheap and easy access 
to capital and insurance; (v) the elimination of unnecessary and burdensome bureau-
cratic regulations; (vi) transparency in administrative decisions; (vii) economic and 
political stability; (viii) protection from crime and riots; (ix) a liberal trade and capi-
tal-transfer regime; and (x) a transparent tax system.  
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3 The context of industrial policy-making in Egypt from 2004 to 2011 
This chapter examines the context of Egypt’s most recent industrial policy strategy. Sec-
tion 1 portrays the framework conditions of economic development in Egypt between 
2004 and 2011. It argues that the natural framework conditions were fairly favourable, 
while the political conditions for economic development were not – at least until the revo-
lution in 2011. Section 2 identifies the main challenges for industrial policy in Egypt. Sec-
tion 3 sketches the history of Egypt’s industrial policy-making from independence until 
2004; Section 4 describes Egypt’s political constellation in 2004.  
3.1  Framework conditions for economic development  
Egypt is a lower middle-income country that in 2011 had a gross domestic product (GDP) 
of about USD 2,600 per capita. With over 80 million inhabitants, it is the most populous 
Arab country and the fourth-largest economy in the Arab world – after Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Algeria. Some 43 per cent of the population live in ur-
ban areas (World Bank 2011a). 
Egypt enjoys a number of conditions that are comparatively favourable for development: 
Natural resources. Egypt has limited mineral resources (phosphate, titanium, iron and 
manganese) but abundant energy resources. Its energy exports (mainly natural gas) exceed 
imports (mainly crude oil), generating a net annual income of almost USD 5 billion (4 per 
cent of GDP).3 The country also annually produces some 15 billion kWh of hydroelectric 
power (mainly from the Aswan Dam) and has great potential for generating energy in so-
lar power plants (EIU 2008). 
External income. In addition to its energy resources, Egypt has another four sources of 
substantial rents: (i) Suez Canal user charges generate about USD 5 billion annually 
(4 per cent of GDP). (ii) The tourism industry benefits from a huge variety of antiquities 
from the ancient Greek and Roman and Islamic periods, as well as Mediterranean and 
Red Sea coastlines. In 2010, 13 million foreign tourists spent some USD 13 billion in 
Egypt (almost 10 per cent of GDP). (iii) Also in 2010, Egypt received about 
USD 1.3 billion in development and military assistance (the latter exclusively from the 
United States). (iv) And remittances from migrant workers exceeded USD 10 billion 
(8 per cent of GDP).4 
Land. Only 5 per cent of the country is arable land, but a sophisticated system of irrigation 
and extremely fertile soil enables intensive agricultural practices to produce food and non-
food products (e.g. cotton) of very high quality (EIU 2008). 
Local market. The country’s substantial local market allows for large-scale production. 
Even industries with high fixed investment costs can become profitable because of the 
                                                 
3  Reserves are estimated at 4 billion barrels of crude oil and 72 trillion cubic feet of gas (EIU 2008). 
4  In 2008, revenues from the Suez Canal accounted for 4%, tourism 7%, official development assistance 
1% and remittances 6% of GDP. In 2007, a total of 4 million Egyptians were living abroad (Brach / 
Loewe 2010; Loewe 2012; World Bank 2009b). 
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large domestic demand. With regards to this criterion, Egypt ranks 26th on the World 
Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) (see Annex, Table A4). 
Trade agreements. Egypt has signed a number of trade agreements that open markets in 
Europe, North America and other countries to Egyptian products. Egypt has been a mem-
ber of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since 1970 and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) since 1994. In 2004, Egypt’s Partnership Agreement with the 
European Union (EU) entered into force and in 2007, Egypt adopted the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy (ENP) Joint Action Plan. That same year, a free trade agreement with the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) came into force. Already in 2004, Egypt had 
concluded an agreement with Israel and the US establishing Qualifying Industrial Zones 
(QIZs), from where specific products can be exported to the US duty-free – if they contain 
at least 12 per cent of value added in Israel (OECD 2007, 20; Salsecci et al. 2008, 23 f.).5 
Proximity to other markets. Egypt is located at the juncture of Africa and Asia as well as 
between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Transportation and communications 
are thus cheap and easy in all directions (Loewe 2012). 
Infrastructure. Although Egypt’s transportation infrastructure suffers from limited capaci-
ty and several serious constraints, it compares favourably with many other developing 
countries. The GCR ranks Egypt 64th of 133 countries with regard to infrastructure; its air 
transport, port and railway infrastructure are rated ‘fair’ or better. The road quality is be-
low average, but aside from frequent gridlocks in Greater Cairo, entrepreneurs do not con-
sider that the infrastructure hinders business (Loewe et al. 2013). 
Demographic change. Egypt is still in the middle of demographic transition and could 
thus still benefit from a demographic dividend. Its population is growing by about 
1.3 million people per annum, although demographic growth has decreased significantly 
since 1970 (UNDP 2007).6 The young population – more than one-third of Egyptians are 
younger than 15 – exerts enormous pressure on the country’s educational and health sys-
tems, as well as on housing and labour markets. At the same time, only 5 per cent of the 
population is older than 65 – meaning that most of the population is of the productive age 
(Loewe 2008; UNDP 2007). 
Social cohesion. The population is comparably homogeneous: It consists almost exclu-
sively of Sunni Muslim Arabs. Most of its inhabitants identify themselves with the coun-
try rather than supra-national entities (the Arab or Muslim world) or sub-national entities 
(tribes, clans or minorities) – unlike inhabitants of other Arab countries such as Syria. 
Even the minority Copts (who make up 10 per cent of the population) consider themselves 
                                                 
5  Egypt also belongs to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which has 20 
members. In 1997, it signed the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) agreement in which 17 signa-
tories reduced their custom tariffs by 10% each year between 1997 and 2000 and 20% between 2000 
and 2005 for all manufactured goods (not services). However, the treaty’s safeguard provision that al-
lows for exemptions has been used by all the member states – rendering the GAFTA practically irrele-
vant in real terms. Intra-Arab trade fell from 9.1% of the region’s total external trade in 1997 to 8.8% in 
2004. That year, Egypt also signed a free trade agreement with Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia (the ‘Aga-
dir Agreement’) that has however not yet been ratified by the Moroccan Parliament (OECD 2007, 19). 
6  Population growth dropped from 2.2% per annum in 1970 to 1.8% today, and the fertility rate almost 
halved – from 5.9 to 3.2 children per woman (UNDP 2007). 
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to be Egyptians first. The conflict about the country’s future that erupted after the revolu-
tion in 2011 is mainly between more religious and more secular groups. Of course, there is 
also a power struggle between political fractions, as well as a contest between social (so-
cioeconomic) groups – but none of them questions Egypt’s national unity. 
Yet between 2004 and 2011, Egypt’s political framework conditions were far less favour-
able for economic development, with its political system and societal order largely shaped 
by neo-patrimonial authoritarian rule7: 
Presidentialism. In fundamental contradiction to the ideas of rule of law and separation of 
powers, the president of Egypt initiated and dominated all decision-making in the country. 
No political decision could be taken against his will, and he could veto decisions taken by 
every Egyptian political body. Although the government had some room for manoeuvre – 
within boundaries drawn by the president again – the parliament was a mere rubber-
stamping body. Manipulated elections always gave the president’s party 75 per cent of the 
votes in parliament, while the president’s de facto veto of candidates for his party elimi-
nated any incentive for parliamentarians to oppose his initiatives. Before 1981, the judici-
ary was the most independent political body; then parliament passed an emergency law 
allowing President Mubarak to circumvent the courts if, for example, he feared that the 
court might rule against his interests. From time to time, the judiciary attempted to regain 
some independence and control the executive. In 2000, the constitutional court declared 
that a judge must be present in every polling station in order to control for irregularities 
during parliamentary elections. But when judges tried to enforce this law in 2005, the 
power struggle escalated (Demmelhuber 2008, 142 f.).  
Lack of participation. There were very few formal controls of decision-makers. In 2008 
the World Bank Governance Indicator of ‘voice and accountability’ put Egypt at -1.24 
(see Annex, Table A1), and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index 
ranked Egypt 119th out of 167 countries world-wide. 
Informality of rule. Decisions were rarely taken through formal channels in accordance 
with any rules, and authority was not recognised in formal structures but rather informal 
hierarchical (pyramidal) networks of bilateral relations based on primordial relations (kin-
ship, neighbourhood) or shared experience. 
Centralised decision-making. Even minor decisions were taken at fairly high levels of 
political power structures. 
Patronage. The legitimacy of the president and the ruling elite was based on the strategic 
allocation of state resources (jobs, housing, etc.) to specific societal groups.  
Clientelism. The same mechanism was used at the micro-level to reward individuals for 
loyalty to the regime or those above them in the pyramid with employment, housing, pro-
motions, and the like. Favouritism, usually referred to as wasţa (connection), was wide-
spread.8  
                                                 
7  Cf. Pawelka (1985); Pawelka (1997); Pawelka (2000). 
8  For a discussion of the causes and effects of wasţa in Jordan see: Loewe/ Blume / Speer (2008). 
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Corruption. Not surprisingly, corruption was rampant. Transparency International’s Cor-
ruption Perception Index gave Egypt a score of just 2.8 on a scale from 1 (high corruption) 
to 10 (low corruption). The GCR noted that in 2010 corruption was the single most im-
portant concern of Egyptian entrepreneurs (see Annex, Table A1). Half of all entrepre-
neurs must pay regular bribes (Loewe et al. 2013). 
Non-existent civil society. The state tried to prevent the formation of any type of non-state 
organisation. Although trade unions, professional associations, chambers of commerce 
and charitable societies were allowed, they had to be aligned with the state, which had a 
representative on their boards and authorised all nominations for board directors. Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) of a political nature were forbidden. A 1999 law on 
non-governmental organisations prohibited all non-state actors accepting financial trans-
fers from abroad without explicit permission from the Ministry of Social Affairs (Dem-
melhuber 2008, 114 f. and 149; Loewe 2000, 24).  
No authentic private-sector participation. Even the chambers of commerce and industry, 
professional unions, employer associations and labour unions all served the government 
more than their members. These bodies have been described as ‘neo-corporatist organisa-
tions’ that inform the government about changes in public opinion, explain government 
policies to their members and mobilise them for the government – instead of representing 
their members’ interests and opinions to the government. Until 2010, many top leaders 
were not elected by their members but instead were appointed by the government. They 
had no veto power (Benhassine et al. 2009, 187; Nabli et al. 2006, 24). 
Censored mass media. The regime controlled and censored newspaper, radio and televi-
sion programmes. In contrast to other Arab countries such as Tunisia or Syria, the media 
were allowed to question ministers’ decisions – but not those of the president, the army or 
the regime as a whole. After 2002, a few independent newspapers and satellite television 
stations were licensed. But they were owned and controlled by the same group of people 
who controlled large parts of the private sector and after 2004, several key ministries, too. 
The popular journal, Al Masri Al-Yaum, is owned by Salah Diab and Naguib Sawiris, two 
of the most influential tycoons in Egypt, and Rus al-Youssef, by steel magnate Ahmed 
Ezz. The Internet, however, quickly developed into a medium that featured independent 
reporting and true freedom of opinion (Demmelhuber 2008, 150 f.; Nabli et al. 2006, 24). 
Ineffective administration. Egypt benefits from a long history of statehood and a highly 
developed public administration, which is present in the most remote areas of the country 
and can monitor and regulate absolutely everything. Even small villages have schools, 
health stations and public administration offices. But in 2011, the quality of public ser-
vices was low, the bureaucracy was slow and opaque, administrative decisions were un-
predictable, public officials were hired and promoted on the basis of personal connections 
rather than merit – and they were rarely accountable. The World Bank Governance Indica-
tor for ‘government effectiveness’ gave Egypt a score of -0.44 in 2008 (see Annex, Ta-
ble A1). 
This combination of factors usually creates situations where economic efficiency and the 
development of the country are not the real goals of policy-making. Decisions are really 
taken to help the regime consolidate its power. 
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3.2  Main challenges for industrial transformation 
Egypt’s macroeconomic indicators improved considerably between 2002 and 2009, but 
this was due to windfall profits rather than structural reform, diversification or a rise in 
productivity. In addition, economic development had only limited social effects. 
Between 2004 and 2008, Egypt’s real annual GDP growth averaged 6 per cent. It peaked 
at 7.2 per cent in 2007 but dropped thereafter to less than 5 per cent – mainly because of 
the global financial and economic crisis. Because in this period the country’s population 
grew 1.8 per cent annually, Egypt’s per-capita income increased by less than 4 per cent in 
real terms each year until 2008, any by about 3 per cent in 2009 and 2010 (IMF 2009b, 4; 
IMF 2010; Loewe 2012; Salsecci et al. 2008, 20). 
Unfortunately, Egypt’s growth spurt between 2004 and 2008 was not particularly labour-
intensive. Unemployment decreased only slightly during this time, stagnated between 
2008 and 2011 and increased considerably after the revolution in 2011. It is very high in 
comparison with other countries in the world: the official rate was s 13 per cent in 2013, 
but unofficial estimates put it as high as 25 per cent. Between 2004 and 2008, underem-
ployment rose sharply because most poor people cannot afford to register as ‘unem-
ployed’: they try to earn at least some income – even if that requires a huge investment of 
time. With its working age population continuing to grow by around 2.5 per cent each 
year, Egypt must create almost a half million new jobs annually to keep the unemploy-
ment rates constant (Loewe 2009d).  
Likewise, Egypt’s growth spurt was not pro-poor. The share of wages in national income 
– already low in 2000 – declined further, from 28 to 25 per cent in 2008. The share of 
households living below the national poverty line increased from 15 per cent in 2000 to 
20 per cent in 2008 (Demmelhuber 2008, 200; Galal 2011, 3). 
The growth spurt occurred as a result of considerable improvements in the international 
economic framework conditions: (i) developing countries had easier and cheaper access 
to capital on international markets, (ii) commodity prices were increasing and 
(iii) remittance inflows were rising. In addition, Egypt benefited from a temporary re-
gional effect when, in reaction to increased security regulations in the United States 
(US) after 9/11, many Arab investments were moved from the West to the Middle East 
(Brach / Loewe 2010). 
Even if these positive framework conditions had continued, Egypt would not have been 
able to sustain its recent growth rates, which were mostly a one-off effect from changes in 
commodity and capital prices. Long-term economic growth can only be achieved through 
a steady rise in economic productivity or productive investment (Hevia / Loayza 2011). 
But Egypt’s total-factor productivity is stagnant, savings rate low9 and foreign invest-
ments, which have almost drought out after the revolution, have flown mainly into non-
productive assets even before. 
                                                 
9  Public and private consumption accounts for 82%, savings for 16% of Egypt’s GDP (EIU 2008). 
Egypt’s rate of saving ranks 80th out of 133 countries according to the World Economic Forum (see 
Annex, Table A2). 
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FDI inflows to Egypt increased by 90 per cent per annum between 2002 and 2008, from an 
average USD 815 million between 1995 and 2004 to USD 9 billion in 2007. As a result, 
their share in GDP rose from well below 1 per cent in 2003 and 2004 to almost 10 per cent 
in 2006 and 2007. Yet this share was still low by international standards, and it fell again to 
almost zero after the revolution. Even at their peak in 2007, FDI inflows to Egypt accounted 
for less than 1 per cent of total global FDI flows and 29 per cent of FDI flows to Africa 
(Demmelhuber 2008, 198; OECD 2007, 14; Salsecci et al. 2008, 31). 
In 2008 one-third of Egypt’s FDI came from other Arab countries because Gulf investors 
had large sums to invest after the recent increase in energy prices. Almost three-quarters 
of the 2008 FDI targeted the energy sector, with most of the rest going to the production 
of non-tradables (financial services, tourism, telecommunications and real estate) rather 
than to export-oriented sectors. Only 4, respectively 3, per cent of FDI were assigned to 
manufacturing and agriculture (Benhassine et al. 2009, 55; OECD 2007, 15; Wurzel 2007, 
16f.). 
This allocation is an indication for Dutch disease contagion from the oil-exporting Gulf 
countries through at least three channels: FDI, tourism and remittances. Between 2005 and 
2008, Egypt’s tourism industry grew annually by more than 30 per cent, the construction 
and IT sectors by 15 per cent, and manufacturing by only 6 per cent. Remittances tripled 
between 2002 and 2008 to almost USD 10 billion annually (Benhassine et al. 2009, 55; 
World Bank 2010). 
Unfortunately, domestic investors, who account for almost 58 per cent of investments in 
Egypt (foreigners 8 per cent and the state 34 per cent), imitated foreign investors: 23 per 
cent of domestic investments went to the oil and gas sector, 9 per cent to facilities, 15 per 
cent to traffic and communications and 6 per cent to construction. Only 19 per cent of do-
mestic investments went to the manufacturing sector, including the oil-processing indus-
tries (EIU 2008; Ghorfa 2009b; IDSC 2008, 42–44; World Bank 2009b). 
As a result, manufacturing still contributes just 16 per cent to the Egyptian GDP, while 
mining accounts for 21 per cent, agriculture 14 and services 50 per cent10 (IDSC 2008, 
131; World Bank 2011a). 
Dutch disease contagion also explains why inflation rose sharply to peak at 16 per cent in 
2008. Consumer prices rose in general but the increase in real estate and tourism was par-
ticularly sharp. Other reason of the high inflation rate of the last decade were Egypt’s de-
pendency on food imports, which increase every year because of the population growth, 
and the steep rise in food prices on international markets between 2005 and 2008.  
It is therefore not astonishing that Egypt’s exports are not very diversified. They include 
around 1,000 different kinds of products with a respective export volume of at least 
USD 100,000 (see Figure 1) – while Malaysia exports more than 4,000 products at that 
volume, the Philippines 2,000 and Tunisia 1,500 (despite its much smaller population). 
 
                                                 
10  This includes 12% for trade, 7% for transportation, 7% for health, education and other social services, 
and 4% each for construction, gastronomy and financial services (Marks 2009). 
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Table 1:  Non-hydrocarbon exports to world trade partners by technology content  
(1985–2005) (% of total exports) 
 1985 1995 2005 
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Egypt 56.1 28.0 14.9 1.0 28.8 40.7 28.3 2.2 36.1 22.8 38.9 2.2 
South Africa 22.7 56.9 19.2 1.2 25.5 34.0 36.6 3.9 26.4 4.8 62.9 5.8 
India 44.9 27.3 22.2 5.6 26.8 34.9 31.7 6.6 20.1 28.6 42.1 9.2 
Brazil 52.4 11.6 27.1 8.8 44.2 11.7 34.4 9.7 44.5 6.3 36.7 12.5 
Turkey 36.6 32.2 26.2 5.0 25.1 43.7 24.4 6.7 14.7 33.6 38.3 13.3 
Morocco 57.5 17.2 24.7 0.6 48.1 24.0 25.2 2.7 33.7 32.7 19.4 14.2 
Indonesia 72.5 12.0 13.4 2.2 46.5 32.1 11.5 10.0 40.7 23.7 18.1 17.5 
Tunisia 24.0 37.1 33.2 5.6 16.0 53.6 20.7 9.7 16.9 44.7 19.0 19.4 
Malaysia 55.3 6.6 12.9 25.2 20.5 11.2 12.8 55.5 13.4 10.3 14.7 61.7 
Source: Enders (2007, 32) 
29 per cent from South Africa, 18 per cent from Turkey and 25 per cent each from Tunisia 
and Malaysia. In the same year, the share of high-technology products was less than 1 per 
cent of all Egyptian exports but 6 per cent from the Republic of South Africa, 11 per cent 
from Morocco, 13 per cent from Turkey, 16 per cent from Tunisia and 54 per cent from 
Malaysia (Benhassine et al. 2009, 60; Enders 2007, Table 6). Even when hydrocarbon 
products are excluded, the technology content of Egyptian exports is much lower than that 
of its peer countries Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia. Between 1985 and 2005, the share of 
high-technology products rose from 1 to only 2 per cent of total Egyptian exports – com-
pared with an increase from 1 to 14 per cent in Morocco, 8 to 15 per cent in Jordan and 6 
to 19 per cent in Tunisia (see Table 1). 
This phenomenon is a symptom of the low productivity of Egypt’s economy. The county’s 
total-factor productivity is just 60 per cent of Malaysia’s and 40 per cent of Brazil’s, while 
its labour productivity is 50 per cent of Malaysia’s and 30 per cent of Brazil’s (Benhassine 
et al. 2009, 66). 
Egypt lacks access to technologies. According to the GCR, it ranks 48th out of 133 coun-
tries with regard to the capacity to absorb new technologies and 66th with regard to the 
availability of the latest technologies. FDI could help reduce this deficit. However, alt-
hough Egypt ranks just 30th worldwide in terms of technology transfer through FDI, its 
firms face significant difficulties − partly because of their limited capacity for innovation 
(see Annex, Table A2). The Philippines, which are roughly the size of Egypt, report more 
technology royalty payments – an indicator of technology importation – than all the Arab 
countries combined (Noland / Pack 2008). 
Another problem is that the state is still a major player in Egypt’s economy. Many state-
owned enterprises have not been privatised or shut down despite their high deficits. The 
private sector’s role has grown steadily in the last 20 years, but state-owned enterprises 
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still account for more than 30 per cent of the country’s official industrial value-added in-
vestment and employment. Furthermore, the military also owns a huge complex of indus-
trial and service companies that are not included in the country’s official output or em-
ployment statistics. It is difficult to even estimate the size of this top-secret complex: it 
could make up 15 per cent of Egypt’s GDP. However, unlike other state-owned enterpris-
es, Egypt’s military companies are fairly well organised and profitable (Benhassine et al. 
2009, 15ff.; Djoufelkit-Cottenet 2008, 8, 13). 
Finally, Egypt lacks large manufacturing firms that are headquartered in the country, alt-
hough some foreign companies and a couple of large domestic firms produce there. The 
vast majority of private manufacturers are small units. In 2006, according to Central 
Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), Egypt’s national statistical 
office, 99.4 per cent of all private companies had 10 employees or fewer (88.8 per cent of 
all employees), while only 0.1 per cent of all private companies had more than 100 em-
ployees (1.3 per cent of all employees) (CAPMAS 2006; EIU 2008; Loewe et al. 2013).  
Almost all Egyptian enterprises are family businesses – both the very big and the very 
small companies. Entrepreneurs prefer tiny, individual ventures and avoid complementing 
each another. But a plethora of one-man bands is hampering Egypt’s long-term growth. 
Teamwork is unknown – both in private companies and the larger society.12 Orascom, 
founded in 1950 and Egypt’s uncontested No. 1 company, was owned, developed and 
managed for many years by one man, Onsi Sawiris. Then, in 1997, the company was split 
into three independent holdings, Orascom Telecom, Orascom Construction Industries and 
Orascom Developments and Hotels, each of which is entirely owned and managed by one 
of the founder’s three sons. 
Businesspeople in Egypt tend to be much older and less educated than those in other re-
gions of the world. This is at least partly due to the way the domestic market was protect-
ed until 1991 – and after that, from the half-hearted liberalisation that only rewarded in-
siders and politically well-connected individuals (Benhassine et al. 2009, 99). 
Entrepreneurship has a rather negative connotation for large parts of the Egyptian popula-
tion. Many interview partners stressed that running a small retail or handicrafts shop is 
widely accepted but that many Egyptians associate any large company with dishonesty 
and political opportunism. Big businessmen tend to be ranked with thieving and corrupt 
tycoons.  
3.3  The history of industrial policy from 1952 to 2004 
Egypt is a particularly interesting case for studying industrial policies because of its 
long history of selective industrial policies. Right after independence, industrial policy 
was made a core – if not the core – element of national development strategies. All 
Egyptian governments believed that industrial policies were needed to neutralise the 
effects of Egypt’s colonial place in the world economy. Colonial Egypt had belonged 
to the periphery, which was supposed to provide cheap primary goods for the factories 
                                                 
12  For a detailed description and analysis of these phenomena see Loewe et al. (2013). 
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in the countries in the centre of the global trading system and to serve as secure mar-
kets for the imperial powers’ manufactured goods. As a result, Egypt lived off earnings 
from agriculture and trade – with handicrafts playing a minor role (even though a big-
ger one than in most other Arab countries). Living conditions were horrendous; 
throughout the first half of the 20th century per-capita income stagnated. Health indi-
cators were worse than anywhere else in the world with the exception of sub-Saharan 
Africa. Infant mortality, for example was 186 per 1,000 newborns. Likewise, 99 per 
cent of all adults were illiterate (Loewe 2010b).  
All post-independence Egyptian governments recognised that economic and social devel-
opment was contingent on economic diversification. They elaborated strategies to channel 
investment into new industries and promote structural change, spur economic growth, cre-
ate employment, reduce poverty and improve the balance of payments. However, none of 
these strategies was really successful: 
“Various regimes have been unable to generate either the levels or the quality of in-
vestment needed to move the economy away from a dependence upon rents in the 
form of foreign loans and grants, canal fees, oil earnings, worker remittances and 
tourism.” (Bromley / Bush 1994, 202) 
Roughly five periods can be distinguished from independence until 2004, when the 
businessmen reform cabinet of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif was formed: (i) Nasser’s 
early days (1952–1956), (ii) Nasser’s statist experiments (1956–1970), (iii) Sadat’s 
open-door policies (1970–1981), (iv) their modification during Mubarak’s first 10 
years in office(1981–1991), and (v) the period of hesitant adjustment and privatisation 
(1991–2004).  
Some patterns, though, remained constant throughout these periods: 
— All the governments viewed Egypt’s industrialisation and the diversification of its 
economy as the main goals of their economic policies. 
— To reach these goals, the governments all relied on selective industrial policies. Be-
cause they believed that private investors needed orientation, they relied on state 
planning rather than the market.  
— All the governments foresaw a strong role for the public enterprise sector and signif-
icant state intervention in economic development (although these decreased some-
what over time – especially after 1971 and again after 1989). 
— At the same time, all governments also favoured other goals, such as social equity, 
economic redistribution and the transformation of society, which sometimes domi-
nated not just social and tax policies, but also industrial policies. 
— Egyptian owners of private capital have always been exceptionally risk-averse. They 
generally hesitated to invest in Egypt, and when they did, they preferred speculative 
investments that generated quick gains (such as real estate) rather than productive 
investments (such as manufacturing), which tend to require longer periods of amor-
tisation and therefore bear more substantial risks. 
— Neither the private commercial sector nor civil society has ever had independent, 
legitimate representation that could take part in a genuinely participatory process of 
elaborating a broadly accepted strategy for industrial development. 
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The early days of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952–1956) 
Industrial policies were introduced in Egypt as an instrument of the country’s social con-
tract “to correct for a legacy of inequities and poverty” (Nabli et al. 2006). The arrange-
ment between the state and society implicitly provided for the allocation of material bene-
fits by those in power to selected social groups in return for their recognition of the legiti-
macy of the former’s rule. Other instruments in this contract were land reforms and in-
come redistribution through transfers, subsidies and services such as social housing, free 
health care, education and social assistance (Pawelka 1993, 73). 
Even before independence, Egyptian intellectuals had acknowledged that the country’s 
geographical limits to agricultural expansion made industrialisation unavoidable in order 
to employ and feed its growing population. Egypt was the first Arab country to have un-
dergone autochthonous industrialisation – starting in the 1920s. Textiles production ac-
counted for most of the country’s early manufacturing, but there was also some food pro-
cessing and a chemical industry (Hill 2003, 86; Zaki 1999, 40). 
When the Free Officers staged a coup d’état in 1952, putting an end to the Egyptian mon-
archy as well as to British dominance, they formed a military junta under Egypt’s first 
President, Muhammad Naguib. Gamal Abdel Nasser soon side-lined Naguib and become 
president himself in 1956. He created an authoritarian political regime in which he was 
central to all political decision-making. Nasser constructed four pillars of power: (i) the 
state party (the Nationalist Union, later the Arab Socialist Union and then the National 
Democratic Party, NDP), (ii) the state bureaucracy, (iii) mass organisations (trade and 
women’s unions, youth organisations, etc.), and (iv) the army. Little changed in this con-
figuration until Mubarak’s resignation in 2011. The army was always the strongest of the 
four pillars and although Egyptian presidents always had its support they had to be careful 
to never encroach on its interests. No other single pillar of power could have seriously 
threatened an Egyptian president. 
At first, the military junta had no real economic policy, aside from stressing the im-
portance of industrialisation. But they had no idea how to finance it. Although Egypt had a 
class of very rich people, their wealth came from large landholdings; only a few of them 
were willing to invest in manufacturing (Pawelka 1985, 170; Soliman 1998, 11). 
Therefore, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s aim in expropriating some of the biggest landholdings 
(for compensation) was not only to redistribute land to rural middle-class families but also 
to free capital: the government was hoping that landlords would invest their money in in-
dustry. Significantly, Nasser’s land reform only benefited the rural middle classes and not 
the rural poor. The government did not want the entire rural population to continue work-
ing in subsistence agriculture; instead, the very poor were supposed to move to the towns 
and become a class of workers for Egypt’s new industrial sector (Pawelka 1993, 75). 
However, expropriation negatively affected investments by serving to warn Egyptian capi-
tal owners to transfer their assets to safety abroad (Pawelka 1985, 222).  
At the same time, the government began to establish the first state-owned industrial enter-
prises to produce basic commodities, leaving the private industrial and service sectors un-
touched (Soliman 1998, 11). 
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Nasser’s statist experiments (1956–1970) 
Egypt has never been a socialist country, although for a couple of years, the state assumed 
a role similar to that of socialist states in Eastern Europe. The means of production were 
almost entirely controlled by the government, which strove to comprehensively substitute 
imports. Collectivism in Egypt was about national development, however, not class strug-
gle. Yet despite high growth and investment rates, the state eventually ran out of liquidity. 
Nasser did not alter Egypt’s economic policy until the Suez War. Early in 1956, after the 
United States had withdrawn support for the construction of the Aswan Dam on the Nile, 
Nasser reacted by expropriating the Suez Canal, which was owned by a French-British 
company. When France, the United Kingdom and Israel retaliated by attacking Egypt, 
Nasser began to expropriate foreign banks, insurance companies and manufacturing com-
panies (Richards / Waterbury 1996, 183). 
In 1957, Nasser received a generous loan from the Soviet Union and began to build up 
state-owned heavy industry. That year, the government also adopted Egypt’s first five-
year-plan. Although the private sector was not invited to elaborate the plan, it was called 
upon to contribute 55 per cent of the investments needed to industrialise Egypt. While 
some private investments were granted tax reductions, the state also began to require its 
approval to establish, expand, change the purpose or location of industrial plants, as well 
as for many other business decisions (Hill 2003, 86; Pawelka 1985, 222; Richards / Wa-
terbury 1996, 183; Zaki 1999, 60−63). 
The private sector contribution to gross capital formation declined from 72 to 26 per cent, 
while the government steadily expanded its engagement in the manufacturing sector (Zaki 
1999, 61). 
In 1960, Nasser abandoned hope that the private sector would help speed structural change 
in Egypt. He nationalised Egypt’s two largest industrial complexes, the Misr Group and 
Abboud Pasha. The following year, he nationalised the remaining banks, insurance com-
panies, transportation and trading companies, public utility providers, hotels and depart-
ment stores, as well as all industrial enterprises with more than 10 employees. Although 
expropriated owners were offered government bonds with an annual fixed interest rate of 
4 per cent, the country’s economic and cultural elite (especially the ethnic and religious 
minorities) reacted by emigrating en masse (Pawelka 1985, 224−231; Pawelka 1993, 75). 
At the same time, the state increasingly invested in the import-substituting industries to 
produce the primary and intermediate goods (chemicals, metals, paper, steel, fertiliser and 
textiles) needed by Egypt’s agriculture and armaments industries, as well as higher tech-
nology consumption goods such as automobiles, TV and radio sets, white goods and 
pharmaceuticals (Galal / El-Megharbel 2005, 15; Pawelka 1985, 232; Zaki 1999, 72). 
During this period, industrial policies were very steep: the state not only indirectly influ-
enced flows of labour and investment into different economic sectors through discrimina-
tory incentives (such as differential tax rates) but also very directly as the country’s largest 
investor. 
At the beginning, the new strategy was very successful. Egypt’s annual 6 per cent eco-
nomic growth rate surpassed that of most developing regions, while industrial production 
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increased even faster and became much more diversified. Productivity also rose significant-
ly as a result of industrial policies that allowed for the utilisation of formerly unused capaci-
ties – including labour that had never been put to work (Galal / El-Megharbel 2005, 6). 
However, in 1967, following Egypt’s defeat in the Six-Day War, the defect in its statist 
experiment became evident. While domestic products had been successfully substituted 
for many imported primary and consumption goods, Egypt had become dependent on im-
ported capital goods to produce its import substitutes. Since Egypt had hardly any prod-
ucts to sell on world markets, it was using up the country’s foreign reserves to finance its 
imports. Between 1948 and 1973, Egypt’s share of global exports shrunk from 1.0 to 
0.2 per cent of global trade (Weiss / Wurzel 1998, 23; Pawelka 1993, 78; Zaki 1999, 73). 
Open-door policies under Sadat (1970–1981) 
Shortly after Egypt’s 1967 defeat, Nasser prepared to shift economic policies from a statist 
to a more mixed economy but his plans were only a half-hearted reform and have not been 
implemented before Nasser died in 1970.  
When Anwar as-Sadat succeeded Nasser in office, it had become obvious that Egypt had 
to export at least some goods in order to finance its imports. But developing new export 
sectors required investments that the country could not afford. After the 1967 war, Egypt 
was nearly bankrupt, and the statist experiments had almost eliminated the private sector. 
Again the challenge was to mobilise funds for investments in new industries. Sadat decid-
ed to solicit foreign capital. His plan was to “harness Arab capital, western technology 
and Egyptian resources by removing Nasser’s statist shackles which were seen to have 
restricted growth and initiative” (Bromley / Bush 1994, 202). 
Egypt’s new infitāħ (open-door) policy was largely based on multiple tax holidays and 
reductions for foreign private investors. All foreign capital was accorded comprehensive 
legal protection against expropriation as well as the right to be fully re-exported at any 
time. In 1977, these rights and provisions were extended to domestic private investors 
(Djoufelkit-Cottenet 2008, 6; Hill 2003, 81; Pawelka 1985, 308 f.; Soliman 1999, 44). 
However, the Egyptian government had not abandoned the idea of guiding economic de-
velopment, including that of the private sector. Although it was unable to drive private 
investment flows the same way it could allocate public funds into specific sectors, it could 
differentiate tax, customs and interest rates by sector, product and location (rural/urban) in 
order to make private investments in certain economic sectors more attractive than in oth-
ers and channel resources from one sector or from one group of people to another. One 
example was the food sector: Egyptian farmers had to sell their crops below international 
market levels to the state, which resold the items abroad at much higher prices, thereby 
generating revenue that was used to finance the subsidisation of food, water and energy 
for urban households: the state thus transferred income from farmers to the urban lower 
and middle classes (Pawelka 1985, 158; Pawelka 1993, 76). In addition, the exchange rate 
was divided into three tariffs: the most favourable was for state-owned enterprises in stra-
tegic areas (petrochemicals, textiles and processed food), the second was for other state-
owned enterprises and the least favourable was for private enterprises (Djoufelkit–
Cottenet 2008, 8; Zaki 1999, 87). 
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These industrial policies were even more vertical and preferential than Nasser’s because 
they artificially created winners and losers within a single private economic sector. Some 
entrepreneurs in large traditional sectors such as agriculture lost out, but others benefited. 
Some understood that they could make substantial gains in certain economic niches from 
favourable combinations of low tax rates, low customs tariffs for imported inputs, heavy 
protection against foreign competition and reduced red tape. Businesspeople with good 
connections (wasţa) to the regime – the so-called parasitic entrepreneurs – made fortunes. 
Some used their connections to policy-makers to circumvent restrictions and controls and 
obtain permits and licences before their competitors, or to learn about changes in regula-
tions, tax rates, trade rules and new profitable business opportunities early. Others benefit-
ed from the state’s inability to implement its development plans: it depended on private 
contractors to expand infrastructure (including roads, telephone lines and sewage sys-
tems), construct social housing and public buildings, and import essential goods. Only 
well connected investors had a prayer of getting these kinds of public contracts. Some who 
did were able to build business empires from scratch; in fact, many of today’s Egyptian 
business stars rose as ‘parasitic entrepreneurs’ during the 1970s (Wurzel 2007, 18 f.). 
The macro-economic results of Sadat’s infitāħ policy were disappointing. Egypt was una-
ble to attract significant amounts of foreign investment, and owners of local capital were 
hesitant to invest in domestic industry. Nevertheless, a few of the most heavily protected 
manufacturing industries – food, leather, wood, textiles and construction – did manage to 
attract some private investment. But the state continued to be Egypt’s largest investor, 
making 75 per cent of all investments (Djoufelkit–Cottenet 2008, 14 and 19; Galal / El-
Megharbel 2005, 16; Hill 2003, 81). 
Egypt’s state-owned enterprises were always in the red despite the fact that (or because) 
they were heavily protected from competition. More and more state-owned enterprises had 
to be subsidised because they were unprofitable. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
Egypt’s manufacturing sector deteriorated: the overall level of investment stagnated at 
25.5 per cent of GDP, manufactured exports declined from 4 to 1 per cent of GDP and im-
ports rose from 10 to 15 per cent of GDP (Beblawi 2008, 23; Pawelka 1993, 129; Weiss / 
Wurzel 1998, 35). 
Even worse, full employment – a cornerstone of Egypt’s social contract – was more and 
more difficult to realise. Until the late 1970s, the public administration had absorbed large 
numbers of the unemployed. Thanks to rising external income from oil and gas exports, 
Suez Canal user fees and taxes on remittance inflows, the government was able to finance 
swelling public-sector employment for quite a while. But when international energy prices 
collapsed in the 1980s, it had to abandon this policy. There was more unemployment in 
Egypt and some other Arab countries than anywhere else (Nabli et al. 2006). 
Open-door policies under Mubarak (1981–1991) 
In 1981, when Hosni Mubarak succeeded Sadat, who had been assassinated by an Islam-
ist, he indicated little interest in economic policies. He knew that Sadat’s infitāħ policy 
had failed to attract additional investment and bring about structural change. But he was 
afraid of distorting Egypt’s power balance, which largely depended on the generation of 
rents for specific social groups. Mubarak viewed economic and social issues through a 
security lens (Wurzel 2007). 
Industr
German
Figur
Sourc
Mubar
for inv
econo
pound
(Djou
For so
reache
turing
produ
Privat
6 per c
But M
increa
promo
pete w
sector
A thir
and pu
lic, Sa
the po
militar
ported
tourism
ial policy in E
 Developmen
e 2: Egypt
e: own des
ak continu
estments i
mic free z
 (EGP) in 
felkit–Cotte
me years,
d an annua
 on total G
ctivity of E
e manufact
ent (Djouf
ubarak con
singly usin
te structura
ith one in 
 (Nabli et a
d enterprise
blic sector
dat and Mu
pular and 
y’s privile
 the militar
, construc
gypt 2004–20
t Institute / D
’s three grow
ign, data from
ed Sadat’s 
n Egypt’s m
ones. He a
order to m
net 2008, 6
 Mubarak’
l 7.5 per ce
DP rose fr
gypt’s indu
uring outpu
elkit–Cotte
tinued to d
g the diffe
l change. E
the public s
l. 2006, 16)
 sector bel
s. Although
barak tried
powerful M
ges untouch
y’s develo
tion, white
11 
eutsches Inst
th spurts (19
 IMF (2009a
efforts to d
anufacturi
lso abando
ake Egypt
; Soliman 
s policy ap
nt during th
om 13.5 pe
strial work
t rose by 13
net 2008, 1
istinguish b
rentials to 
ach time a
ector, the i
. 
onging to th
 the army h
 to limit its
inister of 
ed. In orde
pment of co
 goods, veh
itut für Entwi
80–2010) 
); IMF (2010)
eregulate 
ng sector t
ned centra
ian produc
1998, 6 and
peared to 
e early 198
r cent in 
ers increas
 per cent p
3; Soliman 
etween lev
support an
 firm in the
ncentive str
e Egyptian
ad always 
 influence o
Defence, A
r to co-op
mmercial 
icles, ferti
cklungspolitik
 
domestic m
hrough tax 
l planning 
ts more co
 49−52). 
be success
0s (see Fig
1981 to 18
ed by mor
er year and
1998, 16).
els of price
d protect p
 private se
ucture was
 military em
been at the
n politics. 
bd al-Hali
t the army’
activities in
liser, mine
 (DIE) 
arkets and 
holidays an
and devalu
mpetitive o
ful. Real e
ure 2), the s
.0 per cent 
e than 3 pe
 public sect
, customs a
ublic secto
ctor began 
 altered to 
erged alon
heart of the
In 1989, M
m Abu Gh
s higher ran
 different s
ral water, o
create ince
d the creat
ed the Eg
n world m
conomic g
hare of ma
in 1987, a
r cent each
or output r
nd interest 
r companie
to seriously
benefit the 
gside the p
 Egyptian 
ubarak dism
azala but l
ks, he eve
ectors (inc
lives and b
23
ntives 
ion of 
yptian 
arkets 
rowth 
nufac-
nd the 
 year. 
ose by 
rates – 
s, not 
 com-
public 
rivate 
repub-
issed 
eft the 
n sup-
luding 
read), 
Markus Loewe 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 24 
which were partly financed by the sale of valuable land around Cairo and along the coasts 
to private investors. National accounting reports do not include information about the mili-
tary economic sector but some observers believe that it has swollen to a fifth – some even 
say a third – of Egypt’s GDP (Clover / Khalaf 2011; Demmelhuber 2011; Ginsburg 2011; 
Jacobs 2011).  
In any case, after 1985, Egypt’s manufacturing sector remained too small and too weak to 
compensate for the decline in world oil prices, which severely affected Egypt’s income 
from hydrocarbon exports, remittances and Suez Canal user fees. At the same time, global 
interest rates rose. These two factors created a crisis in the Egyptian economy: the state 
ran out of money and could not invest in manufacturing, so output stagnated. Although the 
private sector continued to grow by 8 per cent per annum, in 1990, it accounted at most for 
23 per cent of Egypt’s manufacturing sector output, 25 per cent of its employees and 
45 per cent of its exports. The national economic growth rate dropped to 1.9 per cent, de-
creasing annual per-capita income by 0.6 per cent. For the first time ever, the official un-
employment rate rose above 10 per cent. In 1989, the Egyptian state was bankrupt (Al-
brecht / Pawelka / Schlumberger 1998, 141; Soliman 1998, 16; Weiss / Wurzel 1998, 36). 
Hesitant adjustment and privatisation 
The regime was forced to accept International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
conditions in order to be granted a stand-by credit, an extended fund facility, debt relief 
from the Paris Club and a World Bank loan to finance a comprehensive stabilisation and 
structural adjustment package. In return, it promised to cut back government spending, pri-
vatise state-owned enterprises, deregulate markets and liberalise trade (Abou Shnief / 
Handoussa 2001, 156; Zaki 1999, 89).  
In the following years, the government (i) reduced public spending in all areas (especially 
subsidies for energy and food, and in the social sectors), (ii) extended tax holidays for pri-
vate investors, (iii) began to liberalise the financial sector, (iv) decontrolled most com-
modity prices, (v) reduced customs duties, non-tariff trade barriers and capital transfer 
restrictions, and (vi) pegged the Egyptian Pound (after a 10 per cent devaluation) to the 
US dollar (Albrecht / Pawelka / Schlumberger 1998, 144f.; Djoufelkit–Cottenet 2008, 
7−8; Wurzel 2003, 106) 
However, little progress was made in privatising public enterprises. The entire public 
manufacturing sector was restructured, and several enterprises were granted more auton-
omy and the right to compete. The government also prepared 314 state-owned enterprises 
(15 per cent of their total), with a book value of USD 80 billion, for privatisation. Not in-
cluded were military businesses, with a book value of at least USD 200 billion and proba-
bly much more. They are said to be much more efficient than government enterprises, but 
no one – in or outside the regime – has ever proposed privatising them. Then, shortly after 
being announced, the privatisation of public enterprises lost momentum. Every now and 
then, the government publicised its intention to sell one or another of the 314 earmarked 
enterprises, but very few were actually sold before 1996. In 1999, when donors called on 
the Egyptian government to make more efforts, the privatisation process regained some 
momentum. By 2004, however, only 93 state-owned enterprises had been sold; another 
110 had been partly privatised (Jacobs 2011; Kienle 2003, 152; Weiss / Wurzel 1998, 
68−72; Wurzel 2003, 106). 
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Nevertheless, the economic reforms of the 1990s triggered a second growth spurt after 
1980 (see Figure 2). GDP per capita increased annually by 3 per cent and the manufactur-
ing sector’s total-factor productivity rose by 1 per cent. These developments allowed the 
government to reduce its budget deficit from 20 to 1 per cent of GDP, lower inflation from 
21 to 6 per cent and cut debt-service spending from 49 to 13 per cent of total government 
spending between 1989 and 1997 (Enders 2007, 3; Galal / El-Megharbel 2005, Table 3). 
Growth was mainly due to an increase in the country’s external income (from remittances 
and Suez Canal user fees) and a private investment boom that was triggered by the liberal-
isation of markets and prices, reductions in tax and customs tariffs and the deregulation of 
the financial sector – as well as the provision of cheap land with good low-cost infrastruc-
ture around Cairo and Alexandria. Private investments swelled from less than EGP 
500 million annually during the 1980s to EGP 5,000 million in 1996. Private-sector manu-
facturing output increased by 14 per cent per annum between 1990 and 2002 while public-
sector manufacturing output decreased by 2 per cent per annum. In 1997, the share of total 
exports of the private sector rose to 36 per cent. In 2003 its share of total industrial value-
added and employment reached 70 and 60 per cent, respectively (Weiss / Wurzel 1998, 40 
and 53; Zaki 1999, 101). 
At this time, well-connected businesspeople got new opportunities to bloat their for-
tunes. Some received preferential access to land sold by the state for housing and pri-
vate-sector development projects. Others were the first to learn about the deregulation 
of specific Egyptian markets or their opening to private investors – and as a result 
were able to get a head start in these sectors (telecommunications, TV, ports, airports, 
power plants and cement). Others again benefitted from the development of new sec-
tors such as software production or the tourism industry on the Sinai. And some who 
had started one economic activity in the 1970s were able to diversify in the 1990s and 
grow immensely large within a very short time. Skafianis (2004) has named them the 
‘whales of the Nile’ (Benhassine et al. 2009, 29 and 183; Chekir / Diwan 2013, 3; 
Wurzel 2007, 15). 
At the beginning of the new millennium, Egypt’s economy consisted of five distinct seg-
ments. (i) Government-owned enterprises continued to monopolise some strategic sectors 
like energy and to be active in others such as heavy industry. (ii) The army’s companies 
produced consumer goods for the domestic market and military supplies, and became ac-
tive in profitable, growing branches such as tourism. (iii) Traditional private companies 
produced handicrafts and import-substitutes. (iv) Foreign-owned companies mainly pro-
duced for world markets. (v) Modern domestic companies served the domestic and export 
markets. Many of these had been built up in the era of Sadat’s policies of market protec-
tion, tax holidays and preferential access to relevant market information.  
After a few years, however, Egypt’s second growth spurt slumped (see Figure 2). Annual 
per-capita growth fell to 1.7 per cent, manufacturing exports decreased from 2 to 1 per 
cent of GDP and FDI stagnated at 0.7 per cent of GDP. The government budget deficit 
increased again, the gross investment rate dropped to 16.5 per cent and poverty levels rose 
(Djoufelkit–Cottenet 2008, 8 f. and 13 f.; Enders 2007, 3). 
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Table 2:  Nominal and effective protection of selected manufacturing sectors in Egypt (2004) 
Manufacturing sector Nominal Effective 
Leather and leather products 29.5 36.1 
Clothes and footwear 26.7 31.6 
Rubber 13.6 14.9 
Textiles 9.2 10.3 
Paper and printing 10.2 9.7 
Food 7.8 9.3 
Wood and wood products 7.3 6.9 
Basic metals 5.9 3.7 
Chemical 4.8 3.2 
Source: Galal / El-Megharbel (2005, Table 4) 
Despite the government’s decade-long effort to diversify the economy, exports were still 
as concentrated in 2004 as in the early 1960s. Nasser’s import-substitution strategy had 
invigorated a number of new industries, many of which still exist: However, after 1980 at 
the latest, the diversity of manufacturing exports had decreased again: in 1983, the 12 
most important groups of export products accounted for 30 per cent of total exports, then 
rose to 37 per cent in 1992 and a whopping 59 per cent in 2003. This was partly due to the 
steep growth of the share of hydrocarbon products between 1987 and 2003; the share on 
total exports of the 11 other most important product groups rose from 15 per cent in 1983 
to 33 per cent in 1992 before dropping to 25 per cent in 2003. In 2003, the main export 
products were almost the same as in 1983. Only four product groups had been added to the 
group of 12 most important export products: rice (2 per cent of total exports), organic 
chemicals (2 per cent), coal and briquettes (1 per cent) and sanitary products (less than 
1 per cent) (Galal / El-Megharbel 2005, Table 1). And Table 2 shows that the effective 
protection rates of some manufacturing sectors were still substantial in 2004. 
3.4  The political constellation between 2004 and 2011 
In 2004, Egypt’s economic policy was more radically modified than at any time since the 
days of Gamal Abdel Nasser. President Mubarak understood that another reform package 
was necessary not only to sustain a level of economic growth that could provide employ-
ment for the growing population but also to appease the market-friendly wing of the ruling 
National Democratic Party (NDP) and extend his power base. He appointed businessman 
Ahmed Nazif prime minister and charged him with fundamentally revising economic poli-
cy. Nazif formed the first cabinet that was dominated by entrepreneurs (Djoufelkit–
Cottenet 2008, 10−11; ESCWA 2008, 5; Salsecci et al. 2008, 18). 
The significance of this act can be understood in the history of the republican Egyptian 
regime, which had not come to power through a revolution of the masses but through a 
coup d’état. The army had always been the dominant pillar of the regime. Nasser, Sadat 
and Mubarak all had military careers. Each of them had used a ruling party and the state 
bureaucracy as the second and third pillars of power, with the army always at the centre 
– especially after Sadat’s assassination, when Mubarak invoked martial law (Pawelka 
1985, 38 f.). 
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Traditionally, most Egyptians in the army, bureaucracy and ruling parties have come from 
the middle class: some were intellectuals or artists, while others came from worker, small 
trader or craftsman families and sought to use the army, party and public administration as 
vehicles for social advancement. This group tends to favour a statist mode of develop-
ment, some protection for the domestic market, and social benefits for the middle classes 
and poor (food and energy subsidies, social housing, public employment, free health care, 
etc.). The regime must pay to legitimise its rule through a ‘social contract’ – the leaders’ 
offer of material goods to the population in exchange for its political consent.  
This type of exchange was possible because Egypt had – and still has – substantial sources 
of external income, including gas exports, Suez Canal user fees and development assis-
tance (see Chapter 2). When these financial inflows were abundant (as in the late 1970s), 
the government could easily offer a job in the public administration to every university 
graduate (Pawelka 1997, 7). 
Unfortunately, it became increasingly difficult to finance this policy. After 1985, income 
from external sources shrunk with the collapse of world energy prices, while the number 
of recipients of social benefits increased as a result of Egypt’s steady demographic 
growth. The government was forced to reduce the benefits, and risked losing its legitimacy 
in the ensuing social unrest. Partly to compensate for its loss of consent from the poor and 
middle classes, the regime attempted to appeal to private businesspeople. During Nasser’s 
statist experiments, entrepreneurs had largely disappeared, while the few who had man-
aged to remain in business shunned attention. Some rose up (again) with Sadat’s open 
door policies but many more with Mubarak’s adjustment and liberalisation programmes 
(Demmelhuber 2008, 104 f.). 
A number of top bureaucrats went into business at this time, in some cases using their ac-
cess to information about political decisions or market conditions to enter profitable nich-
es. Others purchased privatised enterprises at bargain prices. As a result, members of the 
regime began to analyse economic policies in entrepreneurial terms and better understand 
business. Bureaucrats-turned-businessmen and newly-sensitive-to-business-politicians 
began to form alliances – in many cases underpinned by personal ties such as marriage 
(Benhassine et al. 2009, 187; Chekir / Diwan 2013, 3; Pawelka 1997, 9).  
President Mubarak’s sons exemplify this trend: The elder Alaa developed extensive busi-
ness activities, including banking and media (Roll 2006, 19), while the younger Gamal 
worked as an investment banker in London between 1988 and 1996, before returning 
home to launch his political career. He established himself as a moderniser in the Political 
Secretariat of the NDP, the party’s heart, but remained well connected to the business 
world. After building a media holding company, he acquired shares of EFG-Hermes, a 
private equity firm located in Cyprus that started buying up shares of Egyptian companies 
at that time (Demmelhuber 2008, 106).  
From the mid-1990s, ever more Egyptian businesspeople joined the NDP and made their 
parliamentary débuts. Prior to 2000, only 8 per cent of all deputies were businesspeople; 
after that year’s elections, their share was 17 per cent. This was partly due to the fact that 
the business elite had generously funded the NDP electoral campaign. Although their in-
fluence in the parliamentary plenum was not particularly strong, they had a near monopoly 
of some key committees (Al-Ahram Weekly 831/2007; Demmelhuber / Roll 2007, 21).  
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The businessmen-deputies did not all share the same goals; in fact, they clashed on sev-
eral topics. For example, a group of entrepreneurs around Ahmed Ezz who benefited 
from the remnants of Egypt’s market protection, worked with the NDP’s left wing and 
labour unions to successfully block all the initiatives to further liberalise foreign trade 
that were introduced by more liberal (free-market) deputies around Youssef Boutros-
Ghali and Rashid Mohamed Rashid. Some businesspeople entered parliament not be-
cause they wanted to do politics but because they wanted to enjoy parliamentary immun-
ity. Despite the dissent among these groups, Gamal Mubarak was able to gather them 
behind himself.13 Soon, this group dominated not just Egyptian business associations, 
Egyptian economic-policy think tanks and chambers of commerce but also the Political 
Secretariat of the NDP and all party and parliamentary committees charged with devel-
oping economic policy. His group greatly influenced the NDP agenda as well as the na-
tional discourse.  
By 2002, Gamal had convinced his father and other influential NDP members that the re-
gime had no choice but to more radically privatise and liberalise the economy. He took it on 
himself and his friends to define a new agenda for Egypt to be implemented by a new gov-
ernment that was to be dominated by free-market economy oriented business-friendly minis-
ters or even businessmen themselves (Demmelhuber 2008, 106 f. and 203 ff.). 
Of course, both in- and outside the regime there was also opposition to Gamal & Co. 
and the implementation of their political ideas. In particular, members of mass organi-
sations (the women’s, labour and professional unions) and the public administration, as 
well as the army, viewed the entrepreneurs’ plans as threatening the country’s 
achievements, especially those made under Nasser: greater political and economic in-
dependence, land reform, redistribution of wealth, the strengthening of workers’ rights, 
etc. But the opponents in the regime were weak and less well organised than the free-
market wing. The army made a tacit deal to tolerate the reforms as long as the regime 
left its privileges intact and barred all competition to its economic activities, and Pres-
ident Mubarak – who occasionally played arbitrator by vetoing the free-market wing 
                                                 
13  The core group around Gamal Mubarak probably consisted of 20 people, the most important of whom 
were: (i) Onsi Sawiris and his three sons, Naguib, Samih and Nassef. By far the richest family on the 
African continent, the Sawiris own the leading Egyptian companies in telecommunications, tourism and 
construction. (ii) Ahmed Ezz, steel magnate and member of parliament, who headed the parliamentary 
budget committee for some years (see Section 5.2.4). (iii) Rashid Muhammad Rashid, owner of Fine 
Foods, a food-processing company and joint venture with Unilever, and major shareholder of EFG-
Hermes, a leading investment bank with headquarters in Cyprus that made a lot of money by purchasing 
Egyptian firms. (iv) Mohammad Lutfi Mansour, top entrepreneur in the Egyptian automobile and ma-
chinery industry, who bought large landholdings after the 1997 land reform and invested in construction, 
tobacco, large retail, also holds Egypt’s McDonalds franchise. (v) Salah Diab, owner of media and raw-
materials companies and Egypt’s Halliburton partner. (vi) Shafik Ghabr, principal shareholder in steel, 
construction and transportation companies, Egypt’s Skoda distributor and head of the American Cham-
ber of Commerce in Cairo. (vii) Ahmed Maghraby, Accor Egypt shareholder who bought large land-
holdings after the 1997 land reform and was appointed Minister of Housing in 2005. (viii) Ibrahim 
Kamel, owner of Kato Invest and shareholder in many food, tourism, construction and airplane-
construction companies. (ix) Hussein Salem, active in tourism and gastronomy. (x) Ahmed Nazif. 
(xi) Sameh Fahmi. (xii) Mahmoud Mohieldin. (xiii) Hossam Badrawi, owner of a private health insur-
ance company and one of Cairo’s biggest private hospitals. (xiv) Ahmed Heikal, founder of Citadel Cap-
ital and director of EFG-Hermes, a leading investment bank that supervised many privatisations and was 
partly owned by the Mubarak Family. (xv) Mohammed Abul Enain. (xvi) Ahmad Bahgat, owner of large 
real estate, tourism and media companies (Chekir / Diwan 2013; Demmelhuber 2008, 105–106 and 203–
205; Demmelhuber / Roll 2007, 21). 
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initiatives that offended too many Egyptians – was able to appease all other sceptical 
groups in the regime and society. 
When the Egyptian pound was floated in 2003, it immediately depreciated by more 
than 25 per cent, which caused Egyptian exports to become more competitive but in-
flation and poverty rates to shoot up. This unpopular measure was enacted before the 
formation of a new cabinet to protect it being culpable from the start (Demmelhuber 
2008, 104 f.).  
The new cabinet, appointed in 2004, was in the end headed by Prime Minister Ahmed 
Nazif, the former Minister for Communications and Information Technology who had 
overseen the modernisation of Egypt’s information and communication technology 
(ICT) sector. Nearly half of the 37 ministers belonged to the market-friendly wing14 of 
the regime led by Gamal Mubarak, while only about one-third came from the old wing 
of military-bureaucrats15. The cabinet’s make-up was meant to signal a new beginning in 
economic policies (Chekir / Diwan 2013, 3). 
Did this signal reflect reality? For decades, Egyptian government ministers had come 
from the state bureaucracy or the military – or possibly from a trade union or a farmers’ 
or professional association. Then in 2004, for the first time ever, most ministers were 
businesspeople. Did they change the course of Egypt’s industrial policy? When the new 
government was appointed, Egypt’s economy was still comparatively closed in terms of 
export and import and cross-border capital-transaction rates, and the share of its medi-
um- to high-tech manufacturing exports was very low – not only compared with coun-
tries in East Asia, Latin America or southern Africa but also with the rest of the Arab 
world. Could a cabinet with experienced entrepreneurs and economic experts make a 
difference in the drafting and implementation of economic development policies? Would 
it help make industrial policies more effective and more efficient because its members 
could better understand the problems and needs of businesspeople? Would it have posi-
tive – or at least neutral – effects on fairness and transparency in politics and policies? 
Or would the entrepreneurs in government favour themselves and their friends? Could 
the owner of a large hotel company who also ran the Tourism Ministry resist the tempta-
tion? What about the owner of an automobile import and assembling company who 
serves as Minister for Transportation? The owner of a food-processing company, which 
exports large shares of its products to Europe, who doubles as Minister for Trade and 
Energy? The Minister of Housing who also owns a construction company? The Minister 
of Health who works in the medical business?16 
Chapter 4 attempts to answer these questions.  
                                                 
14  They included: Tareq Kamel, Minister for ICT; Youssef Boutros-Ghali, Minister for Finance; Rashid 
Mohamed Rashid, Minister for Trade and Industry. Ali El-Sayed Ali Al-Moselhi, Minister for Social Sol-
idarity; Mahmoud Mohieldin, Minister of Investment; Sameh Fahmi, Minister for Petroleum; Mohamed 
Zohair Garana, Minister for Tourism; Alaa Ed-Din Fahmy, Minister for Transportation. Ahmed Alaa E-
Din El-Maghrabi, Minister for Housing. Hatem Mostafa El-Gabali, Minister for Health and Population; 
and Amin Abaza, Minister for Agriculture. 
15  They included: Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Minister of Defence; Ahmed Shafiq, Minister for Civil Avi-
ation; Habib El Adly, Minister of the Interior; Mohamed Mahgoub, Minister for Local Development; 
and Omar Suleiman, Minister Without Portfolio. 
16  Information from an interview with Angus Blair, head, Beltone FinancialJune 2009. 
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4 Strategies and instruments of industrial policies in Egypt from 2004 
to 2011 
The ‘businessmen cabinet’ of Ahmed Nazif rushed to give new impetus to economic re-
forms in Egypt. On its first day in office, it resumed the privatisation of state-owned en-
terprises, deepened customs, tax and administration reforms, liberalised the financial sec-
tor and rationalised market regulations. It also launched several strategies for private sec-
tor development that would constitute the core of industrial policy between 2004 and 
2011. 
As this chapter will show, these strategies were an improvement over earlier attempts to 
promote structural change because they had (i) a vision of Egypt’s economic development 
and (ii) were oriented to markets and demand. 
However, the strategies also suffered from a number of familiar weaknesses: (i) They were 
designed by a government that included influential entrepreneurs but had no broader pri-
vate sector participation. (ii) Their achievements were not well monitored. (iii) The divi-
sion of labour between implementing agencies remained unclear. (iv) The business devel-
opment services (BDSs) that were offered did not meet real needs. (v) Several pro-
grammes favoured some enterprises over others, and although in principle discrimination 
can help direct investments in a specific direction, this was not based on any kind of ra-
tional analysis. (vi) Some programmes provided very generous financial support with no 
conditions regarding recipient performance or behaviour. 
Section 4.1 sketches the general shift in economic policy under Nazif. Sections 4.2, 4.3 
and 4.4 portray the strategies used by the three main industrial-policies players: the Minis-
try for Trade and Industry, the Social Fund for Development and the Ministry of Investment. 
Section 4.5 summarises the strengths and weaknesses of the strategies. 
4.1  General economic policy reforms 
After just one year in office, the new government had privatised 87 state-owned enterpris-
es, including companies in economic branches that had never been considered for privati-
sation because of strategic considerations. Between 1994 and 2004, only 21 companies 
were privatised each year. During that period, the average annual earnings from privatisa-
tions were EGP 1.7 billion; in 2005, they jumped to EGP 15.1 billion. The receipts partly 
had to compensate for the government’s budget deficit (Demmelhuber / Roll 2007, 10). 
In 2005, a new income-tax law was approved that (i) reduced marginal tax rates, 
(ii) broadened the tax base, (iii) uniformly assessed all kinds of income, (iv) introduced 
administrative improvements in tax collection and (v) created a number of tax incentives 
for investors (Ghorfa 2009b, 87). 
In 2004 and 2007, customs tariffs and procedures were reformed in two steps 2004 and 
2007. Customs clearance was simplified by reducing the necessary steps from 26 to five 
and customs duties were lowered from an average of more than 14.6 to less than 7 per cent 
– while the number of customs-duty rates was cut from 27 to six (Demmelhuber 2008, 
192; OECD 2007, 42). 
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The regulatory framework for investors was also greatly simplified. For example, the 
number of administrative steps for starting a business was reduced from 10 to six, the du-
ration of the procedure from 22 to seven days and its cost from 105 to 16 per cent of per-
capita income. The minimum amount of capital needed to start a business was slashed 
from 740 per cent of per-capita income to virtually zero (see Annex, Table A1). 
Perhaps even more important, the financial sector was liberalised and most of the re-
maining obstacles to foreign investment were removed. At the same time, mergers and 
acquisitions, privatisations and reorganisations in the name of efficiency helped make 
some domestic banks and insurance companies fit to compete with international provid-
ers. For the first time, a state-owned bank, the Bank of Alexandria, was sold – to the 
Italian investment bank Sanpaolo IMI. The Central Bank of Egypt was authorised to 
supervise all financial transactions. Cross-border capital flow was deregulated and regu-
lations for financial service provisions within Egypt were rationalised. As a result, both 
households and businesses could more easily access credit (Demmelhuber / Roll 2007, 
11; Demmelhuber 2008, 191). 
Some sectors, however, remain closed to foreigners: maritime traffic, aviation, legal 
advice, architecture, engineering services, accounting, international trade intermediation, 
energy production, fixed network telephony, railway traffic, postal services, steel and 
aluminium production, fertiliser production, construction (minority participation is per-
mitted) and insurance (foreign firms may only operate in the free zone) (OECD 2007, 
31−33). 
A competition law was drafted and an ‘Egypt Competition Authority’ was established 
with reasonable instruments to check for a provider’s market dominance. But the author-
ity has hardly any instruments to prosecute and punish violations of the competition law; 
only the prime minister can initiate prosecution. In addition, some sectors – such as the 
telecommunications industry – were excluded from its purview (Demmelhuber / Roll 
2007, 12). 
For the first time since Nasser, commodity subsidies were cut significantly: the price of 
petrol rose by as much as 50 per cent, electricity by 19 per cent and water by 100 per cent. 
This helped push consumer price inflation to 18 per cent in 2008 (Brach / Loewe 2010, 
Table 5; Demmelhuber 2008, 195). 
4.2 The ‘Egypt Industrial Development Strategy’ of the Ministry for Trade and 
Industry 
After being appointed prime minister in 2004, Ahmed Nazif created the Ministry for 
Trade and Industry (MFTI) to unite the three ministries for trade, state-owned enterprises 
and industry under one roof. The MFTI became the principal player in industrial policy – 
along with the Ministry of Investment (MOI) and the Social Fund for Development (SFD). 
An overview of the agencies that belong to these three ministries and their activities is 
shown in Figure 3. 
 
 F
ig
ur
e 
3:
 
Eg
So
ur
ce
: 
ow
n 
dy
pt
ia
n 
in
du
st
ri
al
 p
de
sig
n 
po
lic
y:
 T
he
 a
ct
or
s a
nd
 th
ei
r 
re
sp
on
sii
bi
lit
ie
s 
 
Industrial policy in Egypt 2004–2011 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 33
In 2006, the MFTI issued the ‘Egypt Industrial Development Strategy’ (EIDS), the Nazif 
government’s main policy document for private sector development. It explicitly excludes 
(i) companies in the tourism and hydrocarbon sectors, (ii) micro-enterprises (with fewer 
than 10 employees) and (iii) small companies (with fewer than 50 employees) – as well as 
(iv) non-manufacturing companies.  
The EIDS was drafted between 2004 and 2005 by a group of experts appointed by the 
MFTI.17 Although it included some businesspeople in addition to top bureaucrats and aca-
demics, the private sector was not formally involved. The entrepreneurs in the expert 
group – who were authorised to speak on behalf of all private companies in the relevant 
sectors – had been neither democratically elected nor appointed in a transparent procedure 
to speak on behalf of all private companies in the relevant sectors. Many of them belonged 
to Gamal Mubarak’s group (Demmelhuber 2008).  
The EIDS sets clear implementation targets and indicators, with the main goal of sustain-
ing growth and providing employment through “a significant increase in gross domestic 
investment” (MFTI 2006, 13). However, it is not concerned about poverty or inequality 
and includes very few references to environmental sustainability. 
Nevertheless, the document is still effective – de jure and de facto.  
The EIDS takes a vertical approach to industrial policy, focusing on selected manufactur-
ing sectors that the government should support. It also recommends that a development 
strategy be drafted for each sector. However, its long list includes almost all the important 
manufacturing sectors – which makes the policy based on this document resemble a hori-
zontal approach.18 
The EIDS defines eight fields of action (to be portrayed in detail below): (i) human re-
sources and entrepreneurship, (ii) access to finance, (iii) infrastructure, (iv) innovation and 
technology, (v) quality assurance, (vi) enterprise competitiveness, (vii) exports and 
(viii) FDIs.  
Three years after the EIDS was drafted, the Internal Trade Development Agency (ITDA) 
was created for enterprises that produce for the domestic market, a ninth field of action.  
A separate ‘board of trustees’ was named to monitor progress in each field. But nearly the 
same names appear on all the boards. It is the same group that drafted the EIDS document 
                                                 
17  The group was chaired by Samir Radwan, then managing director of the Economic Research Forum, 
who became Minister of Finance for a couple of months after the revolution in 2011. The IMC was rep-
resented by Nihal El-Megharbel. Other members included Helmy Abu-Laisch, Hany Barakat and Ad-
ham Nadeem (interview with Hany Barakat, first undersecretary, MFTI, 17 June 2009). 
18  The strategy focuses on eight traditional sectors as well as six new ones, referred to as ‘target niches’. 
The traditional sectors include (i) engineering and electrical machinery, (ii) food processing, 
(iii) chemicals and pharmaceuticals, (iv) textiles and garments, (v) building materials, (vi) furniture, 
(vii) paper and paperboard and (viii) leather. The new sectors are (i) engineering machinery and equip-
ment (including those for generating renewable energies), (ii) labour-intensive consumer electronics, 
(iii) automotive components, (iv) life sciences, (v) biotechnology and (vi) ethnic products. (Cf. MFTI 
(2006, 16) 
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– a small group of academics, entrepreneurs and top bureaucrats with good connections to 
one or more of the Nazif cabinet businessmen-ministers.19 
Human resources and entrepreneurship 
The target of the first component of the EIDS was (i) to provide on-the-job training for 
workers upon the request of their employers and (ii) to strengthen the technology focus of 
such training (MFTI 2006, 21). 
The Industrial Training Council was established to assess current and future training needs 
and to plan and coordinate the national training offer in cooperation with other state agen-
cies and the Federation of Egyptian Industries (ibid.). 
Meanwhile, competing public and private providers have begun to offer on-the-job training, 
and can provide entrepreneurs with free assessments of their employees’ training needs. The 
training is not free, but employers can apply for a cost refund of as much as 90 per cent 
(95 per cent in Upper Egypt) from the Industrial Modernisation Centre (IMC, see below) for 
training institutes accredited by the Egyptian Accreditation Council (MFTI 2006, 22 and 36). 
Access to finance 
The second component of the EIDS aimed at facilitating private investors’ access to capi-
tal. While the strategy document lists many measures that were needed, its final version 
did not name any specific government actions (MFTI 2006, 31 f.).  
Provision of land infrastructure 
The third component aimed at improving the accessibility and quality of the physical and 
digital infrastructure for enterprises. The Industrial Development Authority (IDA) was 
assigned to (i) manage the state-owned industrial zones, (ii) provide land and infrastruc-
ture to enterprises in these zones (or elsewhere), and (iii) facilitate cooperation between 
the zones so as to encourage formation of industrial clusters.20 
The IDA regularly announces plots that are for sale in government-owned industrial 
zones. If there is more than one bid (on average, there are two), the first applicant gets the 
land unless another bidder already owns a plot in the same zone.  
Between 2006 and 2009, 21 million m2 of land were sold to 2,335 companies – in the au-
tomobile, textile, medical devices and shipbuilding industries – for a total of EGP 
32 billion (IDA 2009b).  
The IDA is not responsible, however, for the heavy industries (aluminium, steel, cement, 
etc.), which have industrial zones administered by the Ministry of Housing. This exception 
is because heavy industries consume more energy and pollute more than other industries. 
They were intentionally located near the Aswan Dam, which supplies them with power. 
                                                 
19  Interview with Hassan Omar, MFTI, 17 June 2009. 
20  The IDA section is based on information from IDA (2009b) and MFTI (2006, 33 f.) as well as inter-
views with Ashraf Dowidar, IDA, 21 June 2009 and Steven Lee, consultant, 2 May 2010. 
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IDA is monitored by the MFTI on the basis of monthly reports on output indicators such 
as the number of plots sold or the number of customers. But it is not controlled for effec-
tiveness (impact), efficiency and transparency or fairness of land allocations. 
Innovation and technology transfer 
The objective of the fourth EIDS component was “to upgrade the Egyptian industrial sec-
tor from being technologically excluded to being a technological adopter in the medium 
term” (MFTI 2006, 24). Its main instrument is the Egypt Technology Transfer and Inno-
vation Centres (ETTICs): 12 non-profit organisations that, for a price, provide Egyptian 
companies with appropriate technological solutions and know-how – either by putting the 
companies in contact with Egyptian universities and research centres or by purchasing the 
technology abroad (MFTI 2009c, 4). 
On one hand, companies can request these services from the ETTICs and on the other, in 
order to identify private sector needs, the ETTICs also regularly conduct demand surveys 
in collaboration with export councils, new industrial clusters and the Federation of Egyp-
tian Industries (MFTI 2006, 25f.; MFTI 2009c, 4). 
The ETTICs’ performance is assessed on the basis of monthly reports about output indica-
tors such as the number of companies served, products certified and technology-transfer 
contracts.21 
Ten of the ETTICs have sectoral or sub-sectoral orientations in: (i) engineering, (ii) food 
processing, (iii) furniture production, (iv) jewellery, (v) leather processing, (vi) leather 
tanning, (vii) marble and granite, (viii) plastics, (ix) textiles and clothing, and (x) fashion 
and design. Each is monitored by the board of the chamber of commerce or industry of its 
respective economic sector. 
The remaining two ETTICs – the Egypt National Cleaner Production Centre and the Kai-
zen Productivity and Quality Improvement Center, an Egyptian-Japanese initiative – have 
crosscutting tasks. 
Other actors have also established technology centres: The SFD runs technology centres 
for micro- and small enterprises (MSEs) (see below). In cooperation with private enter-
prises and universities, the Ministry of Interior founded R&D Centres of Excellence, 
which focus on the ICT sector. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) established the Egyptian Traceability Centre for Agro-Industrial Exports (e-
Trace) to promote new technologies in Egyptian agriculture and agro-industries. In 2010, 
the Ministry of Communication established the Technology Innovation and Entrepreneurs-
hip Centre (TIEC) to compensate for the lack of R&D in MSEs in the ICT sector.22 
                                                 
21  Interviews with Ahmed Fouad Mandour, Food Technology Centre, 22 June 2009 and Hassan Omar, 
MFTI, 17 June 2009. 
22  Interviews with Alaa Fahmy, director, Agriculture and Agro-Industries Technology Centre (UNIDO/ 
ETRACE), 22 February 2012 and Dalia Gamal, Technology Innovation and Entrepreneurship Center 
(TIEC), 4 March 2012. 
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National quality system 
The EIDS has also established a national quality system to align Egyptian manufacturing 
with international norms and standards, thereby facilitating Egyptian exports. Not less 
than six institutions have assumed tasks within this system.23 
Enterprise competitiveness 
The Industrial Modernisation Centre (IMC) is the core of the EIDS. It provides funds to 
companies for the following modernisation efforts: 
— on-the-job training for workers (e.g. functional language courses and IT) 
— training for entrepreneurs (e.g. foreign trade) 
— quality management (establishing standards, calibrating, laboratory upgrading)  
— information and communications technology systems upgrades 
— innovation and R&D 
— technology transfer 
— export development (e.g. market research and export strategies) 
Until 2008, the IMC refunded up to 80 per cent of the total costs for modernisation in 
Lower Egypt and as much as 90 per cent in Upper Egypt. In reaction to the global eco-
nomic and financial crisis, the respective shares were further raised to 90 and 95 per cent, 
respectively.24 
The IMC can provide a subsidy of 10 per cent for the total costs of urgently needed 
equipment (up to EGP 100,000) (MFTI 2006, 36; IMC 2008, 5). 
These services are restricted, however, to formal private-sector industrial entities with at 
least 10 full-time, socially insured workers and rising sales in the previous three years.25 
This means that enterprises with fewer than 10 employees and informal enterprises (which 
have not registered their employees with the National Social Insurance Organisation, 
NSIO) are not served by the IMC. Additional conditions for participating stipulate that the 
                                                 
23  The National Quality Council monitors all the activities of the national quality system. The Egyptian Or-
ganization for Standardization and Quality is supposed to bring Egypt in line with international standards. 
The Egyptian Accreditation Council is responsible for accrediting bodies that assess conformity (including 
calibration and testing laboratories). The National Institute for Standards checks that the results of calibra-
tion and testing do not significantly deviate from international norms. The Industrial Control Authority 
monitors the products of industrial firms to ensure compliance with national and international standards, 
and the National Quality Institute raises awareness about existing standards and norms and explains their 
significance for individual and collective economic development. Cf. MFTI (2006, 27–30). 
24  Since the global economic and financial crisis started, firms in Lower and Upper Egypt have been reim-
bursed for 90 or 95%, respectively, of their upgrading costs, provided these were less than EUR 5,000; 
87.5 or 93.75% for costs below EUR 20,000; 85 or 92.5% for costs below EUR 30,000; 72.5 or 91.75% 
for costs below EUR 40,000; 80 or 90% for costs below EUR 50,000 and a lump sum of EUR 400,000 
or 450,000 in other cases. The maximum support equals 10% of annual sales (turnover) for BDSs, plus 
10% of annual sales for R&D and 4% of annual sales for consultancies by resident experts (IMC 2009, 
13f.; interview with Ahmed Wahab, Engineering Export Council, 25 June 2009). 
25  This includes 12,355 companies, 1,315 of which have more than 200 employees, 2,718 with 50 to 200 
employees and 8,302 with 10 to 50 employees (interview with Hassan Omar, MFTI, 17 June 2009). 
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company must (i) have been operating for at least two years, (ii) have an industrial or 
commercial registry (if applicable), (iii) have growth potential, (iv) operate transparently, 
(v) belong to the Federation of Egyptian Industries (if applicable), (vi) undergo a full as-
sessment prior to implementation and sign a memorandum of understanding about the 
company’s development plan (IMC 2008, 3; Salsecci et al. 2008, 41). 
The IMC also runs three more specialised programmes:  
The National Supplier Development Programme takes a value-chain approach to upgrad-
ing the local suppliers of the top 100 Egyptian manufacturing companies with high export 
potential. Each of these ‘mother companies’ may invite five to 20 of their local suppliers 
to join the programme if they prove serious commitment to the programme’s goal of tech-
nical upgrading and their desire to grow through exporting, and contribute to their techno-
logical upgrading costs.  
In this case, the IMC can:  
— provide an individual analysis of each supplier’s technological gaps and upgrading 
needs to meet the standards defined by its ‘mother company’; 
— provide the supplier with technical assistance to close its technological gaps; and 
— consult the supplier about financial matters and provide credit, if needed. 
In the first round, the programme provided support to 20 suppliers of General Motors. In 
the second round, it assisted another 220 suppliers of 30 mother companies (many of them 
also in the automobile sector) with their technical upgrading efforts. Mercedes reported 
that after taking part in the programme, its Egyptian suppliers’ average productivity in-
creased 35 per cent and waste was reduced by 45 per cent. One supplier confirmed that 
after participating in the programme its productivity had increased by 25 per cent and its 
costs decreased by 40 per cent. 26 
The Clusters Development Programme supports SME clusters with their collective tech-
nical upgrading efforts. It provides technical and financial assistance for innovation and 
export promotion, starting with one cluster in the dairy sector and one cluster in the auto-
mobile industry (IMC 2008, 43 f.). 
The 1,000 New Factories Programme provides training, marketing assistance and tech-
nical support in product design to 1,000 medium-size companies during start-up and ex-
pansion (IMC 2008, 40f.; IMC 2009, 71). 
For the period between 2005 and 2010, the IMC budget was EUR 426 million, 250 million 
(59 per cent) of which were contributed by the EU, 103 million (24 per cent) by the Gov-
ernment of Egypt and 73 million by the private sector (17 per cent from user fees). In 
2009, the IMC had exhausted its funds from the EU, but the MFTI mobilised new sources 
of funds to help the IMC continue to function. Today, the IMC has 17 offices with 85 cus-
tomer service agents.27 
                                                 
26  Interview with Mohammed Ismail, project manager, IMC, 3 May 2010. 
27  IMC (2008, 3); MFTI (2006, 36); Salsecci et al. (2008, 41); interviews with Ahmed Abd-el-Fattah, 
Contistahl Group, 29 April 2010 and Hany Barakat, first undersecretary, MFTI, 17 June 2009. 
Markus Loewe 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 38 
The IMC is required to report monthly to the MFTI about its activities: inputs and outputs. 
It also monitors client development on the basis of four indicators: total sales, total ex-
ports, investments and number of employees.28 
Export promotion 
The aim of the seventh component of the EIDS is to help Egypt export more manufactured 
goods. The Export Council grants subsidies for textile, engineering, chemical and food 
exports. The initial subsidy was 10 per cent of the value of the exported goods but it was 
raised to 15 per cent after the start of the global economic and financial crisis.29 
Politicians, entrepreneurs and researchers in Egypt see no problem with export subsidies 
violating international trade agreements: 
“Of course, export subsidies are against WTO rules in theory. However, in practice 
as you know, all countries are now subsidising their exports – especially after the cri-
sis. Also, I would not say that this subsidy is distortive. Exporters get the refund only 
after they have successfully exported.” (Hanaa Kheir el-Din, then Executive Director, 
Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, 2 May 2010) 
The Export Council also provides financial and technical support to help exporters devel-
op strategies and present their products at fairs and exhibitions. Every now and then it or-
ganises its own fairs and exhibitions or presents national products at an Egyptian stand in 
an international fair. In 2008, the council provided 1,960 services to 1,138 exporters, ena-
bled entrepreneurs to participate in 69 international fairs and hosted six trade missions in 
Egypt (IMC 2009, 10). 
FDI promotion 
The eighth component is intended to attract FDI to Egypt. However, this goal is beyond 
the MFTI’s competence, which is why the EIDS does not propose any concrete measures 
for its achievement. Activities of the MOI in this area are presented below. 
Promotion of non-exporting companies 
In 2009, the MFTI decided to become active in a ninth domain that was not originally part 
of the EIDS: the promotion of enterprises that are not (yet) exporting their products. This 
decision was based on the consideration that most exporters have grown “and made their 
speed” (Steven Lee, consultant, 2 May 2010) on the home market before they manage to 
sell their products abroad.30 
                                                 
28  Interview with Mohammed Ismail, project manager, IMC, 3 May 2010. 
29  Although responsibility for these export promotion activities was transferred from the IMC to the Export 
Council, the IMC remains involved. Information on export promotion from: IDSC (2008, 130); MFTI 
(2006, Box 7); OECD (2007, 29 and 44); and interviews with Wolfgang Klos, National Automotive Co., 
15 June 2009 and Ahmed Wahab, Engineering Export Council, 25 June 2009. 
30  Interview with Steven Lee, consultant, 2 May 2010. 
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4.3 Micro- and small enterprise promotion by the Social Fund for Development 
Since 2005, the Egyptian Parliament has passed several legal reforms to promote micro- 
and small enterprises (MSEs) in Egypt:  
— It reduced the minimum amount of capital needed to start a limited liability compa-
ny from EGP 50,000 to EGP 1,000. 
— It passed the Law on Intellectual Property Rights that prohibits clauses in contracts 
between foreign and Egyptian companies restricting the Egyptian partner’s use of 
imported technologies. 
— Most importantly, however, in 2004 the Egyptian Parliament passed a Law on the 
Development of Small Enterprises that the SFD had drafted under pressure from 
SME organisations. The law stipulates that (i) at least 10 per cent of all government 
bids must be assigned to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and (ii) at least 
10 per cent of all privatised land must be sold to SMEs.31 
Nevertheless, the Social Fund for Development (SFD) is still the main actor of micro en-
terprise promotion in Egypt. It was founded in the 1980s to cushion the negative impacts 
of structural adjustment but later shifted part of its focus to MSE development activities. 
Today, the SFD offers MSEs a comprehensive range of financial and non-financial BDSs 
that resembles what the MFTI and its subsidiary agencies offer to formal medium-size and 
large enterprises.  
SFD financial services include: 
— micro-credits (EGP 50,000−2 million) issued by SFD regional offices, contracting 
banks and SME associations (total annual volume: EUR 120 million); 
— credit-failure, life and fire insurance; and 
— funds to attend national and international fairs and exhibitions.32 
Its non-financial services include: 
— training for quality management, adherence to global standards, customs clearance, 
accounting, micro-finance and human resources management; 
— consultancy about how to benefit from the SME law and how to organise chain 
management, production technologies and procedures for exporting;  
— special one-stop-shops for registering MSEs; and 
— support for technology adaptation (provided by the SFD technology centres that 
were opened long before the MFTI technology centres).33 
The SFD also runs an ‘incubator programme’ to finance construction and rehabilitation of 
selected incubators, and also their management costs until they are financially viable.34 
                                                 
31  OECD (2007, 29); SFD (2007, 28 and 37). 
32  In cases of insolvency, the insurance covers 80% of the losses, with the SFD and the lending bank each 
bearing 10% (SFD 2007, 37). 
33  The leather and footwear-technology centre was the first of these centres. The second was the furniture 
centre, which has since been transferred to the MFTI. 
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4.4 The Ministry of Investment and the General Authority for Investment and 
Free Zones  
Established after Ahmed Nazif became prime minister in 2004, the Ministry of Investment 
(MOI), was charged with improving Egypt’s investment climate and attracting foreign 
investment through reforms in five areas: investment legislation, tax administration, and 
monetary, trade and investment policies.  
Its main instrument is the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI), which 
existed already when the MOI was created but was beefed up and transformed from a reg-
ulatory to an investment-promotion body.  
Since 2005, GAFI has had four main tasks:  
— attract foreign direct investors  
— simplify the registration and licensing of new establishments  
— promote and manage the free zones and the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) 
— (since 2009) promote small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs).35  
GAFI is also very helpful in facilitating conflicts between public authorities and private 
investors: 
“Generally when penalties occur or if there is a problem with the governorate, we 
approach GAFI and generally they agree with us… GAFI responds quickly, and at 
the same time they don’t rush people. Their next step is always to go and see the gov-
ernor to resolve the problem in a friendly manner. GAFI is an ‘intermediary’ between 
the two parties.” (Egyptian entrepreneur quoted in Yousfi/ Humphrey 2008, 30) 
GAFI operations can be seen as attempts to neutralise the arbitrary nature of preferential 
relations between bureaucrats and businesspeople. GAFI supports a more transparent sys-
tem and also institutionalises dialogue between investors and the government, which cre-
ates trust and confidence among investors. 
GAFI’s performance is evaluated by a board of directors on the basis of impact criteria 
such as the number of new projects it attracts, the volume of inward FDIs, the number of 
jobs created or the volume of exports from free zones (OECD 2007, 37 f.). 
GAFI’s main activities include (i) the one-stop-shops, (ii) the free zones, (iii) the Qualify-
ing Industrial Zones, (iv) the MOI’s efforts to develop Egypt’s infrastructure and (v) the 
SME promotion programme. 
                                                                                                                                                   
34  So far, the programme has provided support to 82 incubators. Information about the incubator pro-
gramme is from SFD (2007) and an interview with Azmy Aly, SFD, 17 June 2009. 
35  Cf. Demmelhuber (2008, 194); Ghorfa (2009b, 86); OECD (2007, 37 f.); and interview with Hassan 
Omar, MFTI, 17 June 2009. 
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One-stop-shops 
GAFI established and administers ‘one-stop-shops’ that bring together representatives of 
different organisations (the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Labour, the IDA, the 
Ministry of Health, etc.) to help facilitate the registration and licensing of companies.  
However, these shops are nicknamed ‘one-stop-shores’ in Egypt because they merely as-
semble representatives of various organisations under one roof instead of coordinating the 
procedures. Investors still have to visit the representative of each organisation to obtain all 
the necessary permits.36 
Free zones 
The first free zones in Egypt were established in the 1970s. Today, the country has 10 
public free zones and 32 that are privately administered, many of which include just one 
company. If no appropriate land is available in a public zone, GAFI is authorised to issue 
a licence for a private zone if it has the necessary infrastructure (water, electricity, 
transport, etc.).37 
Companies may settle in a free zone (or establish their own free zone) if they belong to 
one of the branches specified in the Investment Law and export at least 50 per cent of their 
products. They must pay a user charge amounting to 1 per cent of their net profits. In re-
turn, they are exempted from all taxes and customs and all import and export regulations – 
as well as from some provisions of the labour law. Land in free zones is much cheaper 
than in most of Egypt (ESCWA 2007, 43; Ghorfa 2009b, 18). 
GAFI promotes clustering in free zones as a means of facilitating technology transfer. As 
a result, some zones concentrate enterprises from the same manufacturing sector (e.g. au-
tomotive) or from the same country (e.g. China or Russia) (ESCWA 2007, 43). 
The Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) 
The Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) were more recently established under a protocol 
signed by Egypt, Israel and the US. The protocol offers quota-free and duty-free access to 
the US market for products from any company that were manufactured in a QIZ in Egypt 
– provided that the combined value added in Israel and in the Egyptian QIZ is at least 
50.5 per cent38, with a 10.5 per cent minimum of local-Israeli content (Ghorfa 2009b, 19; 
Salsecci et al. 2008, 24). 
Egypt now has four QIZs with a total of 760 companies in (i) Greater Cairo, (ii) Greater 
Alexandria, (iii) the Suez Canal area including Port Said, Ismailia and Suez; and (iv) the 
central Delta governorates Gharbiyya, Minufiyya, Dakhiliyya and Damietta (Ghorfa 
2009b, 19; Bergmann 2009; Salsecci et al. 2008, 24). 
                                                 
36  Interview with Ashraf Dowidar, IDA, 21 June 2009. 
37  Ghorfa (2009b, 87); Salsecci et al. (2008, 39); and interview with Ashraf Dowidar, IDA, 21 June 2009. 
38  Egypt and the US have agreed that cutting, sewing and packaging account for 60% of added value – and 
automatically qualify a product to be exported to the US. 
Markus Loewe 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 42 
Jordan has a similar QIZ arrangement with Israel and the US. Although Jordan’s QIZs 
have attracted more investment than the Egyptian ones, Egypt has created more employ-
ment for domestic workers. Despite the global economic crisis, between 2008 and 2009, 
exports from Egypt’s QIZs rose by about 11 per cent, 90 per cent of which were clothes, 
mostly cotton trousers with Israeli-made zippers. QIZs also export dairy products, phar-
maceuticals, cosmetics and dried vegetables. Especially Turkish, Indian and Italian com-
panies manufacture in Egyptian QIZs but Chinese enterprises are have recently become 
interested as well. By international standards, 90 per cent of QIZ exporters are SMEs with 
fewer than 500 workers.39 
Infrastructure development 
The MOI has also taken the initiative to upgrade the parts of Egypt’s infrastructure that 
represent the most serious constraints for foreign and domestic investors. It has pre-
financed a 275-kilometre-long highway linking one of Egypt’s poorest governorates in the 
Upper Egypt Nile Valley, Sohag, with the Red Sea port of Sahaga. The new road should 
ease the export of goods from Upper Egypt and attract investors to the desert hills between 
the Nile Valley and the Red Sea – in particular for mining (the region along the road is 
rich in minerals), energy-intensive industries, such as cement or container production, and 
solar power projects, for which 100-metre-wide strips along both sides of the road have 
been reserved. New farming areas, tourism resorts and housing projects are also planned 
in the region. Other infrastructure projects include expanding ports, extending railway 
lines and establishing tourist zones near archaeological sites, at lakes and along Egypt’s 
coast, as well as creating a medical town near Alexandria and several R&D centres (MOI 
2009c; FAZ 28 July 2010).  
SME promotion 
Since January 2010, GAFI has also been active in SME promotion, with the aim of uniting 
SME development activities in a more comprehensive strategy that targets companies with 
capital between EGP 2 and 25 million – companies that are somewhat larger than the 
SFD’s normal targets and smaller than most IMC beneficiaries.40 
The strategy includes three elements: (i) business development services (BDSs), 
(ii) access to finance and (iii) skills development. A fourth element – cluster development 
– was put on ice after the revolution in January 2011. 
All three pillars focus on industries that have high potential to create jobs and increase 
output but that suffer from significant gaps in know-how and access to capital. These in-
dustries include agriculture and food processing, logistics, health and education services, 
lab analyses, renewable energies and water-conservation instruments, such as sprinklers. 
Business Development Services. In cooperation with the Canadian International Develop-
ment Agency (CIDA), GAFI has started developing 18 service centres across the country 
                                                 
39  ESCWA (2007, 43); Bergmann (2009); and interview with Hassan Omar, MFTI, 17 June 2009. 
40  Information from Samer Radwan’s presentation in the GAFI head office, 24 June 2009, as well as inter-
views with Reem Elsaady, GAFI, 5 May 2010 and Emran Omran, CIDA, 22 June 2009. 
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under the name Enterprise Egypt or Bedaya (‘beginning’) Centre for Entrepreneurship 
and SME Development. These centres are meant to be reference service points for SMEs 
to get training, legal consultancy and information about investment and marketing oppor-
tunities, as well as finance and insurance. GAFI does not provide or pay for BDSs, but 
rather facilitates demand-and-supply matching in the BDSs. GAFI follows the model of 
the CIDA, which has cooperated with NGOs on Egyptian SME development for many 
years. 
Access to finance. GAFI mainly sees itself as a facilitator of SME financing. It analyses 
SME investment projects, facilitates contact to banks and locates alternative sources of 
finance. In order to help SMEs overcome their scepticism vis-à-vis banks, GAFI has de-
veloped an inventory of finance providers with their respective product portfolios (credit, 
leasing, private equity) and conditions. Many SMEs mistrust banks, which have very se-
vere penalties for borrowers who default. GAFI explains to SMEs that finance is not al-
ways the answer to their problems: sometimes BDSs are needed instead of a loan. GAFI 
helps banks better understand SMEs, and their needs and problems, as well as to develop 
better products and reduce the costs of SME transactions. 
GAFI has also established a private equity fund with other stakeholders that provides equi-
ty capital to SMEs that are selected according to specific criteria: (i) demonstrable corpo-
rate social responsibility, (ii) labour-intensive production, (iii) environmental friendliness, 
(iv) economic sectors that are essential for the Egyptian economy but lack access to finan-
cial products, (v) location in underserved governorates and (vi) risk orientation (50 per 
cent high risk, 50 per cent medium risk). 
Skills development. Before the revolution, GAFI also wanted to build up a post-graduate 
training programme as a third pillar to provide management skills, personal skills (com-
munications, risk-taking, behaviour, etc.), financial-instruments know-how, and exercise 
in developing and exploiting business ideas for junior and senior SME managers. Alt-
hough the programme was supposed to be highly subsidised GAFI was planning to charge 
a fee to ensure participants’ commitment. However, this plan has not been implemented so 
far. 
To avoid duplicating efforts, GAFI signed an agreement with the SFD stipulating that 
GAFI would not serve companies with profits under EGP 2 million while SFD would re-
fer firms that were earning more than that to GAFI. 
However, there is a great deal of overlap between the activities of GAFI and the IMC. The 
IMC serves only manufacturing companies but it provides services to medium-size and 
large ones with the effect that manufacturing companies with profits below EGP 
25 million are eligible for support by both, GAFI and the IMC. 
4.5 Strengths and weaknesses of the strategies and instruments 
The industrial policy instruments implemented by the Egyptian government between 2004 
and 2011 remain effective, even after the January 25th revolution in 2011 and the Muslim 
Brotherhood coming to power in 2012.  
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They are better than earlier policies in two respects:  
Clear and concrete vision. The instruments are based on a realistic analysis of the Egyp-
tian economy’s strengths and weaknesses and chances and challenges for structural 
change. They have a clear vision of industrial transformation with precise and realistic 
goals, relevant indicators of progress and priorities for intervention. They also include a 
manageable set of effective instruments. 
Customer orientation. The state has the role of facilitator rather than regulator or entrepre-
neur as in earlier industrial policy strategies. All services are to be provided only on de-
mand by public agencies instead of the government itself – in order to prevent politically 
motivated interventions in routine procedures. For the first time ever, industrial policies in 
Egypt are thus market- and demand-oriented rather than state-interventionist and redis-
tributive. 
However, the industrial policies implemented between 2004 and 2011 still suffer from 
significant flaws in design with regard to several other of the ‘criteria of success for indus-
trial policies’ identified in Chapter 2: 
No participatory policy formulation. None of the programmes was designed and imple-
mented with broad private sector participation. The government consulted a limited num-
ber of handpicked people from the private sector and academia, many of whom were al-
ready in regular contact with members of the new government. (Many of the businesspeo-
ple belonged to Gamal Mubarak’s market-friendly wing.) The private sector as a whole 
was not involved. Admittedly, this would have been difficult because at that time the Fed-
eration of Egyptian Industries and the chambers of commerce and industry were not inde-
pendent and could not voice any criticism. Egypt’s business associations were small and 
dominated by a couple of big and well-connected enterprises (see Section 3.1). 
No regular impact assessments. Although each programme has a mechanism for regular 
monitoring, it is based on reports drafted by the implementing agencies rather than by inde-
pendent evaluators. The reports are only submitted to the responsible line ministry that elab-
orated the programme itself and is also responsible for the respective implementing agency. 
Furthermore, the reports only contain input and output indicators only, while outcome and 
impact indicators are not measured. Finally, the lack of a standard sanctioning mechanism 
means it is not obvious if the implementing agency has done its job properly – or not.  
No clear responsibilities. The division of labour between line ministries and implementing 
agencies is also an issue. From the beginning, some ministers attempted to extend their 
competencies at the expense of others. Some of them did so in order to increase their in-
fluence – like the Minister of Finance, who sought to acquire competencies in the field of 
SME promotion – while others were motivated by the idea of providing a more compre-
hensive approach – like the Ministry for Trade and Industry that wanted to integrate for-
eign investment promotion and the provision of micro-credit into its industrial develop-
ment strategy. Remarkably, the government learnt that it had to draw clearer lines and to 
assign unambiguous responsibilities to all ministries – however at the cost of isolating the 
programmes of different ministries and further exacerbating their coordination (see Fig-
ure 3). 
Industrial policy in Egypt 2004–2011 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 45
No effective, non-discriminatory instruments. The programmes employ a remarkable vari-
ety of business development instruments. Some market analysts interpret this as an ex-
pression of governmental insecurities: 
“I would describe it as fireworks. The government is starting every rocket it has 
wherever it might go to. On the one hand, the government wants to demonstrate that 
it is doing all it can do to attract investors. On the other hand, it has no idea which 
instruments and sectors are most promising for Egypt.” (Angus Blair, head, Beltone 
Financial, 22 June 2009) 
Still, the programmes are centred on FDI promotion and business development services 
(BDSs), and neither, the cluster nor value-chain approach play an important role.  
The cluster approach is used by only one component of each, the industrial development 
and the SME promotion strategy. This may be due to the fact – but also at least partly ex-
plain it – that only very few Egyptian companies belong to a functional cluster: 
“The problem in Egypt is that we don’t have clusters, only industrial zones.”  
(Mohamed Abo El Wafa, USAID, 21 February 2012) 
The few exceptions include a furniture cluster in Damietta (already founded by the late 
King Farouk), an information and communications technology cluster in Smart Village 
near Cairo, a marble and granite cluster in Sha’a El Te’aban, a leather-manufacturing clus-
ter in Robiky, a honey cluster in Al-Minya, a textiles and garments cluster in Mahalla al-
Kubra, handicraft clusters in Siwa and Upper Egypt, and tourism clusters in Sharm El-
Sheikh and other seaside resorts. 41 
As for the value-chain approach, it is used in just one IMC programme, which helps sup-
pliers of large exporting companies (especially in the automobile, food processing and 
traditional handicrafts sectors) become more efficient. Some observers believe that Egypt 
is not yet ready for the value-chain approach because of the low quality of products manu-
factured by SMEs. They recommend that exporters integrate the whole value chain into 
their companies so they can control every step.42 
No well-tailored incentives. Financial support plays a very important role in Egypt’s in-
dustrial policy, and it is neither conditioned to the performance nor to a specific behaviour 
of the recipients. In addition, the beneficiary’s level of co-financing is also low. For ex-
ample, energy and water are still highly subsidised – in 2008 they cost the government 
more than 7 per cent of GDP. In some branches, firms are granted subsidies of 15 per cent 
of the net value of their exports. And private enterprises receive refunds up to 95 per cent 
of their costs for workers’ training, technical upgrading and the like. 
No rational prioritisation. At first glance, the Nazif government’s industrial policies ap-
pear to be horizontal and they are backed by a general open-door policy. While some pro-
                                                 
41  Interviews with Emran Omran, CIDA, 22 June 2009; Samir Radwan, then advisor to GAFI, 24 June 
2009; and Selçuk Tanatar, IFC, 21 June 2009. See also El-Megharbel (2008, 19–21). 
42  Interviews with Azmy Aly, SFD, 17 June 2009; Natalija El-Hage, GTZ, 23 June 2009; Ahmed Geneidi, 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 15 June 2009; Nader Riad, CEO, Bavaria Egypt, 23 June 2009; and Selçuk 
Tanatar, IFC, 21 June 2009. 
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grammes like the IMC are formally targeted to selected economic sectors (a vertical ap-
proach), there are so many sectors that the strategy has the effect of a horizontal approach.  
Yet close examination reveals that the industrial policies are actually quite selective – yet 
for different reasons. They discriminate between enterprises using several criteria, most of 
which are incompatible with a ‘rational’ prioritisation: 
— Firm size. The programmes employ three different strategies (i) for medium-size to 
large formal-sector manufacturing enterprises (IMC), (ii) for other small to medium-
size enterprises (GAFI) and (iii) for micro- and small enterprises (SFD) – with leak-
ages in and duplications of responsibility between the programmes. 
— Export orientation. In some sectors, exporters are granted subsidies by the Export 
Council. In addition, companies that export 50 per cent or more of their products 
may settle in a free zone, where they benefit from tax and customs reductions. 
— Sector: Textile, automobile feeding, IT and food-processing companies enjoy privi-
leges over producers in other branches – for example, with respect to subsidies 
granted by the Export Council. This differentiation is particularly remarkable be-
cause the selection of target branches is based on arbitrary decisions in all pro-
grammes rather than a sound analysis of current and future comparative advantages 
on world markets. Egypt’s textile industry, for example, can only compete with oth-
er countries because of its possibilities of preferential access to the US market. 
Without it, most of the sector would have folded because of the products’ low quali-
ty and rising costs. 
— Geographical location. Many programmes are aimed at reducing spatial inequalities 
and therefore privilege entrepreneurs in Upper Egypt. The IMC, for example, pays 
much subsidies for modernisation efforts made by companies in Upper Egypt than 
by those in Lower Egypt. 
— Ownership. Army-owned companies continue to enjoy numerous privileges (see 
Chapter 5). 
Poor investment climate. The Nazif government stepped up reforms in several fields in 
order to improve Egypt’s investment climate. But major constraints on investors still un-
dercut industrial policy. (This issue will be discussed in detail in Section 5.2.4.) 
5 Effects of industrial policies in Egypt from 2004 to 2011 
The question is now to what extent the industrial policies that Egypt implemented between 
2004 and 2011 did achieve their goal to promote structural change and economic growth 
and how efficient, transparent, fair and relevant their instruments have been. 
In the following, we argue that although this strategy was more efficient and transparent 
than earlier strategies, its effects on structural change were limited for five reasons: 
— The strategy did not effectively compensate for market failures – such as the lack of 
coordination between investors in a sector or deficits in the provision of sector-
specific public goods – which typically prevent structural change. The IMC-
subsidised workers’ training is one of the few exceptions in this regard.  
— The policies had adverse effects because they provided very generous financial sup-
port. Thereby, they reduced, for example, Egyptian exporters’ incentive to innovate. 
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— Their multiple inefficiencies reduced their potential impact on structural change. For 
example, having three separate strategies issued by different ministries duplicates 
structures and results in a lack of coordination and gaps in responsibility. Overstaff-
ing raises overhead costs. The IMC’s broad targeting criteria caused a large error of 
inclusion. And there was no independent impact evaluation for any of the policies. 
— The policies were too focused on large and well-established companies, which were 
already exporters or could have become exporters even without government support. 
— The policies addressed only a small fraction of the structural problems that plague 
private enterprise development in Egypt – among them, the tax and financial sys-
tems, customs procedures and excessive regulations – so that the business environ-
ment still suffers from many fundamental constraints: low-quality education and 
training, distortions in market competition, deficits in the rule of law, a lack of 
transparency in decisions taken by the government, the public administration and the 
judiciary, and the private sector’s lack of voice and political participation. 
This chapter elaborates on these findings. Section 5.1 examines macro-economic data for 
evidence of the effects of Egypt’s industrial policies from 2004 to 2011. Section 5.2 as-
sesses the immediate effects, efficiency, transparency and fairness and relevance of the 
core policy instruments. Section 5.3 seeks to explain the strengths and weaknesses identi-
fied in the two preceding sections. And Section 5.4 analyses, which groups of entrepre-
neurs benefited the most from the Nazif government’s industrial policies. 
5.1 Macro-level evidence 
Any thorough assessment of public policies should be based on an evaluation of their im-
pact. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to demonstrate the impacts of industrial policies 
(just like those of many other policies) because it is hard to prove the causality between in-
puts and impacts. In addition, no rigorous impact analysis has ever been conducted in Egypt. 
So we can study target indicators, such as economic growth, export quota and diversification 
indices but we do cannot be sure whether what we observe can be attributed to industrial 
policies, policies in other fields – or changes in the policy framework conditions. 
Egypt experienced very positive economic development after the cabinet reshuffle in 2004, 
when another growth spurt began. It lasted at least until the global financial and economic 
crisis reached Egypt in December 2008, and partly until the January 25th revolution in 2011. 
(Egypt suffered much less from the global crisis than many other developing countries and 
continued to grow even in 2009 and 2010, see Section 3.2).  
For the third time since 1981, a programme of profound and serious economic reform re-
moved some of the most binding constraints on investment and growth, liberating some of 
the potential of the Egyptian economy (see Figure 2). In 1981 and the following years, 
central planning, import restrictions and burdensome market regulations had been elimi-
nated. Starting in 1991, price, interest-rate and capital-transfer controls were removed. 
After 2004, tax and customs tariffs were simplified and reduced, the financial sector was 
deregulated and bureaucratic procedures were streamlined. As a result, the Egyptian econ-
omy grew by 5-6 per cent annually between 2004 and 2010. Annual FDI grew more than 
six-fold – from about USD 1 billion in 2004 to an annual average of more than USD 
7 billion between 2007 and 2010. Exports rose from about USD 8 billion in 2004 to USD 
29 billion in 2010 (imports, however, increased even faster). 
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2010 these areas were ‘corruption’, ‘inflation’ and the ‘inadequately educated workforce’, 
T while ‘tax regulations’ continued to be 4th on the list (see Figure 4). 
According to other benchmarking reports (see Tables A2 and A4 in the Annex) , the most 
problematic areas include the following: 
— Quality and relevance of education and training. In the GCR, Egypt dropped from 
106th to 131st position with regard to the ‘quality of the educational system’ and 
from 84th to 112th with regard to the ‘extent of staff training’. In particular, Egypt’s 
position worsened regarding the ‘quality of maths and science education’ and ‘man-
agerial training’. 
— Rule of law (contract enforcement, independence of the judiciary, protection of in-
vestors’ rights). Settling a dispute in Egypt involves lengthy, unpredictable and ex-
pensive procedures that on average cost one-fifth of the claim’s value (OECD 2007, 
30). With regard to ‘judicial independence’, in the GCR Egypt dropped in rank from 
40th to 64th, and from 44th to 67th in the ‘intellectual property protection’ category. 
— Corruption and unfair competition. Egypt’s position in the GCR slipped from 48th 
to 63rd with regard to ‘favouritism in decisions taken by government officials’ and 
fell from 58th to 83rd with regard to the ‘diversion of public funds’. The country 
plummeted from 55th to 95th with regard to the ‘extent of market dominance’ and 
from 74th to 106th regarding ‘effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy’. 
— Private sector consultation and participation in economic policy-making. Remarka-
bly, neither the World Bank Doing Business Index nor the World Economic Forum 
GCR has a category measuring private sector participation in political decision mak-
ing, although it is an important aspect, which improved only slightly in Egypt under 
the Nazif government. As we have argued before, some major, well-connected en-
trepreneurs enjoyed access to and influence on policy-makers between 2004 and 
2011, but the mass of micro-, small and medium-size companies still lacked ade-
quate representation. (This issue is discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.4). 
— Availability of land: Egypt improved in terms of the costs and time needed to regis-
ter property according to the Doing Business Reports, see Table A2 in Annex). Also, 
land is for offer to entrepreneurs, but it is often far from where the entrepreneur and 
workers live, and is becoming more and more expensive. (This issue is also dis-
cussed in more detail in Section 5.2.4). 
A study on SME upgrading in Egypt conducted in early 2012 by a team of researchers 
from DIE and the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES) supports these results. It 
concludes that the main structural constraints for SMEs in Egypt are (i) the entrepreneurs’ 
low quality of human capital (education, work experience and international exposure), 
(ii) the lack and high turnover of skilled workers, (iii) the lack of market information, 
(iv) difficulties in access to finance, and (v) persistent deficits in the rule of law (including 
corruption and unfair market competition). Compounding these constraints are (vi) prob-
lems accessing land, (vii) inadequate BDSs, and (viii) shabby transportation infrastructure 
(Loewe et al. 2013; see Figure 5). 
But what about the more immediate goals of industrial policies – increased productivity, 
product diversification, structural change, technological upgrading and export develop-
ment? How did the Nazif government industrial policy strategies impact them? 
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But again: Can these achievements be attributed to industrial policies or are they mainly 
due to positive trends in the framework conditions – for example, growing global demand 
and greater offers of FDI capital? And would Egypt have been able to sustain the higher 
level of exports without the 2011 revolution that reduced domestic production and ex-
ports? To what extent did the increase in exports between 2004 and 2011 result from gen-
erous energy, export and modernisation subsidies instead of policy reforms? And what 
will happen when these subsidies are eliminated? Answering these questions requires 
more reliable data on how the Egyptian economy has developed in terms of productivity 
and competitiveness.  
The average technology content of exports is still very low, despite modest successes in 
some sectors. For example, until 2004, Egypt used to mostly export raw marble blocks, 
and now it mostly exports finished marble products.46 The share of tanned leather (com-
pared with raw leather) has risen from 20 to more than 50 per cent.47 But raw materials 
still account for more than half of Egypt’s exports, while another 35 to 40 per cent are 
semi-finished products (AfDB et al. 2011; EIU 2011). 
According to the World Economic Forum (WEF), production processes have become 
more sophisticated: In this regard, Egypt climbed from rank 74 in 2006 to 46 in 2010 – 
according to the GCR.  
However, in terms of other aspects of technological and business sophistication, despite 
all the efforts made by the MFTI and its affiliated agencies in the fields of innovation, 
technology transfer and modernisation, Egypt’s GCR rank generally deteriorated between 
2006 and 2010: 
— Availability of latest technologies: 67 to 91 
— Firm-level technology absorption: 60 to 58 
— Technology transfer through FDI: 51 to 53 
— Local supplier quality: 56 to 104 
— State of cluster development: 61 to 66 
— Value-chain breadth: 44 to 67 
— Capacity for innovation: 84 to 109 
— University-industry collaboration in research and development: 95 to 120 
— Quality of scientific research institutions: 96 to 110 (see Table A4 in Annex and 
Figure 6). 
                                                 
46  This is probably the result of very focused government intervention that is not at all typical for its indus-
trial policies in general. In the marble sector, the government created synthetically clusters of coopera-
tion and national value chains between large, medium-size and small companies (interview with Steven 
Lee, consultant, 2 May 2010). 
47  Interview with Hany Barakat, first undersecretary, MFTI, 17 June 2009. 
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5.2 The instruments and their implementation 
In the following, we substantiate our first impressions of the impact of Egypt’s recent in-
dustrial policies – based on macro-data – by more closely examining the instruments used 
and their immediate effects. The analysis shows that the instruments used to implement 
Egypt’s industrial policies between 2004 and 2011 – many of which are still being used – 
may have been effective – at least to some degree – in promoting foreign investment and 
exports. But they were – and are – much less effective for reaching the main goal of indus-
trial policies: the promotion of structural change, or the shift of capital and labour to new 
economic sectors that allow for new and higher gains (see Chapter 2). In addition, these 
instruments are weak in terms of efficiency and significance. They are more transparent 
and fairer than many other Egyptian government programmes but they also predominantly 
target the large and some medium-size companies rather than micro- and small enterpris-
es. And they do not really help the latter to upgrade and become medium-size or large 
companies that can export their products directly. 
We explain our conclusions in four separate sections that assess the Nazif government 
industrial policies with regard to their (i) effectiveness, (ii) efficiency, (iii) transparency 
and fairness and (iv) relevance for structural change. Box 1 summarises the main results. 
Box 1: Main deficits of the industrial policies implemented by the Nazif government (2004–2011) 
Effectiveness: 
— The Nazif government industrial policy instruments – most of which are still being used – managed to 
promote investment and exports until the revolution in 2011. However, they have been rather ineffec-
tive in facilitating structural change. 
— One reason is that these instruments do not properly target the main market failures that usually 
prevent structural change. They create public goods (e.g. workers’ training) and encourage risk-
averse Egyptian entrepreneurs to modernise their firms (mainly by generously subsidising the neces-
sary investment costs). But they do not help overcome coordination failures within sectors, create the 
public good R&D or direct investments in sectors that are considered important for global competi-
tiveness, social development and environmental sustainability. 
— Some of the instruments adversely affect structural change. They generate very generous transfers 
that allow many Egyptian exporters to compete on world markets but at the same time reduce entre-
preneurs’ incentive to boost their own competitiveness.  
— Some instruments are selective without a reason – and distort markets. They favour exporters (as 
opposed to companies that serve the domestic market) and manufacturing enterprises, especially in 
the textiles, engineering, chemical and food sectors (over those in agriculture or the service sectors), 
as well as medium-size to large companies (over micro- and small firms).  
Efficiency: 
— The coexistence of at least three main strategies leads to the duplication of administrative structures, 
a lack of coordination and gaps in responsibility. Overstaffing raises the SFD’s overhead costs, while 
the IMC’s broad targeting criteria create huge errors of inclusion. (For example, all exporting compa-
nies received export subsidies – even if they had already been very successful on world markets for 
many years.) 
— The instruments have no mechanism for independent impact evaluations. 
Transparency and fairness: 
— The instruments do not help small enterprises upgrade and grow into large, would-be exporters. They 
focus on medium-size to large manufacturing companies that are already exporters or almost ready to 
conquer export markets – and that are generously supported by the IMC. While MSEs are entitled to 
assistance from the SFD and GAFI, they receive much less than what the IMC gives to large firms. 
Relevance: 
— The instruments can only have limited relevance as long as very serious deficits prevail in the broad-
er business environment – especially regarding the education and training of entrepreneurs and work-
ers, the rule of law, transparency and fairness in competition, private sector representation and the 
availability of affordable land. 
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5.2.1 Effectiveness 
The Nazif government’s industrial policies tangibly affected investment and export pro-
motion. However, their instruments had little impact on economic diversification because 
they did not properly address the market failures that typically hinder structural change; 
some even had adverse effects. 
All observers agree that the Nazif government did a comparatively good job in attracting 
FDI to Egypt. Many people praise the GAFI in particular for making life easier for inves-
tors. On the one hand, it tries to make administrative procedures transparent so that 
(i) investors know what they have to do to register and get licensed, and (ii) public offi-
cials have less scope for arbitrary decisions.  
On the other hand, GAFI has assumed the role of facilitator between businesspeople and 
the public administration: 
“Generally when penalties occur or if there is a problem with the governorate, we 
approach GAFI and generally they agree with us… GAFI responds quickly, and at 
the same time they don’t rush people. Their next step is always to go and see the gov-
ernor to resolve the problem in a friendly manner. GAFI is an ‘intermediary between 
the two parties’.” (Egyptian entrepreneur quoted in Yousfi / Humphrey 2008, 30)  
Likewise, observers believe that the Nazif government industrial policies significantly 
helped boost Egypt’s exports. The export promotion activities of the IMC and the export 
councils have enabled many companies to sell their products abroad: 
“In January 2010, we have declared the goal to enable another 1,000 Egyptian facto-
ries to export. And we have already succeeded during the first four months of 2010 in 
adding 400 newly exporting factories.” (Hesham Dayem, IMC, 27 April 2010) 
The IMC also did a good job in modernising and technically upgrading more than 14,000 
companies between 2005 and 2009: 53 per cent of its services were used to train workers, 
14 per cent to help companies adopt international standards and become certified, 7 per 
cent to innovate, 6 per cent to participate at fairs and 4 per cent each to pay for financial 
services and marketing support – with just 0.1 per cent to support R&D. (IMC 2009, 8)  
“Before we applied for support by IMC, almost all our business was done in Egypt. 
Then IMC helped us to increase our sales both locally and abroad. The main reasons 
why we were able to increase our exports were: first, that our product design is much 
more demand-driven now; second, we now have a new vision of quality and stand-
ards. We were given intensive advice by IMC consultants on product standards, envi-
ronmental standards, quality standards, etc. Third, we were able to further automate 
our production. IMC has funded advice on the purchase and use of software in our 
production and of course, the export subsidy of the Export Development Authority 
was also helpful for us.” (Ahmed Abd-el-Fattah, Contistahl Group, 29 April 2010) 
The question remains whether such policies also help overcome the market failures that 
we have identified in Chapter 2 as the main reasons for implementing industrial policies. 
In this regard, their contribution appears to be modest since they do not address failures of 
coordination within economic sectors. They may be slightly more effective in allowing for 
dynamic economies of scale, establishing quality reputation and easing firms’ access to 
capital. But over-generous financial support that enables recipients to become or remain 
competitive without making any innovations or adjustments is counterproductive. 
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Public goods  
The MFTI industrial policy strategy contributes to the creation of public goods, and in 
particular has improved workers’ skills by subsidising on-the-job training courses in dif-
ferent economic sectors. Private enterprises often invest less than they should in assets that 
help an economy develop and diversify because of fears that competitors will benefit from 
their investments by copying new products or modes of production, or by luring away 
their newly trained workers. In fact, private sector spending on R&D and training has al-
ways been low in Egypt, and the state is smart to provide support in these areas. The effect 
of training is expected to be considerable: since the IMC declared it would refund up to 
95 per cent of the costs, many companies have begun to train their workers. 
The actual effect of the MFTI industrial policy strategy on R&D, however, is meagre. Be-
tween 2004 and 2008, total spending on R&D actually slightly decreased in Egypt – from 
0.27 to 0.23 per cent of GDP, which is even less than the average of all Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) countries. Some countries such as Syria or Algeria spend even less 
on R&D than Egypt. But between 2000 and 2009, spending on R&D in Jordan averaged 
0.34 per cent of GDP, while in Morocco it averaged 0.64 per cent, in Tunisia 1.1 per cent 
and in Israel 4.5 per cent of GDP (Al-Ayouty 2012, 15). 
First, this is due to the fact that IMC spends just 0.1 per cent of its budget on R&D ser-
vices and the ETTICs have served at most 1,000 companies.  
Second, the private sector is reluctant to request the services offered by the government. 
Very few entrepreneurs ask the ETTICs for R&D support. They prefer to receive financial 
support that helps them at that very moment; research could only help them sometime in 
the future. Many entrepreneurs are also unaware of the role that continuous research and 
innovation play in boosting a firm’s competitiveness on global markets: 
“I believe that the lack of laboratories is not the main problem. It is culture! Compa-
nies in Egypt are underestimating the importance of innovation. Also, they are not 
risk takers. They try to do always the same thing again as they have learnt it rather 
than to do something new.” (Dalia Gamal, TIEC, 4 March 2012) 
Third, many researchers in Egypt are reluctant to conduct application-oriented research. 
They prefer to collect credits for their academic careers.49 
The ETTICs – which were explicitly founded to transfer technology and know-how to 
Egyptian investors – are not very effective, either. Most of the staff comes from the public 
administration with some employees from the private sector. But all of them are unfamil-
iar with research and do not understand themselves university studies – although they are 
expected to use and explain them to their clients.50 
“Once I commissioned one of these institutes with a research project: I placed the or-
der and paid and then ... I've never received anything for my money. One problem is 
that they are expected to find local providers. Therefore, they offer only what the 
                                                 
49  Interviews with Akrum Bastawi, MFTI, 21 June 2009 and Mona El Tobgui, senior advisor, Fraunhofer 
Society, 18 June 2009. 
50  Interviews with Natalija El-Hage, GTZ, 23 June 2009 and Mona El Tobgui, senior advisor, Fraunhofer 
Society, 18 June 2009. 
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country has. But researchers in Egypt are usually not customer-oriented. And the so-
lutions they offer are sometimes even more expensive than the services that you can 
buy from internationally renowned experts. And sometimes these solutions do not 
even constitute an improvement over the way you did it before.” (Nader Riad, Bavaria 
Egypt, Egyptian entrepreneur, 23 June 2009) 
Some of the ETTICs seem to perform better than others: the Food Centre, the Plastic Cen-
tre and the Fashion Centre are all quite effective. The Fashion Centre, for example, has 
hired Italian designers and offers useful know-how to the private sector, while the Engi-
neering Centre has provided the private sector with hardly any services.51 
Coordination failure 
At the same time, industrial policies in Egypt hardly address coordination failures. One of 
the central arguments for industrial policies is that private entrepreneurs depend on com-
plementary activities in their sectors. For example, investments in power generation only 
make sense if they are combined with investments into the transmission of power to con-
sumers. The sector cannot develop unless someone coordinates all relevant parties and 
possibly supplies the missing components. But such engagement requires strategies to 
develop the sector, such as those the government, business associations and donors elabo-
rated in Jordan between 1998 and 2001 for its eight most promising economic sectors.52 
Egypt, however, has hardly made any tangible efforts of this sort: 
“There are always gaps in investment, which constitute an obstacle for the develop-
ment of basically promising sectors. These gaps will not be filled without a strategy. 
This requires coordination. You need a plan for that. And you must have a vision. But 
there is no plan and no coordination in Egypt. […] IMC and IDA and GAFI and the 
others have all just addressed one or two little problems and provided support to 
whatever company. But if you want to move forward, you must have the entire sector 
in mind – the entire economy! And you need a deep-going, holistic strategy, which is 
written by the private sector together with the public sector.” (Steven Lee, consultant, 
2 May 2010) 
The Egyptian government has focused on large companies in the belief that in the long run 
they will help small ones. But the SME sector has not taken off because of the lack of 
business links between large and small companies. The government has not made much 
effort to establish such links or to supply missing investments in promising economic sec-
tors such as, for example, the production of tools for the engineering industry.53 
One of the very few exceptions in this regard is the marble and granite sector, which like 
other sectors, was characterised by large companies co-existing, but not cooperating, with 
SMEs. The small firms used to sell their products domestically while the large ones most-
ly exported their products. All Egyptian firms were restricted to quarrying raw marble; the 
processing was mainly done abroad. Then the government, in cooperation with producers 
                                                 
51  Interviews with Frank Giesel, Chamber of Food Industries, 25 June 2009; Hassan Omar, MFTI, 17 June 
2009; and Nihal El-Megharbel, economist, 15 June 2009. 
52  Cf. MOPIC (2003); YEA (2000); YEA (2006). 
53  Interview with Nihal El-Megharbel, economist, 15 June 2009. 
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and suppliers in the sector, reshaped the sector and synthetically constructed value chains. 
Now many SMEs cooperate with larger firms, and a much larger share of Egyptian marble 
and stone products is processed in the country rather than abroad: the domestic segment of 
the value chain has been considerably lengthened.54 Steven Lee, one of the consultants 
involved in this successful experiment, has drawn the following conclusion: 
“The big companies always want to work on their own because they do not see the 
advantage of cooperating with others. They rely on their good relations with influen-
tial people to stay in the market and perhaps even dominate it. And the smaller ones 
are afraid to cooperate with the big ones. They have all heard about bad experiences. 
So, what you have to do is to connect the development of the sector with the develop-
ment of industrial zones by promoting clusters where you assemble micro, small and 
medium enterprises. And you teach them to cooperate. When the state assists, they 
might become less anxious to sell their products to others. And once you have done 
this, you must try to extend the local content of their products.” (Steven Lee, consult-
ant, 17 February 2012) 
The 2012 DIE/ECES field study on SME upgrading found that very few SMEs cooperate 
with other firms in clusters or value chains (Loewe et al. 2013) although most experts be-
lieve that such linkages would benefit all the partners: 
“We have to promote these linkages [...] as the large provide know-how, technology, 
introduce international standard and, guarantee market access. On the other hand, 
small firms can provide parts at a low price. It is a win-win situation.” (Mona Garf, 
Cairo University, 19 February 2012) 
The reluctance to cooperate comes from the way Egyptian businesspeople tend to mistrust 
each other. They do not integrate their businesses into value chains or clusters because of 
their concerns about the quality of inputs bought from other firms, the timely delivery of 
inputs and buyers’ possible non-payment (El-Haddad 2008, 18). 
This mistrust was created by huge deficits in the rule of law that persisted in Egypt at least 
until the revolution in 2011. Even today, entrepreneurs do not rely on contracts because of 
personal experience or hearsay about how laws and contracts have not been enforced.  
The Nazif government industrial policies did not change anything in this regard. They 
neither addressed the general lack of law and contract enforcement nor did they try to cre-
ate mutual trust among the relevant actors in selected economic sectors. However, private 
sector development experts believe that the government could boost the horizontal and 
vertical cooperation of Egyptian enterprises by offering to arbitrate conflicts about con-
tract interpretation:  
“Clusters do not work in Egypt because people do not trust each other. They could 
only work if there was a third party involved that is able to create trust within the 
cluster.” (Yasser Zaher, Banque du Caire, 26 April 2012) 
Dynamic economies of scale 
The concept of increasing economies of scale could be used as an argument for several 
services that the IMC provides to companies that invest in product or process innovation. 
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According to this concept, many innovations do not pay off on the first day because they 
require learning to help reduce production costs over time. For such cases, it is important 
to not just fund the consultancy but also part of the equipment required for innovating. 
The IMC does this. 
The problem is that the IMC supports almost any kind of innovation: it does not verify – 
and in any case, cannot assess – if an innovation actually brings about dynamic economies 
of scale. 
The only alternative to the IMC would have been for the government to target funds to the 
most promising cases, which would have necessitated criteria for identifying innovations 
that pay off. But for that, the government would have had to understand – better than the 
companies it sought to help – just how the markets were going to develop.  
In some developing countries, including Egypt, a slightly similar argument can be brought 
forward: Many Egyptian entrepreneurs are extremely risk-averse: they are loath to make 
any major investment unless they are sure it will pay off–. Such attitudes reduce their own 
risks, but limit their firms’ long-term development potential as well as the growth poten-
tial of the economy at large. In this context, the IMC help in reducing innovation costs and 
limiting individual risks not only benefits the respective firm but also the Egyptian econ-
omy as a whole. 
The IMC also helps address another market failure by stabilising the market for training 
and consultancy services. It gives the providers of these services some security that, at 
least in the medium term, there will be a demand (and the ability to pay) for their services. 
In Egypt today, many kinds of professional services are offered that were not available 
before the IMC became operative. Without the IMC, most providers probably would have 
different jobs! 
Lack of quality reputation 
The activities of the MFTI and its subsidiaries regarding standardisation and quality man-
agement are helping improve the reputation of Egyptian products on export markets. Re-
tailers on export markets must be sure that their Egyptian suppliers adhere to Egyptian 
standards, which in turn are based on international standards. 
Access to capital 
The first draft of the Egypt Industrial Development Strategy (EIDS) included concrete 
steps to improve investors’ access to finance. Although the final draft of the strategy did 
not include these steps, the EIDS mainly addresses medium-size to large enterprises any-
way. This segment of the private sector should not have any more problems accessing 
finance – thanks to reforms in the financial sector. The SFD provides micro-credits to very 
small companies and GAFI informs SMEs about potential finance providers.  
However, access to capital still constitutes a challenge for innovative SMEs – and the 
government is doing too little to help them (Loewe et al. 2013). In contrast, exporting 
companies can request export guarantee credits and also receive a cash subsidy of 15 per 
cent on their export volume – if they belong to the food, engineering, chemicals and tex-
tiles sectors. 
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Social and environmental development 
Furthermore, industrial policies in Egypt are not designed to facilitate socially or envi-
ronmentally friendly structural change. This may be partly due to the conscious departure 
from the country’s industrial policy strategies of the 1960s and 1970s, which were very 
focused on social goals and had a distorting effect on the economy. But there is no expla-
nation why the industrial policy programmes do not internalise public costs and future 
gains by promoting sustainable structural change. The EIDS alludes to the potential inter-
est of wind and solar power plants for Egypt, while GAFI requires compliance with basic 
environmental standards for inclusion in its SME promotion programme. But these are 
minor details with no major effects. 
In practice, Egypt’s industrial policies between 2004 and 2011 had a polarising effect in 
the private sector because their main programme, the IMC, focused on formal medium-
size to large manufacturing companies that are owned by prosperous entrepreneurs. Less 
affluent entrepreneurs are supported by the SFD, which has a much smaller budget than 
the IMC, although it is mandated to serve the segment of the Egyptian economy that com-
prises more than 99 per cent of all enterprises. In addition, , the SFD also mostly funds 
micro-credits and has little left in its budget for non-financial BDSs, which are at least as 
important for industrial policy. This means that only a tiny portion of MSEs receives non-
financial assistance to modernise and upgrade: their benefits are miniscule in comparison 
with the generous services provided by the IMC.55 
Adverse effects 
The massive financial support provided by the IMC and export councils may help many 
Egyptian companies but they also have negative effects.  
First, while training, modernisation and export subsidies, and cheap energy and tax holi-
days help national exports compete on world markets, they do not guarantee that the 
Egyptian economy will modernise or undergo sorely needed structural change and diversi-
fication. This ‘help’ even reduces entrepreneurs’ incentives to further innovate and ration-
alise their production, thus making exporters more dependent on subsidies: 
“Sustaining the current high level of subsidies in Egypt could greatly weaken the lev-
el of competition in the market. Moreover, it may reduce the attractiveness of the 
market to investors and hinder the growth of emerging sectors.” (Egypt, Arab Repub-
lic 2010, 5) 
Second, focusing on exports also distorts the market by driving investments into the ex-
port sectors and discriminating against enterprises that produce for the local market: 
“The instruments of IMC are thus an incentive to export rather than to sell on the lo-
cal market even though every businessperson knows that if you want to grow and ex-
port and become competitive on global markets, you have to make your speed on the 
domestic market.” (Steven Lee, consultant, 2 May 2010) 
Even some of the most successful exporters are unable to sell their products at home. 
                                                 
55  Interviews with Azmy Aly, SFD, 17 June 2009; Natalija El-Hage, GTZ, 23 June 2009; and Tamer El-
Meehy, Entrust, 28 April 2010. 
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Their competitiveness on world markets is due to export subsidies that they do not get for 
domestic sales.  
One of Egypt’s most successful producers of ready-made garments admits that his busi-
ness entirely depends on the export subsidy: 
“I would have to completely stop my exports without the export subsidies. It is only a 
small amount but without it, I would not sell anything abroad! You must see that the 
garment market is extremely competitive: Small differences in price can mean that 
you are out of the market!” (Louis Bishara, entrepreneur, 13 March 2012) 
Third, massive financial support attracts entrepreneurs who are not committed to upgrad-
ing their companies. But the IMC cannot follow-up or even condition its support, for ex-
ample, on the achievement of agreed goals: 
“The problem is that they do not implement the recommendations. The rich Egyptian 
entrepreneurs are not very interested in the follow-up. They are happy about the 
money they receive from IMC for the modernisation of their company. But often you 
do not know if they really wanted to modernise. So they continue like before.” (Wolf-
gang Klos, National Automotive Co., 15 June 2009 , German original) 
Fourth, some sectors receive more support than others. Export subsidies, for example, 
are reserved for food, textiles, engineering and chemical products – but why these sec-
tors were selected is unclear. Except for textiles, their exports have grown more than 
other sectors – but this could well be a result of, rather than the reason for, the focus of 
Egypt’s export promotion. Some of these sectors are fairly old and probably not espe-
cially promising for the future: no longer able to compete on world markets, they suf-
fered from the economic liberalisation that accompanied Egypt’s accession to the WTO. 
Inexplicably, services – considered to be a rising export sector – receive no support. 
Fifth, the programmes of the various ministries have serious gaps regarding responsibil-
ity. The MFTI and the IMC are responsible for dynamic medium-size to large manufac-
turing enterprises in the formal sector while the SFD works with micro- and small enter-
prises. The strategies of these two institutions are completely separate and neither of 
them targets small to medium-size enterprises or large enterprises outside the manufac-
turing sector. GAFI has partly assumed this task but does not grant any funds. And there 
is no agency to assist small enterprises as they graduate, formalise and grow into another 
size class. 
“The main problem of industrial policies in Egypt is the missing middle: No one is 
trying right now to help SMEs come out of their trap and grow or get linked with 
larger companies. Almost all enterprises are micro, all produce for the local market. 
There is no middle.” (Emran Omran, CIDA, 22 June 2009) 
5.2.2 Efficiency 
Industrial policies in Egypt suffer from transfer inefficiencies, targeting inefficiencies and 
inefficiencies in market allocation (dead-weight losses). 
The main reason for transfer inefficiencies is the coexistence of at least three main strate-
gies that have been elaborated by three different ministries and are being implemented 
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with little coordination by at least seven different agencies. There is hardly any consulta-
tion between the IMC, the IDA and the ITDA although these three bodies are all super-
vised by the MFTI, while at least five institutions run programmes in the QIZs: GAFI, the 
IDA, the IMC, the Export Development Centre and the ETTICs.56 Such duplications of 
responsibilities make life difficult for investors and raise overhead costs because every 
programme needs its own administration. 
Furthermore, while the IMC is still a comparatively lean agency, the SFD suffers from 
overstaffing, which makes its overhead particularly high. The explanation given for this is 
that the SFD has been misused to provide jobs for relatives of higher-ranking public offi-
cials who could not find any other employment. Obviously they are not all qualified for 
their tasks at the SFD: 
“The SFD programmes are very expensive because they have too many employees. 
They have to engage all the sons and daughters of officials. So they ended up with 
more and more bureaucratic procedures because all these people have to be kept em-
ployed. And there are hundreds of committees.” (SME consultant, April 2010)  
The IMC procedures appear to be more transparent and less complicated and time-
consuming than elsewhere: 
“For us it has taken just 45 days until our application was approved - that is nothing 
in Egypt.” (Ahmed Abd-el-Fattah, Contistahl, 29 April 2010) 
One reason for targeting inefficiencies is the EIDS’ overemphasis on financial assistance. 
Export subsidies equal 15 per cent of the value of the goods, while subsidies for moderni-
sation efforts amount to as much as 95 per cent of the costs. Even worse, none of the sub-
sidies is conditional on any change in behaviour or performance by the beneficiary. 
Another reason for targeting inefficiencies is the rampant fraud in most IMC programmes. 
Beneficiaries and service providers agree on the cost of an arbitrage transaction. Then the 
service providers issue invoices for prices far above what was actually paid by the clients, 
who submit the manipulated invoices to the IMC. The IMC refunds up to 95 per cent of 
the falsified price, which results in a net gain for the beneficiary that will be shared with 
the service providers. Some observers even report invoices being submitted to the IMC for 
services that were never provided.  
“There is so much room for arbitrage in the whole procedure and many consultants 
just like enterprises make a big amount of money with this.” (Egyptian entrepreneur, 
April 2010) 
Such ‘generosity’ also produces substantial deadweight effects: Many companies receive 
financial support although they do not need it. 
 “Of course, some companies get funding although they do not really need it. But why 
should we not give them the same? There is no need to curtail, as long as we have 
enough money. For example, there is only one big producer of locks in Egypt. It is a 
world player. Why should we exempt him from our support? Also there is only one big 
glass producer, Crystal Asfour. It is the Number 1 worldwide in the production of crys-
tal with 30,000 employees in Egypt. It exports 98 per cent of its products. Why should 
                                                 
56  Interviews with Ashraf Dowidar, IDA, 21 June 2009; Nihal El-Megharbel, economist, 15 June 2009; 
Reem Elsaady, GAFI, 5 May 2010; and Ali Kamel, USAID, 17 June 2009. 
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we exempt him? Our goals are: job creation, export promotion, FDI attraction and 
GDP growth. And the two companies contribute to all of these goals.” (Hesham 
Dayem, IMC, 27 April 2010) 
“If an entrepreneur wants to modernise, the state pays almost everything for him. This 
creates perverse incentives. The money is used for just anything but in many cases noth-
ing useful.” (consultant,  June 2009) 
At the same time, all these programmes lack mechanisms to transparently and inde-
pendently evaluate their impact and monitor effectiveness and efficiency. The pro-
grammes must regularly report to the responsible ministry – but only on the development 
of inputs and outputs, not on indicators of outcome and impacts. 
5.2.3 Transparency and fairness 
Astonishingly, many experts57 maintain that there has been less corruption and unfair 
treatment in the core programmes of Egyptian industrial policies than in most other policy 
fields. Most IMC funds have been allocated to large companies; it is more difficult for 
SMEs to get their applications approved. However, the latter are still in the running, and 
there is little evidence that either policy-makers or bureaucrats intentionally discriminate 
against medium-size companies. 
For other agencies, however, the picture is a bit bleaker. The SFD, for example, has been 
accused of misusing its funds for political aims. 
The IMC 
Implicitly, the IMC’s main objective is to help Egyptian companies become exporters. 
Accordingly, micro- and small enterprises are seldom considered for IMC support because 
they rarely have export potential. In principle, any company that satisfies this criterion 
qualifies for IMC support. 
A very large share of the IMC budget is allocated to a small group of comparatively large 
companies – although most of them are already able to export their products.58 Many of 
these firms are said to have had good connections to the Nazif government or other mem-
bers of the Mubarak regime. 
One explanation why so much funding went to this small group of ‘big shots’ is that many 
of the projects they implemented in cooperation with the IMC were so expensive that they 
used up a large chunk of the IMC budget. For example, when VW brought an Austrian 
consultant to help make its Egyptian suppliers understand proper costing procedures, the 
IMC contributed EUR 125,000 to the project.59 
                                                 
57  For example, Angus Blair, head, Beltone Financial, 22 June 2009; Hanaa Kheir-El-Din, then-executive 
director, ECES, 2 May 2010; and Selçuk Tanatar, programme manager for industry development, Inter-
national Finance Corporation, 21 June 2009. 
58  Interview with Hany Barakat, first undersecretary, MFTI, 17 June 2009. 
59  Interview with Ahmed Wahab, Engineering Export Council, 25 June 2009. 
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“Some medium-size enterprises also benefit from the IMC, but most of the IMC’s money 
is targeted to the very large enterprises even though they could pay for a consultant them-
selves. Funding them is wasted money.” (Tamer El-Meehy, Entrust, 28 April 2010) 
This does not mean that the IMC does not provide any support to medium-size companies. 
The 2012 DIE/ECES field study on SME upgrading in Egypt reported that 24 of the 102 
entrepreneurs said that they had benefited from financial or technical BDSs during the 
previous five years – most of them provided by the IMC.60 This included most of the very 
large firms in the sample but also 11 MSEs61, while 68 respondents stated that they had 
not received any BDSs during the previous five years and seven did not answer (Loewe et 
al. 2013, Table A27). 
Apparently, a distinction62 must be made between the various IMC programmes: 
— Enterprise promotion through the IMC cluster programme seems to be very trans-
parent. All the companies in a sector or region are included – regardless of size. 
— Most observers also attest to the IMC’s fairness regarding the provision of support 
to individual companies by its standard programmes, which have very clear selec-
tion criteria and accept every eligible applicant – although not always immediately. 
— The problem seems to crop up when applicants who request non-standard services 
such as financial support for a special consultancy or a technical solution. In these 
cases, standard criteria do not apply so the IMC has more flexibility to decide. Of 
course, some of the big and influential companies have tried to benefit from this 
flexibility, which means there is room for discretion in IMC decisions.  
Particularly in the IMC’s early years, there were cases of corruption and preferential 
treatment regarding requests for non-standard services. When these came to light some 
staff was forced to leave.63 
“Even IMC is subject to the interference of big and influential companies who want to de-
fend their market position. That is exactly why I call for an independent monitoring of the 
industrial policy implementation.” (Nihal El-Megharbel, economist, 15 June 2009) 
But almost all observers agree that the IMC is much less corrupt than the rest of Egypt’s 
public administration.64 Applications from some large companies have been approved de-
spite being outside the IMC’s scope, but a valid claim from a less well-connected compa-
ny has rarely been completely rejected – although it may have been considerably delayed: 
                                                 
60  Out these 24 companies, 8 received funding for staff training; 5 export subsidies; 4 consultancy; 4 cred-
it; 2 financial support for travel to international fairs; 2 for the purchase of new machines; and 1 for a 
quality certificate (according to primary data collected for Loewe et al. 2013). 
61  In 2007, before the relevant reference period, 4 of the BDS recipients were micro-enterprises, 11 were 
small, 7 medium-size and 2 large. At the time of the interview in 2012, 2 were micro-, 9 were small, 7 
were medium-size and 6 were large (according to primary data collected for Loewe et al. 2013). 
62  Interviews with Akrum Bastawi, MFTI, 21 June 2009; Frank Giesel, Chamber of Food Industries, 25 
June 2009; and Natalija El-Hage, GTZ, 23 June 2009. 
63  Interviews with Jennifer Bremer, American University of Cairo, 26 April 2010 and Steven Lee, consult-
ant, 2 May 2010. 
64  Interviews with Frank Giesel, Chamber of Food Industries, 25 June 2009; Natalija El-Hage, GTZ, 23 
June 2009; and Ahmed Wahab, Engineering Export Council, 25 June 2009. 
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“IMC does not exclude enterprises from support as long as these fulfil the criteria. 
But it has long waiting lists. Entrepreneurs who are not in the focus of IMC are not 
refused – they get simply stuck on the waiting lists, while others are considered im-
mediately” (Akrum Bastawi, MFTI, 21 June 2009) 
Still, many owners of SMEs complain that they do not benefit from the IMC, and in fact, 
they are underserved: many of them have never applied to the IMC for support.65 The 
IMC66 offers four explanations for this phenomenon: 
— Some medium-size entrepreneurs mistrust government agencies like the IMC and 
therefore do not request its support. 
— Others lack information on what the IMC offers and to whom. 
— Some are unable to prepare the IMC applications for support (perhaps because they 
do not understand the questions) or face problems with the application procedures 
(they may feel they cannot afford to wait for hours in the IMC office). 
— Still others feel that IMC support is not helpful because, for example, they believe 
that training employees is a waste of working hours. 
According to experts outside the IMC, however, the SMEs’ limited interest in the IMC 
programmes has more fundamental reasons. The services the IMC offers and the way it 
offers them do not correspond to the everyday reality of medium-size companies. For ex-
ample, many entrepreneurs do not want the IMC on-the-job training that was designed by 
people from government and large, successful companies that were already exporting. 
These people had in mind the challenges of national champions that were almost at the 
stage to offer their products abroad, but they lacked the understanding of medium-size 
companies that have still some way to go to become exporters.67 
Furthermore, the IMC has its own incentive to pick winners, the big companies, even if 
these can already – or are almost able to – conquer export markets. Because the IMC is 
tasked with transforming as many Egyptian companies as possible into exporters, it is 
normal that it should prefer to support companies that are already successful rather than 
medium-size companies that still have to grow a lot. The problem is that this widens the 
gap in Egypt between the champions and the wannabes.68 
For a long time, the Egyptian government believed that the big companies would eventu-
ally take the small ones with them.69 But this assumption assumes that the small enterpris-
es are linked to the large ones within the value chain, which is not the case in Egypt. The 
2012 DIE/ECES study shows that there is hardly any horizontal or vertical cooperation 
between Egyptian companies (Loewe et al. 2013). 
                                                 
65  Interviews with Hany Barakat, first undersecretary, MFTI, 17 June 2009 and Reem Elsaady, GAFI, 5 
May 2010. 
66  Interview with Mohammed Ismail, project manager, IMC, 3 May 2010. 
67  Interviews with Khaled Attiah, former executive director, Egyptian Competitive Authority, 3 May 2010 
and Natalija El-Hage, GTZ, 23 June 2009. 
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On the other hand, the IMC could not just support winners. It had too much money to 
spend to only consider a few big companies: 
“You know, IMC likes to give out the money that they have: They are not supposed to 
keep it back.” (Mohamed Kassem, World Trading Company, 6 May 2010) 
The SFD 
Although the SFD has a much smaller budget than the IMC, it misuses its funds more of-
ten – perhaps because of its longer institutional history. When the World Bank established 
the SFD in the late 1980s, it was lauded as a model of efficiency, transparency and lean 
management. Today, however, the SFD suffers from the overstaffing, petty corruption and 
burdensome procedures common to many Egyptian government agencies.  
The SFD was also misused by the Mubarak regime to legitimise the rule of those in gov-
ernment more than other government programmes. The SFD has always been touted as an 
initiative that shows how much the government cares about the very weak and vulnerable 
in society – although most SFD funds come from donors rather than the government.  
“The SFD is … heavily politicised. When the current director was appointed, he de-
cided to establish SFD lending offices in the premises of the NDP [the ruling party, 
led by Mubarak himself; author’s note]. I asked him whether he would also establish 
offices in the premises of other parties, and he said that of course they could apply for 
it.” (Consultant, April 2010) 
5.2.4 Relevance  
The Nazif government industrial policies principally failed because they did not tackle the 
five most binding constraints for investment and economic development in Egypt: 
— low-quality irrelevant education and training by the Egyptian school system, which 
limits entrepreneurs’ capabilities as well as their ability to attract and retain skilled 
workers 
— persistent deficits in the rule of law 
— widespread corruption and unfair competition 
— inadequate private sector representation 
— shortages of affordable land 
Industrial policies in Egypt will remain irrelevant unless they address these constraints. 
“IMC and IDA: what can they do? They do not have the mandate and the capacities 
and the instruments to bring about changes in the areas that are most binding for 
businesspeople in Egypt: education and training, bureaucracy, infrastructure and the 
coordination of investors and government agencies for joint sector-development ef-
forts.” (Steven Lee, consultant, 2 May 2010) 
Low-quality, irrelevant education and training  
Deficits in the education and training of workers are among Egypt’s core challenges:  
“Recent growth may have brought Egypt to the point where education constraints be-
come binding.” (Enders 2007, 24) 
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The 2012 DIE/ECES field study showed that the most serious challenge for SME owners 
in Egypt is the lack and high turnover of adequately trained workers: 35 per cent of the 
interviewees identified it as the single most important constraint and 45 per cent consid-
ered it to be among the top four constraints. The World Economic Forum GCR 2010/2011 
ranked the ‘lack of skilled labour’ second among the most binding constraints to doing 
business in Egypt (WEF 2011), while a study commissioned by the Egyptian Ministry of 
Finance (MOF 2008) concluded that SMEs find it difficult to keep qualified and commit-
ted workers. 
This problem is mainly due to the low quality of Egypt’s educational system and the mis-
match between school or university curricula and the knowledge employers need from 
their employees. According to the GCR 2010/2011, Egypt ranked 135th out of 142 coun-
tries regarding the ‘quality of its educational system’ and 131st in terms of the ‘quality of 
staff training’ (WEF 2011). 
The main problem is the low quality and irrelevance of primary and secondary education: 
“Adequate training of workers is the challenge for the Egyptian industry. We have to 
upgrade our human resources. Of course, that should start much earlier than at the 
age of training. Reforming the education system in Egypt is even more important.” 
(Ahmed Wahab, Engineering Export Council, 25 June 2009) 
Furthermore, many graduates have skills that the private sector does not need (El-Megharbel 
2008a, 6). 
“Education is really an important issue. For example, university graduates enter the 
labour market and expect to find good jobs, but the market does not need engineers, it 
needs technically trained workers.” (Mohamed Youssef, MOF, 16 February 2012) 
Higher quality more relevant education is not only important in itself but is also a prereq-
uisite for improved training and for greater awareness of work ethics, investment, savings, 
health, etc. It would create more profit-oriented entrepreneurs, better qualified and en-
gaged workers, and more investment in R&D, technology adoption and adjustment: 
“There is a lack of creativity which is due to the education system. It does not push 
talents, it does not teach you how to market ideas, how to become a risk taker, how to 
transfer an idea to an output, how to get market information.” (Mona Garf, Cairo 
University, 29 February 2012) 
“We have a problem with business skills. People lack knowledge on how it is to run a 
business. Entrepreneurial spirit does not exist. We do not teach entrepreneurship – 
not in the families, not in our schools. People do not know anything about financial 
statements and marketing. You have to teach people entrepreneurial skills very ear-
ly.” (Khaled Sewelam, American Chamber of Commerce, 7 March 2012) 
Much of the crisis in the educational system is because public spending on education has 
been slashed to less than 4 per cent of GDP in the last 20 years. Teachers and equipment are 
sorely lacking and teacher training is deplorable. Ever more children attend private lessons 
after school. A whole sector of tutoring schools and programmes has developed to help 
compensate for the weak public system, meaning that education expenditures are increasing-
ly privatised and children’s educational achievements reflect their parents’ financial means. 
Social mobility is dwindling – perhaps because it was planned by those who formulated 
Egypt’s policies between 2004 and 2011 in a government dominated by Egypt’s top busi-
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ness elite. The privatisation of education helps this elite self-reproduce and prevents the ad-
vancement of competing social groups. All the members of the Gamal faction attended very 
expensive private schools, and most studied at private universities in the US. They are very 
aware the difference quality education makes for a career (Demmelhuber 2008, 208).  
Most Egyptian children cannot afford to attend private schools. At best they can take some 
private lessons at home or at their teacher’s, in mosques or at non-governmental organisa-
tions or commercial service providers (Hartmann 2008). Such education does little to im-
prove the employment chances of workforce entrants and translates into rising unemploy-
ment rates, low productivity and a segmented labour market with marked wage differentials. 
Furthermore, both the knowledge imparted by the Egyptian educational system and the 
methods used to teach it discourage students from becoming independent and creative. 
School curricula are frontally taught, and students are expected to learn by heart. Critical 
thinking and the ability to discuss are not valued. Instruction is authoritarian and patriar-
chal, with no room for questions – much less contradictions. Students are not taught or 
encouraged to learn to learn, to acquire knowledge independently or to develop creative, 
problem-oriented thinking (UNDP / AFESD 2003, 3). 
According to the second Arab Human Development Report of 2003, these problems per-
sist because during the Mubarak era, neither policy-makers nor religious scholars were 
interested in establishing an educational system that would have nurtured students’ analyt-
ic skills, creativity and independent thinking:  
“An alliance between some oppressive regimes and certain types of conservative reli-
gious scholars led to interpretations of Islam which serve the governments but are in-
imical to human development, particularly with respect to freedom of thought, the in-
terpretation of judgments, the accountability of regimes to the people and women’s 
participation in public life.” (UNDP / AFESD 2003, 6) 
Many observers agree with this finding: 
“The quality of education in Egypt is not conducive to innovation. On the other hand, 
this has not come unintentionally. Policy-makers don’t want people to think freely.” 
(Akrum Bastawi, MFTI, 21 June 2009) 
One must hope that the situation will improve under the new Muslim Brotherhood gov-
ernment. 
Deficits in the rule of law 
In addition, entrepreneurs in Egypt continue to suffer from such problems as licensing, 
taxation, customs clearance, inspection and public tendering – as well as competition, cor-
ruption and the protection of property rights. In addition to excessive amounts of time and 
money, the main challenge of interactions with the state is the impossibility of assessing 
the true costs and outcomes. Small entrepreneurs are very insecure because of serious def-
icits in the rule of law: 
“Lack of law enforcement is a very big issue. As from a certain firm size, you have 
some security – at least in standard procedures. For the small and informal ones, 
however, there is no security at all.” (Roland Steurer, GTZ, 17 June 2009) 
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Smaller firms can be randomly subjected to a serious bureaucratic obstacle in the form of 
a restriction, prohibition, fine or fee that they had not (and could not have) anticipated: 
“There is a very smart entrepreneur in town that has opened a couple of shops for 
delicatessen. They are really perfect. You believe that you come to another world 
when you enter them. The articles they sell are really the best that you can get. The 
employees are better trained than anybody else in the country. The building materials 
fit best for their purpose – for example, the stone floor is rounded up a little thereby 
allowing for easy cleaning and avoiding anybody from falling when it is wet. Then the 
owner had ordered some most exquisite sorts of cheese from France. But the order 
was blocked at the border and not let in. The argument was: The cheese smells.” 
(Angus Blair, head, Beltone Financial, 22 June 2009) 
Especially for SMEs, the amount of quickly changing legislation creates legal obscurity, 
while the overlapping responsibilities and competences of various authorities create ambi-
guities in bureaucratic regulations and sometimes lead to unexpected decisions. 
Tax officials, for example, often ask SME owners to pay a bribe to lower the tax demand: 
“Some big companies pay the whole wage of some tax officers just to lower their tax 
burden. And of course, you better bribe tax officers than to pay the tax amount that 
they charge you! I know a pious Muslim who refused to pay any bribe. He ended up 
paying taxes three times a year and each time much too much, given his real in-
come.” (Yasser Zaher, Banque du Caire, 26 April 2012) 
But it is not a good idea to contest an administrative decision. Legal procedures are very 
lengthy and expensive for all parties, and the result is even less predictable than a decision 
taken by the public administration. 
Corruption and unfair competition 
Corruption is another cause of concern for entrepreneurs, and bribery is frequent in busi-
ness relations in Egypt: 
“In Egypt, you have to bribe for every licence. That can be expensive but big compa-
nies can afford it.” (Mohammed Abdel Hameed, Textile and Clothing Business Cen-
ter, 22 February 2012) 
When it comes to the big business deals, favouritism – wasţa – is widespread. Although it 
does not always have a negative connotation, it does have negative effects on the fairness 
of state–business relations and the competitiveness of single entrepreneurs and the econo-
my as a whole.70 
People with good connections often get confidential information, which helps them ex-
ploit market opportunities before others. For example, one private entrepreneur learned 
about the government plan to establish a new big settlement to the east of Cairo before 
everyone else. He bought a big plot of land there at a moderate price and then resold small 
subplots at much higher prices.71 
                                                 
70  For an extensive analysis of the effects of wasţa on state–business relations and the investment climate 
in Jordan cf. Loewe et al. (2007). 
71  Interview with a well-informed researcher, April 2010. 
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Many observers agree that entrepreneurs in Egypt often need more than capital, a good 
business idea, a promising strategy, skills and diligence: 
“For example, when somebody imported the first energy-saving lamps to Egypt a couple 
of years ago, they were not let in by the customs authority. They said that the socket had 
to be painted yellow, green or red – depending on the power of the bulbs. Otherwise, the 
bulbs would have to be sent back. Of course, this decision had been brought about by 
some domestic producers of conventional bulbs with good connections to the regime who 
were afraid of the competition with the new energy-saving bulbs.” (Donor representative, 
June 2009) 
What makes these phenomena more serious is that because everyone knows about them, 
they have a dampening effect on Egyptians’ interest in opening innovative businesses.72 
Some economic sectors are explicitly protected against new market entrants. This includes 
the entire energy sector, landline telecommunications, railway traffic and postal services, 
all of which continue to be legally monopolised by the state. For some sectors, the number 
of production licences is limited. In the case of taxi services and Nile River boats, the ar-
gument is that space is limited, while the steel, aluminium and fertilizer branches are said 
to consume so much energy already that the country might be unable to provide for new 
companies (OECD 2007, 32).73 
Whatever the real reason was to regulate entry into these sectors, at least until the revolu-
tion in 2011, all three were dominated by quasi-monopolies. Ezz Steel, for example, ac-
counted for 65 per cent of Egypt’s steel production in 2010. Its owner, Ahmed Ezz, used 
to be one of Gamal Mubarak’s closest friends and a member of parliament, until he was 
arrested in 2011 – right after the revolution – and accused of corruption (El Amrani 2011). 
Ezz had greatly benefited from his market dominance and the availability of cheap energy 
in Egypt. Although additional licences for steel production were issued in 2009, the mar-
ket share of Ezz Steel did not significantly decrease before the revolution. This suggests 
that either the licences were very small or Ezz himself had bought up some of them under 
another company name. The Haltementi company controlled 50 to 60 per cent of the 
Egyptian cement market in 2010, and two other companies controlled 90 per cent of the 
fertiliser market. The situation was similar in the metallurgy sector: 
“There is a lot of corruption within the cement and metallurgical industries. Corrup-
tion can reach such levels that the government itself cannot keep it quiet any more. 
[…] The greatest monopoly of the metallurgical industry is held by the Z, one of the 
closest allies of our king, the President. We are told that this sector is not being pri-
vatised because specialised knowledge is needed in this field. You don’t know any-
thing about it, you are ignorant! But no, we know plenty!” (Consultant quoted in 
Yousfi / Humphrey 2008, 13) 
                                                 
72  Interviews with Nihal El-Megharbel, economist, 15 June 2009 and Eberhard Kienle, Ford Foundation, 
12 June 2009. 
73  Several sectors (shipping, foreign trading, insurance brokerage, legal consultancy and representation, 
accounting, architecture and engineering services) remain closed to foreign investors. In the aviation and 
construction sectors, foreigners may only hold minority shares. Foreign insurance companies may only 
operate in the free zones. Cf. Egypt (2010, 3); OECD (2007, 31). 
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Between 2004 and 2011, these same entrepreneurial families came to dominate the gov-
ernment. Several ministers were related or good friends. 
“Egypt is controlled by a government consisting of billionaires who lead their respec-
tive ministry like their own company and ask mainly how they can maximise their pri-
vate gains. And if there is no other way they even make the laws themselves as they 
need them for their private businesses.” (Analyst, June 2009) 
“A particularly instructive case is the story of the fertiliser factory that they wanted to 
build in Damietta. Everything was planned and licensed. However, overnight a group 
of so-called NGO activists showed up and demonstrated against the factory. They 
were quickly supported by some parliamentarians, and after some time, the project 
was given up until only a few months later, an almost identical project was success-
fully implemented by a different company.” (Donor representative, June 2009) 
Before the revolution, only a few economic sectors, such as the cement and steel indus-
tries, were protected by formal market-entry barriers. But in many others, competition was 
also distorted – though in a more supple manner. The causes of such distortions could be 
termed ‘market-entry obstacles’ meaning that access was possible but difficult – at least 
until the 2011 revolution – because the established producers benefited from advantages 
such as preferential access to land or tax reductions: 
“Two weeks ago, a decision was taken to earmark a larger tract of land for wind en-
ergy plants. It was divided into small plots of the same size. In principle, there would 
have been enough plots for all bidders but even before the call for bids was pub-
lished, it turned out that some plots had already been promised to some interested 
parties. Very early, these had got the information that the wind conditions on the in-
dividual plots were quite different – with the effect that more energy can be produced 
on some of them than on the rest.” (Ibid.) 
The Egypt Competition Authority supervises markets and controls concentrations of mar-
ket power. But it is not authorised to take any legal action against such trends – even if it 
detects a veritable monopoly. Only the prime minister can start a formal prosecution 
(Demmelhuber / Roll 2007, 12). 
Subsidies were another instrument that the Nazif government used to generate competitive 
advantages for individual firms. The MOF has provided general subsidies on specific com-
modities such as energy and food (see Section 5.1), and used a variety of arguments and 
logics to grant transfers to single firms. In 2005/2006, for example, it transferred large sums 
of money to several Egyptian banks to settle their debts. The MOF also transferred funds for 
other ministries to subsidise public, private and foreign companies, and the recipient minis-
tries did not have to explain to either the public or the MOF why they had been granted the 
subsidy (Egypt 2010, 3). Unfortunately, we do not know what the situation is today.  
Hardly any observer of Egypt’s economic development reports on any cases of unfair 
competition with firms belonging to the army, which is surprising because the army is not 
only politically but also economically by far the most important player in the country. One 
explanation is that the army avoids direct competition with private or government-owned 
enterprises. Another explanation would be that nobody has yet dared to say anything nega-
tive about the army.  
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The tourism sector is an exception, which may be due to the fact that the army is a particu-
larly big player in it. It benefits from the fact that it owns broad strips of Egypt’s coastline 
where recreational tourism boomed in the 1980s. The army handsomely profited from 
selling land to tourism development projects and also started its own. Several hotel com-
plexes in resorts like Sharm el-Sheikh are run by army-owned companies.74 In addition, in 
some regions (e.g. along the coasts), the army must consent to any large construction pro-
ject even if it does not own the land. Many private construction companies may well 
choose to cooperate with army companies to avoid any trouble during licensing proce-
dures (Clover / Khalaf 2011). 
Inadequate private-sector representation 
Under Mubarak, the Egyptian state was organised like a pyramid, with the president at the 
top, playing competing branches against each other so that he always dominated the polit-
ical scene. One influential person (for example, a line minister) headed each branch and 
manipulated the smaller branches beneath him the way the president played the larger 
branches against each other. And so on. In this way, the political system was comparative-
ly stable. Branch and sub-branch heads behaved like little presidents, claiming full author-
ity for their tasks and not coordinating with any other branches.  
Usually decisions were taken at the top of each segment, sector and branch – without any 
formal negotiations. Sometimes the interests of various shareholder groups were taken into 
consideration but very often they were not. In any case, there was no transparent bargaining 
between the stakeholder groups before a decision was taken. At most, the decision-maker 
consulted a small group of people he knew personally. Citizens and entrepreneurs were not 
regarded as customers of public services who should be consulted in the interest of making 
public services more customer-friendly. Instead, the public administration behaved as if 
citizens and entrepreneurs “receive state support by the grace of the government and should 
therefore take what they get” (donor representative, June 2009). 
In recent years, many scholars have discussed how important trustful state-business rela-
tions are for investment and economic growth. On one hand, they help overcome market 
failures such as those related to information-related market coordination and problems of 
collective action. On the other hand, they can also help solve government failure. If they 
are well institutionalised, they lead to a credible commitment of the government to contin-
ue some policy for a certain time. Thereby, they reduce entrepreneurs’ uncertainties about 
the direction of government policies and encourage them to make longer-term invest-
ments. Trustful state–business relations also create an environment where the state is more 
prone to provide the infrastructure that businesspeople need, create an effective public 
administration, secure investors’ property rights, and negotiate with businesspeople about 
tax and customs tariffs and public spending priorities (Sen / te Velde 2009). 
Chekir and Diwan (2013) confirm that  
“there is nothing intrinsically bad about close state business relations. [...] To the ex-
tent that they have the right incentives to perform, close state-business relations can 
form the basis for dynamic capitalism and an effective state. But they can also be-
                                                 
74  A well-informed researcher, April 2010. 
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come sources of influence, corruption and other forms of rent-seeking that distorts 
economic and political incentives.” (Chekir and Diwan 2013, 2) 
The question is what the characteristics of effective state-business relations are, i.e. what 
is needed to generate the positive effects mentioned above. Sen and te Velde (2009) name 
five attributes: (i) transparency of information, (ii) reciprocity of actions, (iii) credibility in 
statements, (iv) mutual trust, and (v) the absence of collusive behaviour between individu-
al businesses and the state. Perhaps the most essential prerequisite for these attributes is 
adequate private sector representation (e.g. in the form of chambers of commerce or busi-
ness associations) meaning that it is transparent, independent and equally represents all its 
members.  
Abdel-Latif and Schmitz (2009) argue that less transparent and less formalised state–
business relationships can have the same positive effects as those with the five attributes 
mentioned above. They use evidence from Egypt to support their thesis, describing four 
economic sectors where negotiations between businesspeople and public officials have 
taken place, created mutual trust and led to a significant increase in investment in the sec-
tor. In all four cases, however, the state negotiated with individual entrepreneurs rather 
than all of the sector’s entrepreneurs or formal representatives; the results of the negotia-
tions were not made public (at least not to the other players in the sector); collusion be-
tween the state and individual entrepreneurs was initiated rather than prevented; and trust 
was created between the state and some, but not all, market players. 
Investments did increase in all four sectors but it was the entrepreneurs who had been on 
the deal who did most of the new investing. In fact, many entrepreneurs were alienated 
from the state and discouraged from making longer-term economic commitments in 
Egypt because they recognised that some of their competitors had preferential access to 
the government. 
How do we know that the rise in investments was due to the negotiations conducted be-
tween the state and some entrepreneurs and the trust created between them? Abdel-Latif 
and Schmitz (2009) fail to present a counterfactual to support their thesis. It may quite be 
true that the increase in investment in the four sectors after 2004 was due to the special 
relations between businesspeople and the state. At that year, red-tape bureaucracy and 
political risk kept investors away from Egypt. Their deal with the government gave the 
businesspeople the protection they needed to overcome their fears. It may thus have well 
been the oil that an economy needs to take off. However, two of the four sectors portrayed 
by Abdel-Latif and Schmitz (2009) were mobile telecommunications and information 
technology, both of which had previously been closed to private investors. Therefore 
much of the rise in investment is probably just because these sectors were finally opened. 
In this situation, the deal with the government was a partial opening of the sectors for se-
lected businesspeople that was clearly excluding competitors and hence not oil but sand 
for the economy and “a story of corruption” as Chekri and Diwan (2013, 11) write.  
Is it possible that even more investment would have been attracted to the mobile telecom-
munications sector if the government had awarded more than three licenses?75 The tele-
                                                 
75  One licence was given to Mobinil, which is owned by Orascom – the Sawiris Family company – and 
France Télécom. The second went to a joint venture of state-owned Egypt Telecom and Vodafone. And 
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communications sector has never been subjected to supervision by the Egypt Competition 
Authority.76 
The exclusive extension of licenses to well-connected businesspeople in several sectors 
meant that these could secure their respective market shares as well as access to credit 
irrespective of their competitiveness. They could make profit even if they were badly 
managed, had high production costs and charged high prices to their customers. Capital 
and labour may thus flow to inefficient companies and sectors rather than more competi-
tive ones. In addition, this unfair competition sent out a signal to the whole economy that 
competitiveness would not pay off and that business people should better spend their en-
ergy on rent-seeking rather than innovation (see Loewe/ Blume/ Speer on this issue with 
reference to the case of favouritism in Jordan). 
Chekir and Diwan (2013, 13) provide evidence that well connected Egyptian companies 
grew faster on average than others between 2004 and 2010 but started to plummet two 
months before the break-out of the revolution on 25 January 2011. And they invested sig-
nificantly more than other firms even though the return on assets and equity was below 
average. As a result, there was no incentive to invest into these companies other than their 
good government relations, which provided investors at least security against political 
risks. This does not mean that other firms (without good government relations but possibly 
a more competitive cost structure) would not have benefitted from higher returns from 
investments in the same sectors if the government had granted them access as well.  
But the government had done all it could for the trustfully linked entrepreneurs – but not 
for others. Abdel-Latif and Schmitz conclude themselves: “The deal violated all the rules 
but was forgotten over time, as Mobinil proved to be a worthy competitor to Vodafone…” 
(Abdel-Latif / Schmitz 2009, 65) 
The deals would have been much less difficult if the Egyptian government had negotiated 
them with private sector representation that fulfilled the three criteria mentioned above – 
transparency, independency and equal representation of all members. 
However, at that time there were no independent business organisations in Egypt that rep-
resented the interests of all the relevant companies in one sector. All enterprises had to 
belong to one of the country’s 16 chambers of commerce or industry – which were not 
independent: two-thirds of their board members were elected by the entrepreneur-
members, one-third was appointed by the government.77  
Although this changed after the revolution, the chambers continue to be dominated by a 
few businesspeople – usually the owners of the largest firms in each sector. Of course, 
their interests differ from those of medium-size and small entrepreneurs, which means that 
the chambers’ policies often conflict with the interests of most of their members.78 
                                                                                                                                                   
the third one was granted a bit later to a consortium that is led by the Abu Dhabi-based Etisalat company 
with a minority share being owned by the son of former president Sadat. 
76  Demmelhuber / Roll (2007, 12) and interview with Francesco Sciacchitano, resident twinning advisor, 
Egyptian Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, 24 June 2009. 
77  Interview with Hani Hafez, executive director, Federation of Egyptian Industries, 25 June 2009. 
78  Interviews with Hassan Omar, MFTI, 17 June 2009; Yousri Tinawy, general manager, Chamber of Food 
Industries, 25 June 2009; and Mohamed Youssef, Ministry of Finance, 16 February 2012. 
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Shortages of affordable land 
A fifth challenge for entrepreneurs – especially smaller ones – is getting affordable land 
with reliable infrastructure for their production facilities. Egypt’s surface area is large and 
the government has generally earmarked enough land for productive and commercial ac-
tivities. But this land is not where workers live or where entrepreneurs would like it. For 
example, only 17 per cent of all land with infrastructure services in Upper Egypt has been 
allocated to enterprises, with 65 per cent for Lower Egypt and an even higher ratio for the 
metropolitan areas (Benhassine et al. 2009, 132). 
It has become very difficult to find appropriate plots in Greater Cairo and Alexandria. In 
some industrial zones there are only very small, unattractive plots or plots for the wrong 
economic branches (see Section 4.2.1). In other zones, the prices are too high or there are 
no infrastructure or services such as reliable utilities, rapid access to highways or railway 
lines to transport heavy products, adequate industrial zone management and maintenance, 
etc. (El-Megharbel 2008b, 6). 
The IDA is also reported to have considerable discretionary power in allocating available 
land to competing bidders.79 Sometimes the IDA gives a plot of land to an entrepreneur 
and soon thereafter, another person shows up with evidence of legal claims to the same 
plot – from the time when other public agencies were responsible for land distribution: 
“In these cases we never know how things end up at courts. We can only act accord-
ing to our information and guidelines. Of course, these cases frustrate investors.” 
(Ashraf Dowidar, IDA, 21 June 2009) 
This is particularly problematic for SMEs. While larger companies can buy their own in-
dustrial zones (and perhaps resell or let parts to other companies), SMEs depend on land 
allocation by the IDA or SFD.80 
This is why some investors have bought state-owned enterprises – just to get the land – 
and then tried to let the workers go and close the old enterprise as quickly as possible.81 
The army benefits from rising land prices because it owns so much of it, including a broad 
strip of land around Cairo with barracks and military defence posts that were erected after 
the war in 1973 when, for a couple of hours, Israeli tanks were just 120 kilometres from 
Cairo. Since then, whenever city development reached that strip, the army simply sold it at 
reasonable prices to private investors for housing and industrial development projects – 
and was granted a free new strip from the government further outside town (that was even 
larger because in the meantime, Cairo had grown) (Ginsburg 2011). 
5.3 Explanation for the strengths and weaknesses 
The strengths and weaknesses of the industrial policies implemented by the Nazif gov-
ernment, which we identified in the previous sections, are no surprise. All the relevant 
ministers were businesspeople who were familiar with the problems and needs of the pri-
                                                 
79  Interview with Nihal El-Megharbel, economist, 15 June 2009. 
80  Ibid. 
81  A well-informed researcher, April 2010. 
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vate sector. They understood economic policy, and had a vision and a feeling for the needs 
of other entrepreneurs: 
“Now things have changed, there is a plan and a long term strategy…. We can feel it 
in the way that problems are resolved, the conversations have changed, the govern-
ment is conscious of changing things... to take the interests of investors into account. 
This has happened thanks to the new ministers, who were businessmen before.”  
(Executive of a French company quoted in Yousfi / Humphrey 2008, 25)  
These businesspeople took up their appointments with great ambition. Possibly, they 
wanted to do right as government leaders: ease the conditions of doing business in Egypt 
for foreign and private investors, support firms of all sizes, improve the rules and elimi-
nate market distortions. 
Unfortunately, however, the ministers continued to view reality through the lenses of 
large-scale, successful entrepreneurs. This means, first, that they lacked understanding for 
SMEs. Most probably, they did not want to discriminate against SMEs, but they were un-
aware of how much SMEs need different support than medium-size and large companies. 
Second, these businessmen-ministers, of course, also continued to feel responsible for 
their own enterprises and those of their friends and partners. Although they did not neces-
sarily try to create individual advantages for their own companies, most ministers did want 
to provide benefits to companies like their own (and even to their competitors). This is 
why the IMC had such a large budget and offered such generous support for export pro-
motion.  
In addition, the ministers tended to only support economic reforms, such as the streamlin-
ing of administrative procedures and financial sector liberalisation, if these benefited their 
own companies and others like them – and they blocked reforms that might have negative-
ly impacted on the development of their own company or the companies of friends, rela-
tives and partners. Between 2004 and 2011 nothing was done to fight corruption (especial-
ly favouritism) or competition distortions on any market where one of their companies or 
friends enjoyed a quasi-monopolistic position (Roll 2010, 4).  
And some ministers even used their positions to increase their wealth by creating competi-
tive advantages for their companies, buying stakes of privatised state companies at cut-rate 
prices, and so on (Demmelhuber / Roll 2007).  
Third, the ministers focused on the sectors where they had stakes. Abdel-Latif and 
Schmitz (2009) explain that “there were a number of selective interventions focused on 
specific sectors. They are less well known because neither government nor business- peo-
ple like to talk about them – because of the risk of accusations of favouritism and corrup-
tion” (Abdellatif / Schmitz 2009, 40). They applaud these interventions, arguing that they 
significantly improved some sectors’ business potential, forgetting that such preferential 
treatment could lead to intra-sectoral distortion based on individual preferences and dis-
criminatory treatment of sectors in which no government member has a personal stake. 
Fourth, some sectors seem to have received support, not because they are the most promis-
ing ones, but because they are some of the older ones that suffer most from government 
liberalisation. The automobile and textiles industries benefit from generous export subsi-
dies although many observers believe that they have little natural competitive advantage 
Markus Loewe 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 76 
on world markets. At the same time, some of the most promising sectors, such as the out-
sourcing-services industry, receive hardly any government support.82 
Fifth, the businessmen-ministers focused on micro-level reforms (company modernisa-
tion, on-the-job workers’ training, travel to international fairs, etc.) and overlooked the 
key problems of most Egyptian entrepreneurs that are of a more structural nature and 
located at a much higher aggregate level. This may be because big entrepreneurs in 
Egypt suffer much less than SMEs from the lack of skilled workers (they can offer 
higher wages or train workers themselves), persistent deficits in the rule of law, wide-
spread corruption and unfair competition, inadequate private sector representation and 
access to attractive land. But the phenomenon may also reflect the Nazif government’s 
reluctance to address more fundamental – political – issues.  
At the same time, the businessmen-ministers also looked at industrial policies through 
the lenses of free-market economists, focusing on micro-level measures and neglecting 
more structural reforms. This perspective explains why the Nazif cabinet refrained 
from taking the more interventionist approach to industrial policy that is needed to 
overcome coordination failure within economic sectors or shift investment into new 
sectors. This predilection for a non-interventionist industrial policy is probably due to 
two factors: first, the business ministers did not want to repeat the mistakes of previous 
governments and second, most of them had studied at American or British universities 
during the heyday of the free-market school of economics. 
5.4 Who benefited and who did not 
The policy reforms implemented by the Nazif government generally benefited both 
segments of the private sector: entrepreneurs and consumers. Everyone gained from 
the liberalisation of the financial sector, the reorganisation of the customs clearance 
system and the streamlining of administrative procedures. In addition, the Egyptian 
economy as a whole also profited – at least indirectly – from the increased foreign in-
vestment, exports and GDP. 
However, these gains were unevenly distributed across households and enterprises. In 
Chapter 3, we showed that Egypt’s growth between 2004 and 2011 did not favour 
poorer households: it did not reduce either poverty or unemployment rates. Many ob-
servers83 maintain that members of the business elite were the main beneficiaries of 
Nazif government policies. The policies affected business groups in different ways: 
while they did not harm any specific groups, some benefited much more than others. 
We cannot quantify these differences, nor do we have much empirical evidence for 
them.  
                                                 
82  Interviews with Akrum Bastawi, MFTI, 21 June 2009; Frank Giesel, Chamber of Food Industries, 25 
June 2009; Natalija El-Hage, GTZ, 23 June 2009; and Wolfgang Klos, National Automotive Co., 15 
June 2009. 
83  Including Jennifer Bremer, American University of Cairo, 26 April 2010 and Andreas Jacobs, Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation, 22 June 2009. 
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Military enterprises still form Egypt’s largest business block. But because they mostly 
produce for the domestic market (much of their production is sold to the army) the 
policy changes between 2004 and 2011 probably did not benefit them much. They 
were ineligible for many enterprise development programmes.  
The remaining government-owned enterprises used to benefit from protectionism. 
While some are still protected by state monopolies (as in the energy sector), most are 
in the red and would not survive without government subsidies. Government-owned 
enterprises may be the only real victims of Nazif government economic policies that 
deregulated markets, opened Egypt to foreign investors and imports, and privatised a 
great number of companies. 
The traditional medium-size enterprises in small trade survived the nationalisation and 
central-planning phases of Egyptian industrial policies. Most are rather conservative 
and tend to support the Muslim Brothers. They mainly produce for the domestic mar-
ket and have generally adapted well to new industrial policies. Between 2004 and 
2011, however, these enterprises may also have been victims of policies that led to a 
steep rise in cheap imports from Asia and increased competition for domestic produc-
ers.  
Manufacturing MSEs did not benefit much from the Nazif government’s general eco-
nomic reforms – but they did not suffer from them, either. This group of companies 
tends to produce for niches in the domestic market, where competition with foreign 
exports is less intense (perhaps because Chinese and other foreign producers concen-
trate on mass production). Yet MSEs have benefited from some changes in legislation: 
for example, since 2004,10 per cent of all government bids must go to SMEs (Section 
4.2.2). Also, the SFD now provides BDSs to MSEs. 
Medium-size to large manufacturing companies that produce for the domestic market 
have expanded under Sadat’s unique offer of market protection, tax holidays and pref-
erential access to relevant market information. Since then, most of them have learnt to 
withstand the competition of imports on the domestic market. Nevertheless, many of 
these companies complain that they benefited much less from the Nazif government 
industrial policies than exporters. 
Enterprises that aspired to become exporters are a small group but the main winners of 
Egypt’s recent industrial policies. They have received generous technical and financial 
support to help them sell their products abroad. 
Enterprises that already were exporters when the Nazif government was appointed 
form an even smaller group of rather large companies that also benefited from substan-
tial financial support that they did not need. Along with the aspiring exporters, they 
were the main constituency of the business ministers and Gamal Mubarak’s wing in 
the NDP and Parliament. 
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6 After Mubarak … a new beginning  
The January 25th revolution of 2011 opened the way to a new beginning in Egypt – not 
least in the field of industrial policies. Egypt now has a new constitution, president and 
government, and eventually will hold its second post-revolution parliamentary elections. 
But the new order will only be stable if political decision-makers manage to revamp eco-
nomic growth, reduce unemployment and fight poverty. In the long term, this will take 
renewed efforts to promote structural change. 
In order to succeed at this task, the new government should learn from the past: The chal-
lenge will be to save the good elements of the ‘incomplete reforms’ implemented by the 
Nazif government in the field of economic policy in general and industrial policy in par-
ticular while overcoming its weaknesses. 
Section 6.1 reviews the most important political and economic developments since the 
revolution. Section 6.2 sums up the main lessons to be learnt from the Nazif government 
industrial policy strategy and Section 6.3 formulates recommendations for Egypt’s future 
government. 
6.1 Political and economic developments since the revolution in 2011 
The revolution that erupted on 25 January 2011 did away with President Mubarak and his 
regime. Although first Mubarak dismissed the Nazif government on 29 January 2011 to 
appease demonstrators, he finally also had to resign on 11 February 2011 and hand power 
to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). The SCAF chairman, Mohamed 
Husein Tantawi, became the effective head of state. He suspended the constitution, banned 
the NDP, dissolved both houses of parliament and appointed an interim government 
(Mattes 2013).  
One year later, Mubarak and his two sons were sentenced to prison for not stopping the 
murder of peaceful demonstrators during the revolution. But they were not found guilty of 
having ordered the killing and most of the other accusations, including corruption and 
economic fraud, were dismissed. Ahmed Nazif is being held in prison for embezzlement 
and corruption; his trial is pending. The former Minister of Finance, Youssef Boutros-
Ghali and the former Minister for Trade and Industry, Rashid Mohamed Rashid, were sen-
tenced in absentia (both escaped from Egypt during the revolution and are now living 
abroad) to prison terms of 30 and five years, respectively, for embezzlement and squan-
dering public funds. Many elite businesspeople, such as Ahmed Ezz, were also arrested. 
He was sentenced to 17 years in prison for corruption and money laundering. Yet many 
who were directly responsible for human rights violations before and during the revolution 
were acquitted or released on bail (Brakel 2011). 
Between November 2011 and January 2012, a new parliament was elected in three rounds. 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s ‘Freedom and Justice’ party won almost half of the seats and 
the Salafi ‘An-Nour’ Party got another 21 per cent, while liberals and social democrats 
won only 10, and the old nationalist Wafd Party 7, per cent (Carnegie Endowment 2012). 
Industrial policy in Egypt 2004–2011 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 79
Presidential elections held in June 2012 resulted in another victory for the Muslim Broth-
erhood: one of their leaders, Mohammed Mursi, became president. He formed a new gov-
ernment of Islamists and members of the old Mubarak regime and dismissed Mohamed 
Husein Tantawi from his functions as Minister of Defence and head of the SCAF, along 
with Sami Annan, who as Army Chief of Staff was probably responsible for most of the 
decisions taken by the post-revolution military regime (Mattes 2013). Apparently, the 
Muslim Brothers and the army have made a deal; the army will not interfere into politics 
as long as the government leaves the privileges of the army untouched and there is no 
threat for Egypt’s national unity. 
In any case, the new government (or the winner of the next parliamentary elections) will 
have to take some very important decisions regarding the Egyptian economy. During the 
revolution, the economy collapsed because many workers were on strike or unable to 
reach their workplaces as a result of the dramatic security situation. Tourists cancelled 
their plans to travel to Egypt and foreign investment came to a standstill. Egyptian inves-
tors and consumers also felt insecure and domestic demand for high-end products implod-
ed. In 2012, the growth rate fell to 1.6 %, which is not even enough to compensate for the 
increase of the population. Some companies went bankrupt, while many others laid off 
workers, further slackening domestic consumption and causing tax income to decline. 
Prices of imported goods continued to rise with the increase in global energy prices after 
the 2008–2009 world financial and economic crisis. The government strained the budget 
by continuing to stabilise prices for energy, water and basic food items through consumer 
and producer subsidies with the effect that the deficit was equal to about 12 per cent of 
GDP in Fiscal Year 2012–13 and inflation rose to more than 12 per cent. Even though 
Qatar and some other countries granted some very generous credits to Egypt, the country’s 
foreign exchange reserves plummeted from USD 36 billion in 2010 to USD 14 billion in 
May 2013, when Standard and Poor’s lowered Egypt’s sovereign credit rating to ‘CCC+’. 
Finally, the government is now considering reducing energy subsidies and increasing in-
come taxes. But it also should reflect on how it can boost economic growth and exports to 
broaden the tax base (Bergmann 2012; Ginsburg 2012). 
So far, we have few signs of Egypt’s future economic policy course. The Muslim Brother-
hood government has not clearly expressed its vision and in fact, it has given contradictory 
messages. Presumably this is because only a few Muslim Brothers are familiar with eco-
nomics and there are competing views of the future within the movement. Most of its eco-
nomic policy ideas fit into a ‘social-market economy’. However, it includes models that 
come close to German ‘ordoliberalism’ as well as models that would be called ‘social 
democratic’ if they were propagated by secular parties (El Shorbagi 2013; Habibi 2012). 
All the Muslim Brotherhood models rely on market forces, competition and free trade to 
provide for the efficient allocation of goods and production factors. But they are also all 
based on the notion that all citizens should participate in the country’s economic develop-
ment and that the government may have to intervene in order to assure that nobody is left 
out. Almost all their economic development models emphasise the need to reform institu-
tions, fight corruption, eliminate monopolies and more effectively control competition. 
Many of them include provisions to protect foreign and domestic investments, increase 
spending on education, create more efficient and fairer social-protection schemes and re-
duce the budget deficit. Finally, many models express the need to foster economic diversi-
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fication and structural change and strengthen export orientation – without elaborating how 
these goals can be achieved (Habibi 2012). 
However, we do not even know if the Muslim Brothers will win the next elections again. 
Their popularity has fallen sharply since the parliamentary elections in December 2011 
and January 2012 because the government has been unable to stimulate the economy or 
effectively combat unemployment and poverty. Today, it seems likely that the Muslim 
Brothers will have to form a broad coalition with other religious or secular parties – or that 
Salafi parties will make the race (El Shorbagi 2013). 
6.2 Lessons learnt  
The main lesson to be drawn from the economic development strategies implemented by 
the Nazif government is that industrial policies must involve much more than private en-
terprise development. The businessmen-ministers who held power between 2004 and 2011 
seem to have believed that any broad provision of generous BDSs would do to foster 
structural change. The results indicate that they were mistaken. At best, their strategic ap-
proach can be described as an incomplete reform: 
First, support for the private sector will only have limited effects as long as significant 
deficits persist in the broader business environment – especially in the quality of education 
and vocational training, but also in the transparency of the political system, the public ad-
ministration and the judicial system, in the rule of law, in market competition, in govern-
ment–private sector dialogue and the availability of land. 
Second, industrial policies risk being ineffective if they address just some of the market 
failures that inhibit structural change. The Nazif government strategy, for example, ad-
dressed the lack of public goods such as R&D and workers’ training, but it did not over-
come coordination failure within sectors. This deficit may have resulted from policy-
makers’ reluctance to be overly interventionist, which is understandable considering 
Egypt’s experience with industrial policies under Nasser and Sadat. It may have been wise 
for the government to not focus its support too much on selected economic sectors that are 
considered to have high potential. But it should have been more interventionist within sec-
tors, encouraging companies to try new forms of cooperation and industrial organisation. 
Third, industrial policies must focus in particular on technology transfer. Economic devel-
opment is increasingly linked to the ability of countries to acquire and build know-how. 
Comparative advantages come less from resources and abundant labour – as it may have 
been the case in the past – but more from the successful application of knowledge. 
Fourth, innovation requires more than technology transfer: the transferred technology 
must be adopted and used. In this regard, Egypt’s main constraint is entrepreneurs’ lack of 
awareness regarding the need to constantly innovate. 
Fifth, in order to be socially inclusive and economically sustainable, industrial policies 
also should be more supportive of SMEs. They should not focus on single SMEs but ra-
ther create an entrepreneurial ecosystem that is equally supportive of SMEs and larger 
companies, and helps both groups cooperate and integrate. In particular, SMEs should be 
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supported in their efforts to upgrade (i.e. to grow through innovation) – either through 
well-tailored individual support or through cluster or value-chain programmes. 
Sixth, industrial policies should not rely too heavily on financial instruments because too 
generous financial support reduces the incentive for government agencies to use their 
funds sensibly and companies’ incentive to become more competitive by themselves. Any 
major financial support should be conditioned on proof of how it helped the recipient – for 
example, by significantly increasing exports.  
Seventh, industrial policies should be formulated with well-informed and well-organised 
private sector representation in a transparent and participatory dialogue. Without such dia-
logue, the government risks providing support that fails to address the main concerns of 
private enterprises. 
6.3 Recommendations for the new government 
The Nazif government showed that Egypt is capable of designing a rational industrial pol-
icy strategy that includes reasonable goals with measurable progress indicators and identi-
fies appropriate instruments. 
In addition, the IMC has demonstrated that it is possible to set up agencies in Egypt that 
deliver government services by following the rules in a relatively efficient, transparent 
and fair fashion. However, we have seen that the efficiency and transparency of these 
agencies may fade away over time: once one of the leanest, most transparent agencies in 
Egypt, the SFD is now plagued by high overheads, favouritism and the misuse of funds 
for political ends. 
The main problem of the industrial policies between 2004 and 2011 was the Egyptian 
government’s reluctance to implement more comprehensive reforms. It did not overhaul 
the public education system, formulate clear and transparent rules for decision-making in 
the public sector, respect the rule of law, establish fair, market-based competition or per-
mit democratic private sector representation.  
As long as these fundamental deficits persist, no industrial policy strategy can easily 
achieve its goals. Therefore, the first step that Egypt’s new government should do is to 
care about the fundamentals. A second step should be to reorganise how industrial policy 
is drafted and managed. And the actual redesign of industrial policies should only be the 
third step. 
6.3.1 Reforming the framework of industrial policies 
Egypt is unlikely to remain (or become more) competitive unless the government manages 
to improve the quality and relevance of education and training, restore the rule of law, 
combat corruption and unfair competition, encourage the establishment of democratic pri-
vate sector representation and allocate enough suitable land for productive purposes. 
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Quality and relevance of education and training  
Probably the most urgent reform is that of education and training. Experts opine that the 
entire public education and training sector must be overhauled so as to promote not just 
students’ knowledge and skills, but also their powers of analysis, creativity and imagina-
tion, and the basic competencies needed for entrepreneurship. Public schools should also 
encourage teamwork. 
The Egyptian government would be wise to help its next generation of entrepreneurs ac-
quire the skills needed to run a business. Basic economic and business know-how should 
be part of the secondary school curriculum. Professional business schools should be 
opened; university-level economics and business administration courses should be more 
practical and relevant. The government could organise business-plan competitions like the 
Junior Business Association of Jordan has done for more than five years. 
The government might also consider providing more support to help young Egyptians get 
international exposure – by promoting international student exchanges, helping students 
intern in foreign companies and funding attendance at international fairs and business con-
ferences. These activities can help inspire future entrepreneurs to innovate, think business 
and build international networks.  
Finally, a comprehensive vocational training system should be developed. The Mubarak-
Kohl Initiative has taken important steps towards this goal. However, this initiative has 
shown that it will take a very long time to train a significant share of future workers. The 
government could also consider expanding the outreach of short-term training courses that 
truly respond to the demands of employers and employees. Curricula should be developed 
in close cooperation with private sector representatives like trade unions, chambers of 
commerce and industry as well as general business, small enterprise and employers’ asso-
ciations. 
Rule of law 
The Egyptian government can take the following steps to enhance the rule of law: 
Provide incentives for government officials to comply with laws and regulations – for ex-
ample, by creating monthly awards for the officials who best meet clients’ demands. 
Establish an efficient government-employee impeachment procedure. 
Reform the judiciary and make it independent of the executive branch. 
Make public officials more accountable through improved monitoring mechanisms. The 
government could publish laws and guidelines helping public administration customers 
compare the theory and practice of administrative procedures. It could also introduce more 
elements of e-government throughout the public administration and extend ICT solutions 
to all public services. E-procurement and e-tendering are especially effective for reducing 
corruption. Moreover, independent bodies could be used to assess the performance of all 
government departments and evaluate the transparency of their decision-making. Finally, 
whistle blowing could be encouraged to help identify individuals in the public administra-
tion who are corrupt or break the rules.  
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Combat corruption and unfair competition 
While most measures that help establish the rule of law also combat corruption and unfair 
competition, the government of Egypt could achieve more by also strengthening the Egyp-
tian Competition Authority and providing it with an effective sanctioning mechanism. In 
addition, it could pass an anti-trust law and set up an independent anti-trust commission. 
Democratic private sector representation 
Another challenge is to encourage the private sector to establish free and democratic rep-
resentation to speak on behalf of all companies in Egypt and take part in constructive dia-
logue with the government. The Federation of Egyptian Industries, the umbrella organisa-
tion of all chambers of industry and commerce, would be most suitable for this task. En-
terprises are already obliged to belong to one of the two chambers. To make chamber 
membership attractive even for informal companies, membership fees should be as low as 
possible – at least for MSEs. Board members should be elected to represent all enterprises. 
Quotas for representatives of large, medium-size, small and micro-enterprises would help 
assure equality of representation. 
Workers should also be encouraged to join trade unions. It is in the government’s interest to 
have elected trade union representatives who can speak on behalf of all Egyptian workers. 
Finally, enterprises could be encouraged to establish business associations alongside the 
chambers of commerce. These could facilitate mutual exchange, joint action and the airing 
of concerns of particular sub-groups of entrepreneurs. But the government must remember 
that associations with voluntary membership normally represent only a fraction of busi-
nesspeople, whose interests and opinions may not be in line with other – sometimes, most 
of the other – entrepreneurs: 
“What is really needed is an organisation representing SMEs, which can sit down 
with the government to inform it about the real needs of SMEs.” (Mona Garf, Cairo 
University, 19 February 2012) 
Land for productive purposes 
Supporting small and medium-size companies in Egypt also calls for the allocation of 
more land at attractive locations for industrial use. Obviously the government of Egypt 
cannot offer all companies land next to Alexandria and Cairo. But it can offer companies 
more choice with regard to land, and it must expand the areas reserved for MSEs that can-
not get plots in some of the most attractive industrial zones. 
The infrastructure in industrial zones and traditional industrial production areas needs to 
be improved. Transportation, in particular, has become a problem for many enterprises. 
6.3.2 Reorganising the making and management of industrial policies  
Reforms are also overdue in the fields of industrial policy-making and implementation. 
Both should be comprehensive in terms of (i) the actors involved, (ii) policy fields consid-
ered and (iii) instruments employed. 
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Multi-stakeholder process 
In order to make future industrial policies more responsive to the needs of the private sec-
tor, the government of Egypt should involve not only all relevant line ministries and im-
plementing government agencies, but also representatives from all sub-groups of entrepre-
neurs and workers, in drafting a new strategy. It might also be good to involve non-
governmental organisations such as groups that lobby for environmental concerns. 
In addition, it would be wise to also establish an independent supervisory board composed 
of representatives from the government and public administration, entrepreneurs, workers 
and civil society to monitor the implementation of industrial policy. The effects of indus-
trial policies should be reviewed in regular public–private consultations. 
Broad perspective 
The government and the private sector should work together to identify the most binding 
constraints to growth and structural change to be addressed by the industrial policy strate-
gy. These constraints could be entrepreneur or enterprise characteristics, industrial organi-
sation or the business environment. The industrial policy strategy must not be restricted to 
specific policy fields such as BDSs: reforms may actually be more pressing in education, 
public sector organisation, trade policies or infrastructure. Industrial policy planning must 
therefore adopt a very broad perspective. 
Integrated set of many different instruments 
Egypt’s future industrial policy strategy should consist of a large variety of instruments 
that address the country’s various constraints to growth and structural change. In no case 
should it be limited to a specific set of tools. 
At the same time, however, the possibly heterogeneous tools should be conceptually con-
sistent. Programmes implemented by the different line ministries should be harmonised 
and coordinated so that their responsibilities do not overlap or leave gaps: 
“SME promotion has to be much better coordinated than it is today. We have so 
many different programmes and they are not harmonised at all. We need one special-
ised entity for SME promotion and a comprehensive strategy for the whole country. 
This strategy has to include all different pillars of SME promotion, namely finance, 
clustering, export promotion, etc.” (Mona Garf, Cairo University, 19 February 2012) 
6.3.3 Redesigning industrial policies 
Ideally, reforms in the design of industrial policies would emerge from the reorganisation 
of the drafting process. Also, it is not necessary to start from scratch: Egypt’s new gov-
ernment can build on the programmes it has inherited. They are not all bad; some just need 
to have their implementation processes overhauled, and some existing programmes may 
need more vigorous state interventions. 
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Better coordination of the IMC, GAFI and SFD  
The IMC services – now only provided to medium-size and large manufacturing firms – 
should be extended to companies of all sizes and from all sectors. It might make sense to 
let the SFD continue to focus on MSEs for a while so that the IMC can get adjusted to 
working with MSE customers. In the long run, however, companies of all sizes ought to 
be able to access the same services. Programme officers would then be able to accompany 
and support the entire growth process of their customer firms and understand the type of 
support that each company needs in each development phase. 
The IMC should also extend its services to offer consultancy services, such as those pro-
vided by GAFI to help customers locate and access finance (credit, equity, insurance, 
etc.), and non-financial BDSs from other providers. After a period of transition, GAFI’s 
entire Bedaya programme could be merged with the IMC. 
In the long run, the SFD should focus on providing MSEs with micro-finance, including 
credit, private equity, micro-leasing and micro-insurance. 
In order to offer all these services, the IMC might need a larger budget. To ensure effec-
tive, efficient, transparent and fair use of this funding, an independent supervisory board 
made up of government, private sector and NGO representatives should be established 
with authority to review every IMC document and impeach any IMC employees suspected 
of embezzlement or corruption. 
More holistic approach to human resource development 
The IMC should in particular continue to support enterprises that train their workers. 
However, the content of IMC co-funded training programmes should be redesigned with 
private sector representatives to make sure that the content and modalities of training 
conform as much as possible with the needs of different kinds of enterprises and groups 
of workers. This consultative process should also include people who understand the 
specific problems of smaller and informal firms. 
However, the IMC might also have to take action to stimulate demand for its training 
programmes. It should run campaigns to raise awareness of the importance of workers’ 
training for their productivity, motivation and loyalty. The IMC could cooperate in this 
regard with the chambers of commerce and industry, and get business associations to 
publicise the training programmes. 
The IMC could offer to support its customers in their human resources development ef-
forts. Its awareness campaigns should emphasise that human resources development 
helps workers feel good about the firm, creates incentives for the more skilled and moti-
vated workers to stay and helps integrate them into major decision-making processes at 
the firm. 
At the same time, the IMC could consider raising the co-payments of beneficiaries of its 
training programmes. Programmes that are more responsive to the demands of employ-
ees and employers will help reduce misuse (take-home effects) and lower costs.  
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More emphasis on technology transfer 
Egypt’s new government should place more emphasis on technology transfer. This re-
quires both improvements in the availability of technologies for Egyptian enterprises and 
in their absorptive capacities. 
To facilitate technology transfer, the IMC should spend a larger share of its budget on the 
ETTICs, which need to be completely overhauled. The food technology centre’s transfor-
mation into a service agency could serve as an example. Representatives of the private 
sector should have a major say on how to improve the demand orientation of the ETTICs. 
The ETTICs should also raise their researchers’ salaries to provide an incentive for aca-
demics to conduct application-oriented research instead of collecting credits for academic 
careers. 
Interaction between enterprises and Egyptian universities should be intensified. Private 
sector representatives should participate in academic planning and course design, and uni-
versity professors should be encouraged to work part-time in industry-initiated research 
projects and professional development activities. Job assessments could be amended to 
invite participation in applied research and consultancy, and university professors abetted 
to seek third-party funding through paid assignments by private companies that need sup-
port for technical problems. Conversely, industry staff could be prompted to second to 
universities. 
Rationalisation of subsidies 
Egypt’s new government must reduce subsidies both to reduce its budget deficit and to 
lessen their negative incentives for entrepreneurs. The government should raise electricity 
and petrol prices that are incentives to waste energy and encourage investments in sectors 
that are energy- instead of employment-intensive. Egyptian enterprises must become com-
petitive without energy subsidies– for social, ecological and economic reasons. Egypt’s 
energy subsidy is unsustainable. 
The government should also rationalise its export subsidies. Sooner or later, some compet-
itor country will sue Egypt at the WTO because its export subsidies violate the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Subsidies also reduce Egyptian producers’ incentive to 
become competitive on world markets. Following the logic of the ‘infant industry’ theory, 
export subsidies could be granted for a limited number of years to help exporters become 
competitive as the subsidy is gradually reduced to zero. But even in this case, the govern-
ment should reconsider its subsidy focus, which now includes old industries (textiles and 
food production), and add industries with potential. 
Finally, while tax holidays for firms in the free zones could be continued, they should be 
conditioned on some performance indicator. 
Coordination  
The most important action for the Egyptian government is to crowd investments into tar-
get sectors that have been neglected by private entrepreneurs because of coordination fail-
ures. For example, foreign investors may want to invest in renewable energy but lack local 
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cooperation partners (Vidican 2012). The state can solve this problem by (i) providing 
complementary investments to investors, (ii) encouraging private domestic investors to 
invest (for example, by assuming some of the investment risk), or (iii) helping foreign 
investors create local value chains. 
The IMC already tried the last option by helping foreign automobile companies improve 
their local supplier networks, which at first was very successful. (Unfortunately, the pro-
gramme was not introduced in any other sectors.) The idea is to create value chains in a 
promising sector through partnering with a leading private firm that understands markets, 
technologies and entrepreneurial requirements better than the state. Such a firm might be 
interested in cooperating with local suppliers but not want to assume the risks associated 
with local supplier development. The firm could be allowed to select the suppliers to be 
developed with IMC help on the condition that it guarantees to purchase a minimum 
amount of products from these firms in subsequent years. 
The government should generally support the extension of Egyptian value chains as a 
means of increasing the local content of exported or domestically sold products: 
“It is all about the supply chain. Many Egyptian firms import large shares of their in-
puts. But they do not have to. Rather, the country should rely on its own wealth. In 
addition, Egypt should also move up the value chain. It could start from its marble, 
vegetables, and cotton – and step by step move up.” (Steven Lee, consultant, 
17 February 2012) 
For this, the government can provide financial incentives: 
“The initiative to foster the linkages between SMEs and large firms is the responsibil-
ity of the government as it cannot be expected that large firms will take the lead. The 
government could offer tax holidays for large companies that integrate SMEs into 
their value chain. Moreover, such companies could be favoured in government ten-
ders.” (Nihal El-Megharbel, economist, 15 June 2009) 
It is however even more important to create confidence between cooperating companies. 
The main reason for the limited number of vertical linkages between Egyptian firms is 
mistrust, which comes from problems in enforcing contracts, that is, in the rule of law. 
The state could effectively moderate between partners and arbitrate if needed.  
The state could even go one step further and create vertical and horizontal forms of coop-
eration – provided it has the vision of a sector’s entire cooperation network. Egypt has 
already been fairly successful with this approach in the marble and granite sector. In the 
future, though, sector deficit and development plans should be worked out with private 
sector representations. 
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Table A4: Egypt’s global-competitiveness ranking – according to the World Economic Forum 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 score rank score rank score rank score rank score rank
Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 4.1 65 4.0 77 4.0 81 4.0 70 4.0 81 
Basic requirements 4.6 64 4.2 79 4.2 83 4.2 78 4.2 89 
1st pillar: Institutions  4.2 50 4.2 51 4.2 52 4.0 56 4.0 57 
2nd pillar: Infrastructure 3.7 56 3.5 62 3.7 60 4.1 55 4.0 64 
3rd pillar: Macro-economic stability 3.7 111 3.7 124 3.6 125 3.5 120 3.4 129 
4th pillar: Health and primary education  6.5 51 5.2 83 5.2 88 5.2 84 5.4 91 
Efficiency enhancers 3.6 75 3.6 85 3.7 88 3.9 80 3.8 82 
5th pillar: Higher education and training 3.7 77 3.7 80 3.6 91 3.6 88 3,6 97 
6th pillar: Goods market efficiency 4.1 66 4.0 76 4.0 87 4.0 87 3.9 90 
7th pillar: Labour market efficiency  3.0 80 3.2 130 3.3 134 3.5 126 3.4 133 
8th pillar: Financial market sophistication ... ... 3.5 113 3.7 106 4.0 84 4.0 82 
9th pillar: Technological readiness ... ... 2.8 87 3.0 84 3.4 82 3.3 87 
10th pillar: Market size ... ... 4.5 31 4.7 27 4.8 26 4.8 26 
Innovation and sophistication factors  3.6 65 3.6 63 3.5 74 3.5 71 3.5 68 
11th pillar: Business sophistication 4.2 57 4.1 67 3.9 77 4.0 72 4.0 63 
12th pillar: Innovation 3.0 83 3.2 67 3.2 67 3.0 74 3.0 83 
1st pillar: Institutions           
Property rights   58  51  67  67  56 
Intellectual property protection  44  64  60  58  67 
Diversion of public funds   ...  58  85  88  83 
Public trust of politicians  51  55  51  37  40 
Judicial independence   40  41  42  64  64 
Favouritism in decisions of gov’t officials   48  50  61  81  63 
Wastefulness of government spending  64  67  86  61  95 
Burden of government regulation  74  57  55  70  51 
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes  ...  48  55  39  79 
Efficiency of legal framework in  
challenging regulations   ...  ...  67  63  40 
Transparency of government policy-making  ...  92  ...  57  69 
Business costs of terrorism  105  106  72  106  68 
Business costs of crime and violence   51  49  23  53  97 
Organised crime  30  32  21  15  14 
Reliability of police services  47  57  52  54  81 
Ethical behaviour of firms   50  53  53  52  59 
Strength of auditing and reporting standards  72  70  66  50  58 
Efficacy of corporate boards  80  87  93  64  82 
Protection of minority shareholders’ interests  61  61  68  60  46 
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Table A4 cont’d: Egypt’s global-competitiveness ranking – according to the World Economic Forum
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
  rank  rank  rank  rank  rank 
2nd pillar: Infrastructure           
Quality of overall infrastructure  57  60  57  56  68 
Quality of roads  47  71  74  73  75 
Quality of railroad infrastructure   47  57  54  47  46 
Quality of port infrastructure  62  79  69  57  69 
Quality of air transport infrastructure  57  59  52  44  39 
Available seat kilometres*   ...  34  32  32  33 
Quality of electricity supply   54  55  53  51  53 
Telephone lines*   73  75  79  73  87 
3rd pillar: Macro-economic stability           
Government surplus/deficit*   127  127  126  128  107 
National savings rate*  69  71  70  80  108 
Inflation*   112  61  122  101  135 
Interest-rate spread*   67  78  81  68  69 
Government debt*  104  116  124  121  119 
4th pillar: Health and primary education           
Business impact of malaria  59  60  52  1  1 
Malaria incidence*   1  1  61  1  1 
Business impact of tuberculosis  58  64  60  57  32 
Tuberculosis incidence*  45  41  42  40  44 
Business impact of HIV/AIDS   53  41  32  39  29 
HIV prevalence*  1  1  1  1  1 
Infant mortality*  78  81  88  89  80 
Life expectancy*  82  85  89  92  94 
Quality of primary education  ...  126  129  124  126 
Primary enrolment*   ...  57  63  45  73 
Education expenditure*   ...  51  59  59   
5th pillar: Higher education and training           
Secondary enrolment*  61  65  65  68  90 
Tertiary enrolment*   57  59  59  63  78 
Quality of the educational system   106  119  126  123  131 
Quality of maths and science education   96  106  128  124  125 
Quality of management schools  89  100  116  114  122 
Internet access in schools   ...  82  99  95  96 
Local availability of research and training 
services  
 80  83  92  78  64 
Extent of staff training   84  81  96  106  112 
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Table A4 cont’d: Egypt’s global-competitiveness ranking – according to the World Economic Forum
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
  rank  rank  rank  rank  rank 
6th pillar: Goods market efficiency           
Intensity of local competition   68  73  92  83  91 
Extent of market dominance   ...  55  87  102  95 
Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy  74  80  98  95  106 
Extent and effect of taxation   37  33  34  52  75 
Total tax rate*   ...  78  80  79  78 
No. of procedures required to start a business*  63  65  34  26  34 
Time required to start a business*   27  29  16  15  21 
Agricultural policy costs   92  75  102  99  84 
Prevalence of trade barriers  107  113  118  114  114 
Tariff barriers*   ...  114  132  131  123 
Prevalence of foreign ownership  86  93  78  66  100 
Business impact of rules on FDI   ...  98  83  63  75 
Burden of customs procedures   ...  69  77  68  50 
Degree of customer orientation   ...  41  27  43  63 
Buyer sophistication   ...  121  130  106  126 
7th pillar: Labour market efficiency           
Cooperation in labour-employer relations   ...  72  50  46  99 
Flexibility of wage determination  ...  28  62  56  60 
Rigidity of employment*  ...  97  40  43  67 
Hiring and firing practices   ...  106  92  72  76 
Firing costs*   ...  123  119  121  128 
Pay and productivity  ...  79  114  93  76 
Reliance on professional management   ...  94  124  106  86 
Brain drain  ...  115  129  123  114 
Female participation in labour force*  ...  129  133  127  130 
8th pillar: Financial market sophistication          
Financial market sophistication  77  86  95  85  – 
Financing through local equity market  55  62  49  22  29 
Ease of access to loans   82  95  79  44  49 
Venture capital availability   89  79  46  34  41 
Restriction on capital flows   ...  99  80  66  84 
Strength of investor protection*  ...  87  67  55  – 
Soundness of banks   95  106  111  86  61 
Regulation of securities exchanges  ...  95  80  69  67 
Legal rights index*  ...  123  123  98  103 
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Table A4 cont’d: Egypt’s global-competitiveness ranking – according to the World Economic Forum
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
  rank  rank  rank  rank  rank
9th pillar: Technological readiness           
Availability of latest technologies  67  65  60  66  91 
Firm-level technology absorption  60  68  63  48  58 
Laws relating to ICT  81  81  64  51  – 
FDI and technology transfer   51  49  55  30  53 
Mobile telephone subscriptions*  94  98  106  97  102 
Internet users*   85  88  92  78  90 
Personal computers*  87  91  90  84  – 
Broadband-Internet subscribers*  ...  86  86  82  91 
10th pillar: Market size           
Domestic market-size index*   ...  29  25  25  27 
Foreign market-size index*  ...  40  39  26  27 
11th pillar: Business sophistication           
Local supplier quantity   35  37  86  71  36 
Local supplier quality   56  69  103  104  89 
State of cluster development   ...  61  46  41  66 
Nature of competitive advantage   62  77  105  69  35 
Value-chain breadth  44  54  73  72  67 
Control of international distribution   31  28  49  66  94 
Production process sophistication   74  67  61  56  46 
Extent of marketing   90  89  95  85  79 
Willingness to delegate authority   89  84  38  31  57 
12th pillar: Innovation           
Capacity for innovation   84  78  85  96  109 
Quality of scientific research institutions  96  92  96  101  110 
Company spending on R&D   99  70  57  54  74 
University/industry collaboration in R&D   95  85  79  96  120 
Government procurement of advanced tech-
nological products  
 84  58  57  72  86 
Availability of scientists and engineers   40  29  47  53  25 
Utility patents*  72  84  70  86  84 
Note: The table does not display the 2011 results because they show the effects of the revolution. 
Source: WEF (2006); WEF (2007); WEF (2008); WEF (2009); WEF (2010) 
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